How many voters are needed for paradoxes?

Summary. This paper presents a general procedure for finding profiles with the minimum number of voters required for many important paradoxes. Borda's and Condorcet's classic examples are revisited as well as generalizations. Using Saari's procedure line, we obtain an upper bound for the minimum number of voters needed for a profile for which the Condorcet winner is not strictly top ranked for all weighted positional procedures. Also we give a simple upper bound on the minimum number of voters needed for a set of prescribed voting outcomes. In contrast to situations wherein small numbers of voters are needed, we consider paradoxes requiring arbitrarily large numbers of voters as well as large numbers of alternatives. Finally we indicate connections with statistical rank based tests. Received: April 18, 2001; revised version: May 25, 2001     

On the evolutionary edge of altruism: a game-theoretic proof of Hamilton’s rule for a simple case of siblings

We offer a game-theoretic proof of Hamiltons rule for the spread of altruism. For a simple case of siblings, we show that the rule can be derived as the outcome of a one-shot prisoners dilemma game between siblings.JEL Classification: A13, C70, D64Correspondence to: Oded Stark, ZEF, University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Strasse 3, 53113 Bonn, GermanyWe are indebted to an anonymous referee and to Uwe Cantner for helpful comments and suggestions. Partial financial support from the National Institute on Aging (grant RO1-AG13037) and from the Humboldt Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

产业集群内企业之间合作创新的理论分析

集群有利于降低合作创新的交易成本、获得合作伙伴的隐性知识.企业选择合作创新,其动机主要是解决技术的外部性、分担研究开发成本和风险、获得合作伙伴的缄默性知识、实现技术转移以及获得巨大的国内和国际市场等.对合作创新的博弈分析表明,企业要形成合作创新的联盟,该联盟必须满足超可加性;否则,其成员没有动机形成联盟,已经形成的联盟也将面临解散的威胁.合理的利益分配方案是合作创新的基础.该方案是合作各方讨价还价的结果.     

Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications

Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. We investigate a class of cooperative games that generalizes some economic applications with a similar structure. These are the so-called line-graph games being cooperative TU-games in which the players are linearly ordered. Examples of situations that can be modeled like this are sequencing situations and water distribution problems. We define four properties with respect to deleting edges that each selects a unique component efficient solution on the class of line-graph games. We interpret these solutions and properties in terms of dividend distributions, and apply them to economic situations. This research has been done while the third author was visiting Tinbergen Institute at the Free University, Amsterdam. The research is part of the Research Programme “Strategic and Cooperative Decision Making” at the Department of Econometrics. Financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) in the framework of the Russian-Dutch programme for scientific cooperation, is gratefully acknowledged. The third author also appreciates partial financial support from the Russian Leading Scientific Schools Fund (grant 80.2003.6) and Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund (grant 02-02-00189a). We thank three anonymous referees for their valuable comments.     

On transaction efficiency and China’s Urban-Rural disparity

It is recommended for economists to examine China’s Urban-Rural disparity from the perspective of transaction efficiency, in that it can provide us with a systematic explanation to both the cases of different countries and development stages. China’s Urban-Rural disparity is special and virtually a demonstration of its special transaction efficiency structure. Exploration of China’s Urban-Rural disparity from such perspective indicates that, different from those in countries with a market economy, China’s case involves many exogenous and contrived factors. Therefore, the solutions are to improve the whole transaction efficiency in the economy, which includes eliminating its regionally unfavorable policies and institutions, and enforcing more favorable and regionally balanced institutional reforms. __________ Translated from Fudan Journal (复旦学报, Social Science Edition), 2006, (1) (in Chinese)     

控制权性质影响税收敏感性吗?——基于企业劳动力需求的检验

西方学者研究表明企业所得税是劳动力需求的重要影响因素,这一理论在中国是否适用?中国大部分上市公司为国有控股企业,这一特殊的制度背景是否会影响企业所得税与劳动力需求的关系?本文基于2007年企业所得税改革这一外生政策变化,在检验西方企业所得税与劳动力需求关系的理论在中国是否适用的基础上,就不同控制权的性质是否会影响企业劳动力需求的税收敏感性进行了检验。研究发现企业所得税税率降低和"就业税盾"增加提高了企业劳动力需求,但这种税率和"就业税盾"的变化对国有控股企业劳动力需求变化的影响要显著小于非国有控股企业。这表明税收是影响企业劳动力需求的重要因素,但国有控制权使得这种税收敏感性变弱。本文的研究结果不仅丰富了相关领域的国际学术文献,而且对我国就业政策的制定具有政策含义。     

A Suggested Interpretation of Some Experimental Results on Preplay Communication

M. Rabin (1994, J. Econ. Theory63, 370-391) proposes a model of behavior in two-person complete-information games with preplay communication, using non-equilibrium notions in the spirit of rationalizability to derive lower bounds on players' expected payoffs when players have unlimited communication opportunities. This paper adapts Rabin's model so that it can be used to analyze the results of the experiments of R. Cooper et al. (1989, Rand J. Econ.20, 568-587) on structured preplay communication in the Battle of the Sexes and the results of the unstructured bargaining experiments of Roth, Malouf, and Murnighan. Adding empirically motivated restrictions that allow the model to predict the payoff effects of changes in bounded communication possibilities like those in the experiments, it is shown that the data from both experiments are generally consistent with Rabin's model, and with the predictions of the extended model. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, C78, C91.     

食品供应链安全问题的信号博弈模型

基于食品供应链上安全信息不对称的特点以及零售企业运营状况,针对滥用食品安全标签(如无公害、绿色、有机食品标签等)的现象,以食品生产商和消费者作为博弈方,建立信号博弈模型,分析信号博弈的三种贝叶斯均衡及其条件,得出了信息不对称情况下安全食品生产商的损失函数,以及政府控制食品安全的策略。     

论企业文化在塑造核心竞争力诸因素中的核心地位

本文借鉴7S模型分析了塑造企业核心竞争力的影响因素和途径,运用文献和案例论证了企业文化在塑造核心竞争力的各因素中居于核心地位,指出了塑造核心竞争力的途径是运用先进的企业文化培育和谐的7S体系。     

具缺货期不同决策支配权的两级供应链合作机制研究

从考虑市场需求固定且卖方和买方对缺货期的不同决策支配权情况,研究了两级供应链的合作机制,建立了其不完全信息的动态博弈模型,并得出其精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡,从理论上证明了卖方和买方分别占支配地位和从属地位时买方卖方应相互合作。