Declining Labor Share： Is China＇s Case Different？

This paper explores why labor share in China has declined since the middle of the 1990s. Existing literature usually ascribes the labor share decline in developed countries to biased technological progress. However, our investigation shows that China ＂s case is different. Using a simultaneous equation model estimated with three-stage least squares, we find that FD1, levels of economic development and privatization have negative effects on the labor share. The negative influence of FDl on labor share results from regional competition for FD1, which weakens labor forces＂ bargaining power. A U-shaped relationship exists between labor share and the level of economic development, and China is now on the declining part of the curve. The negative effects of privatization on the labor share stem from the elimination of the so-called ＂wage costs eroding profit ＂ situation and the positive supply shock on the labor market.     

Reforming the local public sector: economics and politics in privatization of water and solid waste

Several empirical studies have analyzed the factors that influence local privatization. We examine the influence of transaction costs and political factors on local governments’ choices through new variables. We consider two relevant services accounting for different amounts of transaction costs: water and solid waste delivery. Our results show that privatization is less common for water, which has higher transaction costs. Furthermore, we find that municipalities with a conservative ruling party privatize more often regardless of the ideological orientation of the constituency. Finally, we find that intermunicipal cooperation may be a suitable organizational form for some municipalities.     

Effect of political connections on corporate financial constraints: new evidence from privatization in China

Taking advantage of the SOEs privatization events in China, our research looks to identify the causal effect of political connections on corporate financial constraints. In a difference-in-differences framework, we demonstrate that after the transfer of control from state to private owners, privatized SOEs hoard more cash, save more cash from incremental cash flow, and exhibit higher cash flow sensitivity of investment.     

试论日本的国有企业改革

加快国有企业改革是发展生产力、构建和谐社会以及实施可持续发展的重要举措。应借鉴日本国有企业改革实践中的引入市场机制、面向广大社会公众出售国有股份、分担债务的清偿责任等经验,我国国有企业改革要发挥所有权的激励作用;改革方式不拘一格;改革中应兼顾效率与公平等。     

Voucher privatization: implications for macroeconomic policy1

This paper analyses the impact of voucher privatization schemes on the behaviour of households and the consequences for macroeconomic policy. The stylized facts of the voucher privatization scheme are described for the Czech case. The consumption as well as portfolio decision of households during the voucher scheme are modelled within the framework of a consumption function and a system of demand functions for financial assets. The envelope theorem is used to modify the standard Almost Ideal Demand (AID) system. The empirical results are presented. The paper concludes that the interdependence between privatization and macroeconomic stability should be better understood by policy-makers in transitional countries that are going to adopt a similar approach to privatization to that applied in the Czech Republic.     

Corporate Performance of Mixed Enterprises

We delineate Hong Kong listed corporations into three levels of privatization: the fully privatized blue chips, semi‐privatized red chips and the least privatized H shares. Both H shares and red chips are mixed enterprises that mimic private ownership with joint government and private stock ownership. We find that mixed enterprises are less profitable and lower valued than the fully privatized blue chips, but red chips are more efficient and perform better than blue chips when market confidence swings to their favor. Regression analysis suggests that increased stock ownership by the government and increased emolument incentives are counterproductive to profitability, especially in bad economic times of the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis.     

不能让新自由主义误导国有企业改革

在国有企业的改革中,一些经济学家根据新自由主义思想,反对公有制,鼓吹私有化。新自由主义经济学是把"人的本性是自私的"作为既定的、无需论证的前提,由此来解释一切经济现象。这是历史唯心主义的命题,由此得出私有化的必要性的结论是站不住脚的。在对待国有企业改革的问题上,应该用马克思主义来理解中央的有关方针政策,不允许新自由主义者把这些方针政策朝私有化方向解释。     

On bank privatization: The case of Egypt

This paper discusses the controversy regarding the privatization of the banking sector in Egypt. It provides an overview of the structure and evolution of the banking system, in the context of the series of reform measures undertaken by the Egyptian authorities over the past decades. The paper assesses the performance of the state-owned banks versus private banks over the period 1995–2005. Microprudential indicators, such as capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings, and profitability, reveal that state-owned banks lag behind in terms of efficiency and performance, compared to their private counterparts. Results also suggest that retaining government ownership can adversely affect banks performance. The paper explores the factors hindering the smooth implementation of bank privatization. The authors indicate that the financial sector reform currently adopted is comprehensive; however it is confronted with various political, social, and economic risks, which raise concerns regarding its sustainability. The paper then draws on the existing literature to provide guidance to policy makers, regarding effective and successful implementation of bank privatization.     

论私有化主体的基本权利

全体人民是民有资源、民有组织和民有资产的所有者,而全体集体则是集体资源、集体组织和集体资产的所有者。因此,对是否需要对民有资源、民有组织和民有资产进行私有化的决定权在于全体人民。同样,是否需要对集体资源、集体组织和集体资产进行私有化的决定权在于全体集体。同时,人民还具有私有化的实施权、监督权、评价权和控诉权。而作为代理人的公有资源、公有组织和公有资产的管理者对公有资源、公有组织和公有资产做出的私有化行为都是剥夺人民的所有者权利的非法行为。