Squatting as a transition problem in South Africa

This paper applies principles of transition to land tenure and squatting in South Africa. Political transition in South Africa reassigned political property rights, which produced contestable, and rent‐seeking incentives for squatting as a means to privatize land and redistribute wealth. Government failure to establish and protect private property rights in a squatter camp resulted in common‐pool problems that resisted private and public resolution with consequent rent dissipation and social loss. In response to this retreat from duty, informal agents emerged to claim their own share of the prize. Without enforceable rules of capture, the growth of squatter camps in South Africa will continue. JEL classification: D7, H8, K1, K4, R1, R4.     

A duration analysis of privatization in the telecom sector

The paper attempts to identify the telecom-sector performance indicators, relevant economic variables, and institutional characteristics of a country that effect the process of privatization of state-owned telecom enterprises. Using standard duration analysis of a panel data, we demonstrate that the privatization incentives are not only shaped by the mobility of financial capital in a country but are also influenced by the degree of competitiveness of private sector participation in policy-making process. The empirical results also reveal the significant impact of productive efficiency in telecom service provision on its course to privatization. We thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. We are solely responsible for all mistakes.     

The Effects of Public Ownership and Regulatory Independence on Regulatory Outcomes

We examine the effects of public ownership and regulatory agency independence on regulatory outcomes in EU telecommunications. Specifically, we study regulated interconnect rates paid by entrants to incumbents. We find that public ownership of the incumbent positively affects these interconnect rates, and suggest that governments influence regulatory outcomes in favor of incumbents in which they are substantially invested. However, we also find that the presence of institutional features enhancing regulatory independence from the government mitigates this effect. In order to study regulatory independence, we introduce a new cross-country time-series database—the European Union Regulatory Institutions (EURI) Database. This database describes the development of institutions bearing on regulatory independence and quality in telecommunications in the 15 founding EU member states from 1997 to 2003 *We thank Laurent Pipitone for superb research assistance. Geoff Edwards thanks the Sasakawa Foundation and the Institute of Management, Innovation and Organization at the Haas School of Business for generous financial assistance, and London Business School for non-financial support. Leonard Waverman thanks the Global Communications Consortium for support     

Lessons from the transition process

The illusions that market mechanism would transform former communist countries easily into welfare states were gradually replaced by disappointments. Major problems are common to all countries in transition; they all endured an unprecedented fall in measured output and rise of unemployment. Four countries: former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia constitute a group in which the fall was the lowest and which also have reached the bottom. While the mechanisms of depression in these countries differ basic links of the vicious circle seem to be similar. The transition is reflected in constitutional provisions on property rights; new constitutions depart radically from their socialist predecessors, return to the principles of French revolution, and provide more than adequate protection of private property. Equally important are legal frameworks for market activities, and privatization aimed to improve efficiency, enable fairness, and serve in the abolition of the monoparty system.     

公用事业民营化进程中的政府规制重构

民营化逐渐成为西方国家公用事业改革以及政府治理模式变革的基本潮流，并对后发展中国家的行政改革产生了巨大的示范作用。转型中国的公用事业民营化在约束条件、目的、绩效评估等方面与发达国家有所区别；对政府合理边界的确定是民营化改革成功的关键，要以破除行政性垄断为突破口、依法规制为核心、适当放松规制为原则、建立相对独立的规制机构为保障重构政府规制体系，促进公用事业的发展。     

国有企业民营化的约束机制研究

民营化作为国有企业产权改制的主要方式不能动摇,但必须重点研究国企民营化的约束机制。其中,产权理论难有实质性突破构成国企民营化的理论约束;部门间就业专移阻滞、分级所有的国资管理体制、利益集团行为刚性、财政资源紧张与补偿制度缺失形成国企民营化的实践约束。摆脱这些约束,国企民营化才能顺利地进行下去。     

民营化进程、企业目标函数选择与转轨效率

文章把转轨过程看作是政府可控的变量,从我国转轨中民营企业独特的目标函数出发,分析经济转轨过程中国有企业的成本函数选择对民营企业经营目标和经营行为的影响,以及在改革进程可控条件下,不同程度的改革进程是如何决定民营企业对目标函数和企业行为选择的,并对该选择与改革对社会福利水平的影响作了进一步分析。研究发现,政府与民营企业具有追求收入最大化内在合作的要求,该要求是竞争中双方博弈的均衡解;在非利润最大化目标函数的框架下,选择渐进转轨不会导致社会总产出的急剧下降,从而避免经济转型发生社会震荡。并且民营企业在改革进程中的目标函数选择与企业行为与实施的改革战略(改善社会福利)具有内在的一致性,因此,民营企业在改革不同阶段的选择行为对改革进程起到了一定的促进作用。     

唐宋至清末土地流转制度的正负效应分析

唐宋以后,我国封建社会相对完全自由的土地私有制度开始确立.国家在制度层面上不断明晰产权,使土地的所有权、使用权等进入市场,土地流转速率加快.土地流转制度一方面可以增进社会福利、优化资源配置、调节宏观经济,并能起到融通资金的作用;另一方面由于我国诸子均分的财产继承制度和其他历史因素的影响,土地流转制度使土地趋于零散化、分配平均化,形成了我国农业小规模经营和过密化生产方式,导致社会经济发展缓慢.     

The impact of privatization on efficiency and profitability

Over the past three decades, China has undergone tremendous economic and social change as a consequence of the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. This paper examines a key feature of this transition – the privatization of the state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) – through both a theoretical model and empirical analysis. Using newly collected primary data from a variety of sources, we study how privatization of listed SOEs affects employment, wages, profits and other aspects of economic performance at the firm level. Our major finding is that privatization results in substantial downsizing of employment, increased labour productivity and rising profitability.