The (Price) Core of a Bertrand–Edgeworth Economy

In this paper, a solution concept from cooperative game theory is applied to a special kind of oligopolistic markets. Traditionally, oligopoly theory uses non-cooperative game theory. The cooperative solution concept, the Price Core, has been specially developed for this paper. In contrast to the Core, in the Price Core, different consumers may pay different prices for the same commodity. An example shows that the set of competitive allocations may be a proper subset of the Core and that the Core may be a proper subset of the Price Core. Received July 24, 2001; revised version received February 25, 2002 Published online: December 5, 2002     

Revision of conjectures about the opponent’s utilities in signaling games

In this paper we apply the concept of preference conjecture equilibrium introduced in Perea (2005) to signaling games and show its relation to sequential equilibrium. We introduce the concept of minimum revision equilibrium and show how this can be interpreted as a refinement of sequential equilibrium     

On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Emission Permits

It is typical for economists andpolicy makers alike to presume that competitivemarkets allocate emission permits efficiently.This paper demonstrates that competition in theemission permits market cannot assureefficiency when the product market isoligopolistic. We provide the conditions underwhich a bureaucratic mechanism is welfaresuperior to a tradeable emission permitssystem. Price-taking behaviour in the permitsmarket ensures transfer of licenses to the lessefficient in abatement firms, which then becomemore aggressive in the product market,acquiring additional permits. As a result, theless efficient firms end up with a higher thanthe welfare maximizing share of emissionpermits. If the less efficient in abatementfirms are also less efficient in production,competitive trading of permits may result inlower output and welfare.     

网络型寡占市场结构与企业技术创新——兼论实现中国企业自主技术创新的市场结构条件

市场结构与技术创新关系问题的研究应转变研究思路，创新研究范式，立足于动态的现实企业竞争过程．将企业组织和企业网络纳入市场结构的范畴中来。基于这种新的研究范式，网络型寡占市场结构应成为实现中国企业自主技术创新的最有效的市场结构形式。为形成这种市场结构，必须进一步发展有竞争力的大企业；调整和优化企业组织。再造企业流程；加强企业协作，发展企业网络和进行合作创新。     

Tit for tat in small steps: the internationalization of Swedish banks

Earlier studies of the internationalization of manufacturing firms have shown that they tend to start their foreign operations in countries that are culturally close to their own and then gradually move to more alien ground. If banks follow their customers abroad, we would expect their internationalization to assume a similar pattern. Their penetration of foreign markets could also be expected to be related to direct foreign investments and exports. An empirical test in the case of major Swedish banks did not support this hypothesis. Instead these banks tended to concentrate their internationalization efforts to important financial centres. Thus they have not only chosen to establish themselves in places where many international banks are already working, but they have also tended to follow each other in a pattern of tit for tat. The nature of this process supports the idea suggested in earlier studies that internationalization is generally a gradual process, starting with minor commitments which are developed over time.     

Intertemporal price–quality discrimination and the Coase conjecture

We examine time-consistent intertemporal price–quality discrimination by a durable goods monopolist, when there are a continuum of buyer demand-intensities with respect to product quality, and it is profitable for the monopolist to trade with the marginal buyer-type (i.e., the “gap” case). We show that along every subgame perfect equilibrium path, with probability 1, prices and qualities decline over time, and the market is completely and monotonically depleted according to buyer-type in a finite number of offers. But, unlike the fixed quality literature, the monopolist may randomize over price–quality offers along the equilibrium path. We also show that the Coase conjecture continues to be valid here, but in a form that is significantly different from the usual formulation. In the limit, as the time between offers evaporates, the monopolist makes a continuum of offers and perfectly screens the market. However, he effectively cannot price-discriminate, because the equilibrium profits converge to the complete “pooling” profits that would be made if the entire market had the marginal buyer-type’s valuation.     

Intermediate Inputs and External Economies

Is the degree of external economies （at the industry level） higher than the degree of internal increasing returns （at the firm level）？ If so, what is the exact source of this difference？ In the general equilibrium model in which firms producing final goods choose the degree of specialization of their technologies, external economies arise from the usage of intermediate inputs and the existence of internal increasing returns. It is frequently assumed that increasing returns are absent at the firm level while present at the industry level. In this model, the existence of increasing returns at the form level is necessary for the existence of external economies at the industry level. We show that the degree of external economies increases with the level of linkage effects. However, a higher linkage effect does not always lead firms to choose more specialized technologies.     

网络型寡占市场结构与中国产业的国际竞争力

产业竞争力归根结蒂是一个产业组织问题，形成有效竞争的产业组织和市场结构是培育和增强我国产业国际竞争力的根本途径和决定性条件。在经济全球化和网络经济条件下，为迅速提升产业的国际竞争力，我国必须形成一种网络型寡占市场结构。     

从薛定谔猜想试论邓小平理论内核的科学性本质

建立在牛顿决定论基础上的均衡经济理论明显存在一些缺陷，量子力学的鼻祖薛定谔的三大猜想或许能给我们全新的启示，令人惊异的是邓小平理论的内核也与此暗合且都具有相当的科学性。今天，在我国政治经济社会领域面对复杂新形势的时候，我们经济类的学者肩负历史重任，更应该深度认识到研究中国经济理论应该具备怎样的科学方法论。     

网络寡头企业的生成机理与战略关键——基于演化博弈的模型分析

在分析网络寡头企业生成动因的基础上,构建了其生成的演化博弈模型,分析了其生成机理,并得出相应的模型推演结论。基于该推演结论,从业务互补性、资源整合力和网络中心性三个方面,论述了网络寡头企业的战略关键,并对中国企业的未来发展提出政策建议。