关于旅行社低价格竞争之原因的综述

对前人关于旅行社低价格竞争原因的研究文章进行分析、说明，并加以评述,最后提出思考的几点方向，以作为以后研究此类问题的思路。     

金庸小说《笑傲江湖》之《葵花宝典》探讨

《葵花宝典》是金庸武侠小说《笑傲江湖》中的一部武学秘籍。文章从《葵花宝典》的创立者之分析、明朝宦官及其弄权现象与《葵花宝典》之关系、《葵花宝典》的象征性三个方面分析论证了《葵花宝典》的创立者到皇宫中当了太监的原因,分析了历史上明朝宦官与宦官弄权现象对金庸创作《笑傲江湖》的启示意义以及《葵花宝典》象征着现实社会中的权力等问题。     

Stochastic chaos or ARCH effects in stock series?: A comparative study

Recent empirical studies have shown that the chaotic behaviour and excess volatility of financial series are the result of interactions between heterogeneous investors. In our article, we propose verifying this hypothesis. Thus, we use the Chen et al. [Testing for non-linear structure in an artificial financial market. Working Paper, University of Bonn (2000).] model to show that the modification of the agents' homogeneity hypothesis can drive to stochastic chaotic evolution of price series. Then, through an econometric procedure, we try to identify the underlying process of the Paris Stock Exchange returns series (CAC40). To this end, we apply several different tests: (1) dealing with long-memory components derives from the fractional integration test of Geweke and Porter-Hudak (GPH) [J. Time Ser. Anal. 4 (1983) 221.] and (2) dealing with chaotic structures comes from the work on correlation dimension of Grassberger and Procaccia [Physica 9D (1983) 189.] and the Lyapunov exponents method of Gençay and Dechert [Physica D (1992) 142.]. Finally, we forecast the CAC40 returns series using the recent methods of Principal Components Regression (PCR) and Radial Basis Functions (RBF). We conclude with the implications of the presence of chaotic structures in stock markets and future research on ARCH and chaotic models' relationships.     

论刘震云小说中的乡土文化

作为一个从农村中走出的作家,刘震云一直试图对乡土文化进行反思和批判。在他的小说中,对乡村文化中的关系、权利和历史进行了深刻而独特的思考,他所反思的是农民文化历史观中对人精神禁锢和毒害的部分,也就是乡土社会里几千年来封建传统的官本位文化和现实功利精神。     

Developing a dual-perspective low-carbon tourism evaluation index system for travel agencies

This paper presents a two-stage development model for low-carbon tourism (LCT). In study I, a qualitative questionnaire was developed using the Delphi and analytic hierarchy process methods, and this was then distributed to 19 experts, whose opinions were used to develop a complete index system for low-carbon tours. In study II, 393 tourists questionnaires administered in the Sun Moon Lake National Scenic Area were utilized to determine whether the index system would affect visitor purchase intentions. The findings showed that the LCT index system positively influenced tourists' purchase intentions, and their actual purchase behaviors toward low-carbon products. However, this study empirically found that there are significant differences with regard to what these two groups (experts and tourists) view as important in a low-carbon tour system. The contributions of this study include: (1) confirming the importance of the multiple perspectives obtained from the travel industry and tourists to establish the LCT system; (2) using the case study to investigate tourists' opinions to better understand whether the LCT index that was developed based on the industry perspective in stage one was appropriate; and (3) offering practical suggestions to help businesses better understand specific trends and plans for LCT.     

科技中介机构的发展障碍与策略

科技中介机构是推动科技与经济结合的桥梁与纽带,是国家科技创新体系的重要组成部分。该文通过对科技中介机构的构建及发展的探析,指出影响我国科技中介机构发展的主要障碍是法律地位不明确、体制不顺、机制不活、人才不足、服务不全,提出了完善管理机制和加强自身建设等促进     

The Agency Structure of Loan Syndicates

Leaders of loan syndicates often delegate some administrative tasks to banks known as co‐agents. One reason is that co‐agents are specialized banks that help split the costs of managing the syndicate. Another reason is that co‐agents monitor the leader on behalf of syndicate members to mitigate informational asymmetry problems. Large sample tests on the Dealscan database provide support for both arguments. Evidence of repeated contracting between the same banks explains the moderate magnitude of monitoring effects.     

General stopping behaviors of naïve and noncommitted sophisticated agents,with application to probability distortion

We consider the problem of stopping a diffusion process with a payoff functional that renders the problem time‐inconsistent. We study stopping decisions of naïve agents who reoptimize continuously in time, as well as equilibrium strategies of sophisticated agents who anticipate but lack control over their future selves' behaviors. When the state process is one dimensional and the payoff functional satisfies some regularity conditions, we prove that any equilibrium can be obtained as a fixed point of an operator. This operator represents strategic reasoning that takes the future selves' behaviors into account. We then apply the general results to the case when the agents distort probability and the diffusion process is a geometric Brownian motion. The problem is inherently time‐inconsistent as the level of distortion of a same event changes over time. We show how the strategic reasoning may turn a naïve agent into a sophisticated one. Moreover, we derive stopping strategies of the two types of agent for various parameter specifications of the problem, illustrating rich behaviors beyond the extreme ones such as “never‐stopping” or “never‐starting.”     

Heterogeneous Agents in Public Goods Experiments

We explore by purely experimental means a heterogeneous agents scenario in experimental public goods games, assuming the existence of at least three types of player: free riders, cooperators, and reciprocators. We identify the various types by means of four classification methods, and then play the public goods game with homogeneous groups. We observe that (eq1) the average contribution level is enhanced in this setting; (2) the decay phenomenon is replicated in groups of pure free riders, whereas in groups of cooperative and reciprocating players the contribution is high and fairly stable throughout the game.The experiments reported in this paper were financed by the Cognitive Science Laboratory and the Computational and Experimental Economics Laboratory of the University of Trento. We would like to thank Marco Tecilla, Macrina Marchesin and Dino Parisi for their help in running the experiments, and Luigi Mittone, director of CEEL, for letting us use the laboratorys resources. Paul Webley, Robert Moir, seminar participants at the Universities of Pisa and Trento, Charles Holt and two anonymous referees provided very useful comments on a previous draft.     

Collusion Proof Transfer Payment Schemes with Multiple Agents

Most of the current studies on transfer pricing under asymmetric information focus on a single principal and a single agent. Under a separating management and ownership assumption, transfer pricing is at minimum a three-person problem involving one principal and two agents. This paper considers a transfer pricing problem with two agents who possess private information and seek to maximize their net cash flows, instead of divisional accounting profits. The objectives of this paper are: (1) to derive a direct-revelation mechanism that induces truth telling and efficient allocation; (2) to study the agents' collusion behaviors under the direct-revelation mechanism. The findings indicate that when agents have the option to quit after contracting, it is optimal for the center to produce less than the first-best output level unless the costs for both divisions are at their lowest levels. The optimal amount of underproduction varies according to the demand condition. In addition, two sets of transfer functions, named as identical and nonidentical functions, are derived to induce truth-telling and yield optimal equilibrium output. The two sets of transfer functions are subject to collusion. However, the functions induce different collusion behaviors among agents, that is, the collusion sets for both functions are not common sets. This property enables us to eliminate any collusion between agents, particularly prior to their observation of private information.