Economic Competition,Policy Interdependence,and Labour Rights

Extant scholarship treats national policies concerning labour rights as a function of economic factors and yet neglects influences of policies among economically competing states. Relying on the policy interdependence theory, this study argues that labour rights policy in a state is dependent on its economic competitors’ labour policy decisions. It specifically maintains that the intensifying competition for foreign direct investment and exports as well as against imports channels negative externalities of deteriorating labour protection in competing states which drives expansive downward policy mimicking and leads to a global decline in labour rights – a race to the bottom. Utilising spatial econometric technique to analyse a new data on labour rights for the period 1994–2009, it finds that labour rights practices are interdependent among economic competitors and experience global deteriorations; whereas labour rights laws remain largely independent due to high policy and reputational costs of lowering them and show more fluctuations.     

Monitoring the foreign exchange rate benchmark fix

ABSTRACT

We develop a Manipulation Index (ManIx) that captures the potential manipulation intention of dealers during the World Markets/Reuters (WMR) benchmark (London Close) period at 4 pm London time through a unique algorithm and simulation. The application of this model (using a dataset with dealers’ identities) can identify banks that are prone to potential manipulative behavior. The results concerning the identified banks are validated by the regulatory investigations. Implementation of this algorithm allows regulators better direct their limited resources towards more targeted in-depth investigation.     

Impact of state-dependent oil price on US stock returns using local projections

In this paper, we investigate the impact of oil prices on both aggregate and industry US real stock returns over the period 1973–2017. The empirical analysis contributes to the related literature introducing a state-dependent oil price (high and low) and the local projections approach. Our main finding is that, depending on the nature of the shock and industry, the negative effects of oil price shocks become exacerbated -and the positive effects get moderated- if oil prices are already high.     

Why will Trump lose the trade war?

ABSTRACT

The escalating U.S.–China trade conflicts have increasingly shadowed the outlook of the world economy. The Trump administration aims to achieve its strategic goals including reducing current account deficits, promoting the U.S. manufacturing sector, and curbing Chinese high-tech industries by waging the trade war against China. This paper argues that the current account deficits and the declining manufacturing sector in the U.S. are mainly driven by its internal structural factors, such as low saving rates, high labor costs, and rising service sector, rather than by the import competition from China. Moreover, the trade war further deteriorates the U.S. current account deficits and erode its comparative advantage, and it forces China to invest more in technological innovation and human capital, and thus promote its progress in high-tech industries. Thus, the U.S. will not be able to achieve its strategical goals and eventually lose the trade war.     

严监管背景下农信社合规风险管理体系建设

2018年,银行业监管环境进一步趋严,不但强调对银行的监管,更提出了对监管人员职责的监管,这种严格的外部监管环境对农信社的合规风险管理带来了极大的挑战。农信社合规风险管理体系的建设和完善已势不容缓。论文提出了农信社合规风险管理体系建设要从战略定位、文化渗透、防线搭建、专业专职化、考核和追究六个维度入手,推进合规风险管理长效机制的建设。     

Competing for Good Immigrants

I analyze the competition among different countries for ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ potential immigrants, using both an immigration quota and a level of (imperfect) ‘scrutiny’ that would‐be immigrants face. Scrutiny imposes costs on immigrants and therefore makes it less attractive to immigrate. The number of applying undesirable immigrants increases in immigration quota and decreases in the level of scrutiny. In contrast, the number of desirable applicants can go in either direction as scrutiny increases and is independent of the immigration quota, because an increase in the immigration quota is completely crowded out by more applications by undesirable immigrants.     

In Data We Trust? An Analysis of Indonesian Socioeconomic Survey Data

What if a popular dataset that has generated a large amount of literature has been misunderstood and has led to misleading inferences? This paper examines household expenditure data from the Indonesian National Socio-economic Survey (Susenas), which started more than 50 years ago. Appropriate use of Susenas data for policy analysis requires an understanding that the survey’s expenditure variable does not measure true out-of-pocket expenses, because it includes subsidies received by households when obtaining goods and services. We also highlight an abrupt change in the survey instrument that occurred in 2015, when the reference period for certain items was extended. For health items, this generated a change in the expenditure series that can be misinterpreted as being the result of a social health insurance reform introduced in 2014 to lower the health care burden on households. Accordingly, we propose a way to account for this artificial expenditure movement in Susenas.     

LEADERSHIP IN CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION: CONSEQUENCES AND INCENTIVES

Initiatives in favor of unilateral action on climate change are frequently challenged by concerns over free riding. Nevertheless, we observe an increasing number of unilateral efforts at different administrative levels and in different parts of the world. Previous academic literature described various individual mechanisms where emissions abroad may increase or decrease as a reaction to unilateral emission reductions. In this paper, we collect a comprehensive set of both positive and negative reactions and analyze them in stylized models. This allows us to identify the most important characteristics that determine the potential of a leader to boost mitigation efforts abroad. We find that this potential depends on (i) a strong ability to generate knowledge through leadership, (ii) a high degree of credibility in the international community, and (iii) a similar economic structure to the most important emitters. While most effects are difficult to quantify, this comprehensive assessment suggests that leakage effects resulting from unilateral mitigation may well be outweighed by positive reactions.     

Are China’s regional agricultural productivities converging: How and why?

This article tests the hypotheses of convergence to a single level of total factor productivity (TFP), and a steady state of TFP growth rate in China’s agricultural sector. Based on multilateral TFP estimates we found that China’s agricultural sector has rebounded in recent years from a slower TFP growth in the 2005–2007 period. While convergence test results confirm a “catch-up” effect that provinces with lower TFP levels tend to grow faster than others, estimated rates of β convergence are conditional on how we capture the heterogeneity effect across regions. The rates of β convergence range from 0.016 to 0.039 under different model specifications. Estimates show that higher growth rates of educational attainment, R&D, and intermediate goods density (per unit of labor) can enhance TFP growth. Unfortunately, there is no evidence of an overall σ convergence, indicating that TFP levels are not converging except in the South region. It implies that to catch up with leading provinces, it would require extra efforts for those lagging behind by increasing their region-specific research investment, promoting rural educational attainment, and enhancing embodied technical change.     

Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection: Implications for Discount Window Stigma

I study the implications for central bank discount window stigma of a workhorse model of adverse selection in financial markets. In the model, firms (banks) need to borrow to finance a productive project. There is limited liability and firms have private information about their ability to repay their debts, which gives rise to the possibility of adverse selection. The central bank can ameliorate the impact of adverse selection by lending to firms. Discount window borrowing is observable and it may be taken as a signal of firms' credit worthiness. Under some conditions, firms borrowing from the discount window may pay higher interest rates to borrow in the market, a phenomenon often associated with the presence of stigma. I discuss these and other outcomes in detail and what they suggest about the relevance of stigma as an empirical phenomenon.