计及碳排放权交易的电力市场纵向合作减排策略研究

为减少温室气体的排放,一些发达国家和地区已经制定了相应的减排机制,其中最主要的就是实施CO2排放权交易。电力行业作为CO2减排的主力军,面临巨大减排任务的同时,又具备显著的减排空间。在此背景下,本文研究了CO2排放权交易机制下电网公司与寡头发电商间的纵向合作减排问题,基于现货市场结清结构框图思想提出了一个多方竞争下博弈对策模型,求解出最优合作策略并设计了合理的收益分配方案。最后,以一个包含4个发电商参与的电力市场为例进行了仿真计算,结果表明了该模型的可行性。     

跨国公司进入与中国寡头垄断市场结构的形成

我国目前的市场结构具有典型的分散竞争型特征,这种市场结构制约了规模经济的实现,不利于企业的技术创新,也不能适应经济全球化条件下激烈的国际竞争需要。因此,我国应充分利用跨国公司对我国的投资,改善我国的市场结构,提升我国产业的国际竞争力,参与全球范围的垄断性竞争。     

三维数字化技术在服装中的应用

本文以三维数字化技术为出发点,论述三维技术在服装生产中的应用现状以及发展趋势。在服装工业中,它加快了企业对市场反应速度;同时是开展服装电子商务的必要条件和重要依据,它将服装生产与高科技紧密结合起来,使服装生产和设计更具个性化和人性化,提高了服装的适体性,对服装工业的快速发展有极大的推动作用。     

Towards a welfare model of trade and multinational firms with oligopolistic competition

This paper constructs a general equilibrium model in a world with two-symmetric countries. It explains welfare gains from international trade and horizontal Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the economy with firm heterogeneity and variable markups stemming from oligopolistic competition. My model shows that the pro-competitive effects of trade and horizontal FDI happen because trade openness induces an increase in product market competition that reduces markups and toughens selection, increasing aggregate productivity. The most significant contribution of the paper is that multinational firms, via horizontal FDI, produce the most significant welfare gains through the toughest selection and lowest markups.     

Free entry equilibria with positive profits: A unified approach to quantity and price competition games

Free entry equilibria are usually characterized by the zero profit condition. We plead instead for a strict application of the Nash equilibrium concept to a symmetric simultaneous game played by actual and potential entrants, producing under decreasing average cost. Equilibrium is then typically indeterminate, with a number of active firms varying between an upper bound imposed by profitability and a lower bound required by sustainability. We use a canonical model with strategies represented by prices, although covering standard regimes of quantity and price competition, to show that in equilibrium the critical (profit maximizing) price must lie between the break-even and the limit prices.     

ON THE ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE BRÓDY CONJECTURE

The aim of the paper is to study the economic aspects of the Bródy conjecture: an increase in the size of a (random) input matrix causes a decline in the ratio of its subdominant and dominant eigenvalues and implies faster convergence to equilibrium [Bródy, A. (1997) The Second Eigenvalue of the Leontief Matrix. Economic Systems Research, 9, 253–258]. Simulation results provide evidence that this ratio depends inversely on the level of data aggregation and can therefore not be a good indicator of the speed of convergence of an economy to its equilibrium path. We show that this is consistent with findings based on actual input–output tables of EU member states. These results imply that theorems about the speed of convergence of random matrices are not useful in describing the cyclical dynamics of real economies.     

证伪主义-反思经济学的方法论

近代西方经济学派别林立,各种理论、学说、派别层出不穷,如何理解这些理论,建立对于经济金融现象的全面理性理解,变得越来越困难。之所以会这样,完全是由于人们对于经济学的哲学基础关注甚少。从现代经济学研究史看,哲学思维其实扮演着极为重要的作用,正确的方法论是经济学理论发展的重要标志。本文反思了以往传统经济学证实分析思考模式的局限性,分析探讨了证伪科学哲学对于经济学研究的意义和价值,重新审视了错误在确立理论科学地位属性中的独特价值和决定性作用,赋予人们一种与以往证实分析研究模式完全截然不同全新的视角,对于分析和理解金融现象颇具启发性。     

A Ricardian model of international trade with oligopolistic competition

This paper studies a Ricardian model of international trade with a continuum of products in a general equilibrium model in which firms engage in oligopolistic competition. It provides a bridge between trade models based on perfect competition and models based on imperfect competition. Compared with a model based on perfect competition, the incorporation of fixed cost leads to the result that an increase of domestic labor may increase the relative wage of the domestic country.     

Offshoring Quotas and Strategic Export Subsidies

We present an analysis of strategic export subsidization in the presence of exogenous limits on the extent of offshoring that is permissible for a domestic firm. Rather than offsetting a quota’s cost-raising effect, the government reduces its optimal strategic subsidy compounding the negative effects on the domestic firm’s market share. This double jeopardy of lower subsidies and greater offshoring restrictions must reduce domestic profits as well as domestic welfare. Finally, we show that there is no guarantee that such an offshoring quota will raise domestic employment in the oligopolistic sector, calling into question the efficacy of such a barrier.