Effect of credible quality investment with Bertrand and Cournot competition

We show how credible revelation and ability to commit to quality choice effect equilibrium qualities and welfare when product market is either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We show that results depend on the type of competition but not generally on the cost of quality function. We show that with Bertrand competition, the equilibrium qualities are lower with credible commitment. Competition is moderated and producer surplus is higher and consumer surplus lower. With Cournot competition, higher quality will be better but lower quality will be worse with credible commitment. Consumer surplus is always greater with credible commitment and if cost does not increase too quickly with quality, producer surplus will also increase. Thus credible commitment is a collusive device with Bertrand competition but it can improve social welfare with Cournot competition. Received: February 8, 2000; revised version: February 14, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The idea of this paper originated in the weekly workshops of Mordecai Kurz at Stanford. I am forever in debted to Mordecai and fellow students – Luis Cabral, Peter DeMarzo, John Hillas, Michihiro Kandori, Steve Langois, Patrick McAllister, Steve Sharpe, Peter Streufert, Steve Turnbull and Gyu-Ho Wang – for their criticism and encouragement. I also benefited from comments from Yi-Heng Chen, Jin-Li Hu, Kala Krishna, Jinji Naoto, Thomas J. Prusa, and Shyh-Fang Ueng at various later stages of this work. Last but not least, I am grateful for the detailed comments of the referee.     

Cost Structures and Nash Play in Repeated Cournot Games

This paper reports an experiment designed to assess the effects of a rotation in the marginal cost curve on convergence in a repeated Cournot triopoly. Increasing the cost curve's slope both reduces the serially-undominated set to the Nash prediction, and increases the peakedness of earnings. We observe higher rates of Nash equilibrium play in the design with the steeper marginal cost schedule, but only when participants are also rematched after each decision. Examination of response patterns suggests that the treatment with a steeper marginal cost curve and with a re-matching of participants across periods induces the selection of Nash Consistent responses.     

Unemployment insurance: The role of electoral systems and regional labour markets

Levels of insurance against unemployment vary considerably across countries. Replacement rates, the ratio relating income from unemployment to what people earned when they were employed, are higher in countries with proportional electoral systems than in countries with majoritarian systems. Also, replacement rates are positively correlated with per capita income and negatively correlated with the countries' unemployment rates. I develop an electoral competition model that replicates these stylized facts.     

Taxation of Mobile Factors as Insurance under Uncertainty

This paper considers the effects of the taxation of mobile factors, i.e., capital, under uncertainty. The wages earned by residents of a jurisdiction are uncertain due to random shocks. Since the uncertain wages in a jurisdiction depend on the amount of mobile capital employed in the jurisdiction, and since taxation alters the quantity of capital employed, taxation affects the riskiness of uncertain wages. In particular, the taxation of capital moderates the fluctuation of uncertain wages, thereby providing insurance. For this reason, jurisdictions use distortionary capital taxation even if lump‐sum taxation is available. In addition, this insurance effect counteracts the tendency toward too low tax rates on capital arising from tax competition, and possibly improves the efficiency of tax competition.     

论马克思主义政治经济学理论创新——兼论政治经济学学科的发展方向

本文拟在三个既定前提条件下论证三个命题.三个既定前提条件是:1.中国新民主主义革命胜利、新中国和社会主义制度的建立,是马克思主义与中国实际结合的产物;2.1978年开始的改革开放和现代化建设,是在中国化的马克思主义指导下进行的;3.今后中国的改革发展还要以马克思主义为指导.要论证的三个命题是:1.马克思主义政治经济学必须创新;2.马克思主义政治经济学能够创新;3.马克思主义政治经济学创新的基本方向是:坚持实践第一,坚持把马克思主义基本原理与中国实际相结合,坚持吸收人类创造的一切文明成果.     

银行竞争、专用性人力资本投资激励与国有商业银行的公司治理

本文结合中国银行业竞争日趋激烈的现实背景,从商业银行专用性人力资本投资激励的独特视角入手,分别讨论了银行高层管理者和普通员工的专用性人力资本投资激励与他们参与银行公司治理机制的有关问题.研究发现,在国有商业银行公司治理结构改善过程中,更需要增加专用性人力资本投资的有效激励,并通过积极引入境外战略投资者和加强职工代表在银行监事会中影响力的办法,进一步激励银行员工进行能够提高银行经营绩效的专用性人力资本投资.     

Growth,Employment and Taxation with Distortions in the Goods and Labour Market

Abstract. This paper analyses taxation in the presence of distortions in goods and labour markets in an endogenous growth model. The government disposes of capital, labour and consumption taxes. It is shown that the market solution leads to suboptimally low levels of growth and employment. However, available tax instruments are sufficient to attain the first‐best growth path in this economy. The paper further explores the relative distortion of capital and labour taxes. For plausible parametrisations of the model, lowering capital taxes dominate reductions in labour taxes in welfare terms.     

云南旅游品牌发展与对策分析

随着国际国内旅游市场竞争的日益激烈,我们应该意识到,旅游市场之争实质上是品牌之争。云南旅游业应该在充分认识自身旅游品牌发展存在的问题基础上,找出问题,寻求改进的措施,从简单的资源要素竞争转化为品牌经营竞争战略,不断地进行品牌建设和品牌创新,实现从旅游品牌到旅游名牌的飞跃。     

Full-cost pricing in the classical competitive process: A model of convergence to long-run equilibrium

In the last 10–15 years a lot of attempts has been devoted to study the calssical process of convergence of market prices toward natural prices. The two forces that one has thought could achieve this target were capital mobility, that determines the dynamics of output, and demand-supply forces, that determine the dynamics of prices. In this article a model of classical competition is proposed in which a full-cost pricing mechanism is adopted in the rule of evolution of market prices. An asymptotical stability result of long-run equilibrium is proved for a two-commodity model with and without a final demand.     

企业网络组织协同竞争的理论与效应解析

竞争与合作相统一的协同竞争已成为企业网络竞争战略发展的必然趋势。通过对企业网络组织协同竞争研究脉络的梳理，可构建协同竞争研究的评析架构。其理论演进是：以系统思维作为理论逻辑的基点，以合作竞争为行动策略，以价值创造作为网络协同竞争的本质属性；在实践效应上，协同竞争具有提升竞争优势的特征，而博弈模型对协同效应发挥着解析工具的作用。