混合所有制企业的民营化程度如何影响高管薪酬-业绩敏感性？

在中国深化改革、推进转型的特殊背景下,探索出一条适合中国混合所有制企业实际情况的高管薪酬制度改革路径是现阶段中国国有企业改革亟待解决的问题之一。高管的薪酬-业绩敏感性是判断薪酬激励契约有效性的主要指标,基于此,文章首先构建一个委托-代理框架下的寡头市场模型,从理论上分析混合所有制企业的民营化程度与高管薪酬-业绩敏感性之间的关系;其次选择2007—2016年沪深两市A股经过民营化的国有控股上市公司数据进行实证检验。结果发现：总体上,提高混合所有制企业的民营化程度会显著增强高管薪酬-业绩敏感性;进一步分析发现,混合所有制企业中非国有股比例小于67%时,提高民营化程度会降低高管的薪酬-业绩敏感性;非国有股比例介于67%~75%之间时,提高民营化程度对高管薪酬-业绩敏感性没有显著影响;非国有股比例大于75%时,提高民营化程度会提升高管的薪酬-业绩敏感性。     

俄罗斯的私有化改革及其对我国国有企业改革的启示

通过对俄罗斯私有化改革及其公司治理问题的分析,结合目前我国国有企业改革过程中出现的主要问题,指出私有化并不是什么灵丹妙药,不是现代公司治理的必经途径,也不是国有企业改革的充分条件。一个国家在进行企业改革时,既要吸取别国成功经验,也应充分考虑本国改革所依赖的制度环境和市场环境,即本国的国情。     

地区间竞争、财政自给率和公有制企业民营化

相关文献认为 ,分权化改革导致的地区间竞争加剧引发了各地区的国有企业民营化进程。本文试图通过实证分析验证这一结论。本文的实证分析表明 ,地区间竞争加剧的确会推动相关地区国有经济民营化进程。但是由于 1 994年以来 ,地区间市场一体化水平基本没有提高 ,从而地区间竞争并没有明显加剧 ,因此 ,2 0世纪 90年代以来普遍展开的公有制企业改制进程主要不是由地区间竞争推动的。地方政府积极推动公有制企业民营化的主要动因来自于财政方面 ,来自于 1 994年分税制改革给地方政府造成的财政压力和预算约束硬化 ,来自于非国有经济发展、非国有经济比重提高对改善地方财政状况的显著作用。本文的实证分析表明 ,非国有经济比重的提高明显有助于提高地方财政自给率。     

Declining Labor Share： Is China＇s Case Different？

This paper explores why labor share in China has declined since the middle of the 1990s. Existing literature usually ascribes the labor share decline in developed countries to biased technological progress. However, our investigation shows that China ＂s case is different. Using a simultaneous equation model estimated with three-stage least squares, we find that FD1, levels of economic development and privatization have negative effects on the labor share. The negative influence of FDl on labor share results from regional competition for FD1, which weakens labor forces＂ bargaining power. A U-shaped relationship exists between labor share and the level of economic development, and China is now on the declining part of the curve. The negative effects of privatization on the labor share stem from the elimination of the so-called ＂wage costs eroding profit ＂ situation and the positive supply shock on the labor market.     

Strategic incentive in mixed oligopoly

This paper develops a two stage game model with two competing firms in a mixed oligopolistic market, a public firm and a private firm, and only the public firm giving its manager an incentive contract. The paper presents three types of public firm owner’s objective function and each objective function corresponds to three types of delegation, either of a profit-revenue type, or of a relative performance, or, finally, of a market share one. In an equilibrium, the public firm owner has a dominant strategy to reward his manager with an incentive contract combining own profits and competitor’s profits. Different from Manasakis et al. (2007), this paper suggests that the dominant strategy of the public firm owner is to reward his manager with a profit-revenue type of contract or a market-share type of contract, that is to say profit-revenue is identical with market-share. Using relative-performance type of contract will move the manager away from the owner’s true objective function when the public firm owner only pursues maximizing the social welfare. The private firm will be crowded out and the public firm is the only producer of the market. Under profits-revenues type of contract, the owner’s objective of maximizing the summation of the profit and consumer surplus leads the manager more aggressive. Different combinations give us different results. By comparing the results, each type of incentive contract is an owner’s best response to his decision.     

Reforming the local public sector: economics and politics in privatization of water and solid waste

Several empirical studies have analyzed the factors that influence local privatization. We examine the influence of transaction costs and political factors on local governments’ choices through new variables. We consider two relevant services accounting for different amounts of transaction costs: water and solid waste delivery. Our results show that privatization is less common for water, which has higher transaction costs. Furthermore, we find that municipalities with a conservative ruling party privatize more often regardless of the ideological orientation of the constituency. Finally, we find that intermunicipal cooperation may be a suitable organizational form for some municipalities.     

Post-Lange Market Socialism: An Evaluation of Profit-Oriented Proposals

In recent years we have observed significant growth in the private sector in many higher education systems around the globe. This growth of private higher education is associated with high political expectations, notably concerning greater choice of programs and greater responsiveness of institutions to students' and labor markets' demands. Looking at the experience of several European and Latin American countries, this study analyzes the patterns of program diversification of public and private higher education and discusses the impact of the private sector for the diversification of higher education's supply. The results show a contrasting picture between political beliefs about privatization in higher education and its actual results, suggesting that private institutions tend to be far more specialized than their public counterparts.     

当前中国农村土地所有制改革模式研究综述

探讨对当前农村土地所有制改革模式,学者们从农村集体土地所有制存在的缺陷出发,提出了各种改革主张,大致来说主要有以下几种观点:实行农村土地私有化,取消集体土地所有权;实行农村土地国有化,取消集体土地所有权;部分取消集体土地所有权,实行农村土地国家所有、集体所有和农民私人所有三者并存土地混合所有制或复合所有制;保留现有的集体土地所有权,对其进行改革与完善。     

试论日本的国有企业改革

加快国有企业改革是发展生产力、构建和谐社会以及实施可持续发展的重要举措。应借鉴日本国有企业改革实践中的引入市场机制、面向广大社会公众出售国有股份、分担债务的清偿责任等经验,我国国有企业改革要发挥所有权的激励作用;改革方式不拘一格;改革中应兼顾效率与公平等。