大股东-管理者合谋与监督效率——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

本文利用中国上市公司2003～2005年的面板数据对这一问题进行了检验。实证研究发现:上市公司管理者的机会主义行为与大股东的资金侵占行为显著相关,大股东对上市公司的资金侵占程度越高,上市公司管理者的机会主义行为越严重。这表明大股东与管理者的合谋行为会弱化大股东对公司管理者的监督效率。     

Cartel success and institutions. The Finnish Cotton Cartel, 1903–1939

This article uses institutional theory to interpret collusive behaviour in the pre-World War II cotton cartel in Finland. The findings do not support the optimistic view of the institutionalists about the efficiency of economic institutions in boosting cooperation. Only one (the conciliation mechanism) of the four institutions identified in the cotton cartel could check opportunism to a certain degree, although it too lacked effective enforcement characteristics. This article argues that, in cartels, the motivation to follow institutions is fundamentally different from other environments, particularly trade. Besides institutions, organisational solutions, such as a sales agency that removes individual firms' discretion over pricing decisions, are needed to enhance cartel stability.     

Institutional investors’ information seeking and stock price crash risk: nonlinear relationship based on management’s opportunistic behaviour

This paper examines the influence of management’s opportunistic behaviour on the relationship between institutional investors’ visits and stock price crash risk. We find that the relationship between visit frequency and stock price crash risk is inverted U-shaped because of management’s opportunistic behaviour aiming at avoiding the negative impacts of visit. Institutional investors’ visits raise stock price crash risk when visit frequency is low and it can reduce crash risk just when visit frequency is high enough. This nonlinear relationship is more significant when management’s opportunistic behaviour is highly motivated and the implementation space is larger.     

The tourist art market as a factor in social change

Richter, Dolores. “The Tourist Art Market as a Factor in Social Change,” Annals of Tourism Research, Vol. V, No. 3, July/September 1978, pp.323–338. This paper disputes the theory that participation in the tourist art market has had limited economic impact on African artists. An analysis of social changes that have occured in the social organization of a group of traditional woodcarvers indicates that tourist art market participation is directly responsible for significant changes in many social institutions. It has also provided the economic means by which the carvers have been able to respond positively to government policies and regulations aimed at modernization.     

我国上市公司股权激励中的机会主义问题研究

股权激励的制度安排是为了解决委托代理关系产生的利益矛盾,将管理层与股东利益一致起来。同时,股权激励也可能导致管理层的机会主义行为,即通过盈余管理、股利政策、投融资决策等影响业绩和股价,使之向对自己有利的方向发展。强化内外监督和约束、防范股权激励的负面影响,是推进股权激励制度建设中不可或缺的重要环节,具体包括:一是优化公司治理结构;二是提升我国证券市场的有效性;三是培育经理人市场。股权激励这种上市公司内部的制度安排需要外部的一系列制度安排来配套才能有效地发挥作用。外部配套的制度安排会通过影响管理层的预期来影响管理层的行为选择,从而较好地降低和防止管理层的机会主义行为。     

长期导向对企业使用合同抑制渠道投机的影响

文章以关系营销与营销渠道行为理论为基础,制造商与其经销商之间的关系为研究对象,检验了制造商的长期导向对其合同制订以及经销商投机行为的直接及交互影响。研究结果表明：企业的长期导向不但可以直接促进完备合同的制订,还会间接影响合同制订与投机行为之间的关系。其中,详细的交易条款对投机行为虽然无直接影响,但是会在与长期导向的交互影响下对投机行为产生作用。当企业的长期导向低的时候,详细的交易条款会抑制合作伙伴的投机行为;当企业的长期导向高的时候,详细的交易条款却会加重对方的投机行为。周全的意外处理条款则会对渠道投机行为产生直接的抑制作用,并且这种抑制作用会随着长期导向的增强而加强。     

集群企业合作隐性契约的博弈分析

以弹性化和专业化为主要特点的集群内企业的合作是集群得以健康发展的关键。要保证企业间高效的合作就必须有强有力的制度保障。在新制度经济学的视角下．当企业选择签订长期契约代替一体化经营时，可以采用显性契约和隐性契约两种方案。由于契约的非完备性和未来的不确定性，提高了显性契约的实施成本。因此．基于集群企业间合作的隐性契约在规范集群企业行为方面提供了强有力的保证。本文运用完全信息和不完全信息下的动态博弈理论对防止集群企业机会主义行为的隐性契约进行了博弈分析．阐释了隐性契约运行的内在机理，并在此基础上对如何规范集群内企业的合作行为提出了具有实践指导和可操作性的政策建议。     

Compensation transparency and managerial opportunism: a study of supplemental retirement plans

Existing research on managerial compensation is based primarily on optimal contracting and managerial hegemony theories. Under the optimal contracting theory, observed compensation contracts are optimally determined, aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. Under the managerial hegemony theory, observed compensation contracts deviate from the optimum because top managers with power over boards are able to influence their own pay. I argue that the impact of managerial power over boards on managerial pay, and hence the deviation of compensation contracts from the optimum, is contingent on the transparency of managerial compensation. Within this framework, I investigate the impact of supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs)— historically the least transparent compensation component— on opportunistic decision making. An empirical analysis based on a time series sample of CEOs of S&P/TSX60 firms provides support of the compensation transparency theory. I find that SERP benefits are primarily driven by variables proxying for CEO power over the board, whereas more transparent compensation components are primarily driven by economic factors. The results also suggest that CEOs whose SERPs are contingent on firm performance appear to reduce firm R&D expenditures as they approach retirement. Both findings provide important contributions to existing research on the impact of managerial compensation on opportunistic decisions. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

旅游地历史文化机会主义研究

随着各地对历史文化旅游开发的加快,一种捏造、编排、夸大历史文化的旅游地历史文化机会主义悄然流行起来。这种机会主义,一方面可以从历史文化的鉴定及其与旅游文化的关系中找到其产生的客观原因和解决之路,另一方面可以从政府、媒体、旅游企业、专业研究人员和旅游者等旅游活动主体身上找到滋生机会主义的主观原因和消解之道。