国有股退出程度的经济后果比较——对上市公司剩余国有股价值的分析

本文研究了我国资本市场国有股退出程度的不同在经济后果上是否存在显著差异。非参数检验与回归分析均表明,国有股部分退出的公司在民营化之后的业绩扭转要差于完全民营化,回归分析还反映出部分民营化后未彻底退出的国有大股东有显著负效应。在大股东并存的产权类型上,民营大股东之间的共存比民营同国有大股东的共存对公司价值提升更为有利。     

Ownership structure,monitoring, and market value of companies: evidence from an unusual privatization mode

This study analyses the impact of ownership structure and market liquidity on company value. We investigate different aspects of ownership: the risk of political interference, private investors vs. the state acting as influential blockholders, and preferential political treatment of companies. Using a unique dataset of Polish partial privatizations initiated by shares transfers to entities under limited government influence, we find that government divestments can enhance company value, due to reduction in risk of political interference. A potential increase in the liquidity of trades in transferred companies’ shares also boosts their market value. On the other hand, an increased likelihood of the emergence of private blockholders able to expropriate minority shareholders reduces the firm’s market value. Our results support the political view of privatization: governments have objectives different to profit maximization, which leads to suboptimal investment from this point of view and lower market value of companies. We also develop a model to empirically distinguish between different aspects of ownership on company value.     

西方国家行政改革实践及发展模式探究

西方国家的行政改革实践始于20世纪70年代末,改革基本上围绕着私有化、缩减政府规模、削减公共开支、转变政府职能等目标展开,所采取的具体措施也基本以绩效控制、私有化、政府再造和公共服务市场化等手段为主。结合西方国家行政改革的实践经验和未来发展模式,可将西方行政改革的模式归纳为四种:市场式政府模式、参与式政府模式、弹性化政府模式和解制型政府模式。     

Upstream privatization and downstream licensing

This study attempts to investigate the impact of downstream foreign licensing on upstream privatization policy in a vertically related market, in which a public firm and a domestic private firm supply exclusively to downstream domestic and foreign firms, respectively. We show that downstream licensing occurs when the cost differential between downstream duopolists is small, and the optimal strategy under licensing is upstream partial privatization. In addition, downstream foreign licensing facilitates upstream privatization. We further show that downstream licensing improves (reduces) local welfare when the cost differential is large (small).     

Corruption and privatization: Evidence from a natural experiment in China

This paper investigates how government corruption shapes state-owned enterprises' (SOEs) privatization. To establish causality, we exploit a natural experiment (i.e., the investigations of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection) to document that SOEs significantly deepen privatization after the crackdown on corruption. Further evidence demonstrates two plausible mechanisms driving our findings. Specifically, anti-corruption campaign: 1) accelerates privatization process by curbing the underpricing transfers to state entities and encouraging the normal transfers to private entities or individuals; and 2) by reducing managers' incentives to maintain the dominance of state ownership for expropriation through the discretion of perk consumption. Moreover, our findings are particularly pronounced for SOEs located in areas with high levels of social trust, government intervention, and less information asymmetry.     

Training,productivity and wages: An investigation of China's manufacturing enterprises in a privatization era

We estimated a structural model of production and wage determination in which labour quality can be affected by a firm's training decision using data of China's manufacturing enterprises in an era of privatization (2004–2007). Training increased both productivity and wages, but the former increased more, which explained the voluntary provision of on-the-job training. Our results also indicate that state-controlled enterprises' investment in training could be both privately and socially efficient; unions played a role in promoting training; it might be more privately and socially efficient for manufacturing firms to prioritize training resources to lower-educated, female and junior workers, if they had not done so, during privatization.     

Entry decision of a vertically integrated foreign firm with downstream subsidization and upstream privatization

This study considers a vertical structure model in which an upstream state-owned enterprise (SOE) and a downstream domestic firm compete with a vertically integrated foreign firm (VIFF). We consider the cost-inefficiency of the SOE and examine the entry decisions of a VIFF under downstream subsidization. We find that without upstream privatization, the VIFF's entry decision might not be socially desirable unless it enters both markets and the cost inefficiency is intermediate. Additionally, a policy to reduce the cost inefficiency might cause a drastic welfare increase or loss when the VIFF changes its entry decision. We then examine upstream privatization and show that a substantial improvement in cost efficiency can increase welfare with privatization. When the SOE maximizes welfare, however, lesser (greater) cost efficiency improvement is necessary to increase welfare with privatization if the ex-ante cost inefficiency is high (low).     

Has the acceleration of privatization become inevitable in Bahrain?

Bahrain remains the most vulnerable Gulf country due to its limited savings and sharp rise in debt levels, leaving it exposed to high financing risks. The financial crisis has been deepened by the economic double blow of the decline in oil prices and the effects resulting from the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic. Bahrain has decreased subsidies and increased taxes on many products. Those measures seem, however, insufficient to mitigate the negative impacts on the economy. This paper presents a model based on a comparison between fast privatization and gradual privatization strategies undertaken in some Bahraini economic sectors. It shows that the contribution of privatization to economic restructuring is only as effective as the commitment of the government to maintain a high pace of privatization. This condition can provide needed revenues, and can particularly foster private investments and initiatives. Therefore, it may represent an appropriate context to elevate Bahrain out of the present equilibrium characterized by slow privatization and government dominance on the economy.     

What role should public firms play in the upstream market?

We investigate the upstream public firm's desirable option of production timing in the vertically related upstream market. We find that multiple equilibria may exist, including the Cournot-type and Stackelberg-type, with different degrees of privatization in the presence of upstream firms' efficiency gap. These equilibrium outcomes are also influenced by the intensity of downstream market competition. We further show the corresponding optimal degree of privatization in different phases of gradual privatization.