国有企业民营化的约束机制研究

民营化作为国有企业产权改制的主要方式不能动摇,但必须重点研究国企民营化的约束机制。其中,产权理论难有实质性突破构成国企民营化的理论约束;部门间就业专移阻滞、分级所有的国资管理体制、利益集团行为刚性、财政资源紧张与补偿制度缺失形成国企民营化的实践约束。摆脱这些约束,国企民营化才能顺利地进行下去。     

从我国国有企业改革看农地产权私有化

在简析我国国有企业改革过程的基础上,阐述了我国农地的产权、功能和经营状况,通过国有企业与农地相似方面的横向比较,分析了我国农地产权改革私有化的不合理性,同时提出了我国农地产权改革的一些建议.     

Reappearance of the Public: Placemaking,Minoritization and Resistance in Detroit

Recent studies of public space in US central cities tend to focus either on (1) market‐driven placemaking (privatized parks, hipster shops) in gentrifying enclaves or (2) street cultures (community gardens, hip‐hop) in low‐income neighborhoods. Neither focus adequately frames the ability of African Americans to shape public space as the white middle class returns to central cities. In this case study of downtown Detroit, I theorize a dialectic: the history of clashes between racial capitalism and social movements in public space reappears in the contradictory design of market‐driven placemaking, which suppresses and displays cultures of resistance. White business and real‐estate interests showcase downtown spaces to counter news of disinvestment and suffering in low‐income neighborhoods. The legal and political legacies of civil rights and black power struggles—combined with consumer demand (black culture sells)—force them to involve black entrepreneurs, professionals and artists in placemaking. This placemaking subordinates the black urban poor, even as it incorporates their street cultures. The contradictions of placemaking shape possibilities for resistance, as shown in mundane subversions and street protests that use the downtown spotlight to call for social justice citywide. This analysis contributes to research on public space at a time when new movements are challenging public order in the financial core of US cities.     

Airport partial and full privatization in a multi-airport region: Focus on pricing and capacity

This paper studies the capacity and pricing choice of two congestible airports in a multi-airport metropolitan region, under transition from a pure public, centralized airport system to partial or full privatization. We develop analytical models to investigate three privatization scenarios: public–private duopoly, private–private duopoly, and private monopoly. We find that, airports follow the same capacity investment rule as prior to privatization when capacity and pricing decisions are made simultaneously. Pricing rule after privatization becomes more complicated, with additional factors having an upward effect on the privatized airport(s) and a downward effect on the remaining public airport.     

Macroeconomic implications of voucher privatization in a model with incomplete information

Voucher privatization implies a significant wealth transfer from state to private agents who, in turn, would increase consumption. This paper investigates the consequences of this wealth effect on the macroeconomic equilibrium in a high unemployment economy. The model builds on a two-stage sequential game between the government and private agents. We verify the existence of a pooling equilibrium in which private agents cannot guess whether a policy of fast privatization will be continued in the future or not. This configuration presents an endogenous probability of privatization slowdown; as a consequence, the wealth effect is moderated and the genuine fast privatizer government bears an “undue” credibility cost in terms of employment     

Lack of commitment to future privatization policies may lead to worst welfare outcome

We investigate the welfare consequences of a lack of commitment to future privatization policies. The government implements a privatization policy after the competition structure is determined by the entry of private firms. We find that in an equilibrium, the government fully privatizes (nationalizes) a public firm if private firms expect that the government fully privatizes (nationalizes) the public firm. This is because an increase in the number of firms entering a market increases the government's incentive to privatize the public firm, which mitigates future competition and stimulates entries. The full-privatization equilibrium is the worst privatization policy among all possible (either equilibrium or non-equilibrium) privatization policies for welfare because it causes excessive market entry of private firms. Partial commitment of a minimal public ownership share may mitigate this problem.     

Local governments’ fiscal balance and privatization in transition countries1

Several transition economies have undertaken fiscal decentralization reforms over the past two decades along with liberalization, privatization and stabilization reforms. Theory predicts that decentralization may aggravate fiscal imbalances, unless the right incentives are in place to promote fiscal discipline. This study uses a panel of 20 transition countries over 19 years to address a central question of fact: Did privatization help to promote local governments’ fiscal discipline? The answer is clearly ‘no’ for privatization considered in isolation. However, privatization and subnational fiscal autonomy along with reforms to the banking system – restraining access to soft financing – may prove effective at improving fiscal balances among local governments.     

Industry and Labour: Class Struggle at Work and Monopoly Capitalism; Social Standing in America: New Dimensions of Class; Class Structure and Social Mobility in Poland

A very well-established economic literature maintains that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are inefficient as compared to privately owned ones (POEs). In this paper, I argue that SOEs' inefficiency is not due to state ownership per se, but is rather caused conditions other than ownership, to which SOEs often — though not necessarily always — relate. In particular, I focus on dynamic efficiency — specifically, the production of technological innovation — of SOEs in manufacturing industries, where SOEs should contend with POEs in a competitive environment. I suggest that targeted measures, which are aimed at increasing managers' commitment to long-term investment strategies and at reducing corruption and political interference — albeit complex and difficult to implement — can be much more (positively) impactful on long-run technical progress than the simple privatization of companies. This leaves room for exploration and implementation of policies that might reconcile state ownership and market competition in industrial sectors.     

Achieving Synergy from Synergogy

In face of growing public disaffection with American business and American business schools, business faculty need techniques to improve student learning and performance. Unfortunately, most of the new teaching techniques designed to improve student learning are detrimental to student-teacher relationships. This study applied two Synergogy teaching methodologies to an International Business course, and the results were improved student performance as well as improved student evaluations of teacher performance.     

Privatization and efficiency wages

The impact of privatization is investigated in a shirking model of efficiency wages. Without trade unions, privatization — modeled as a stricter control of employees — lowers wages and raises employment, output, and profits, while effort and productivity effects depend on the employees' risk aversion. However, for a utilitarian monopoly union, facing a company characterized by a constant-elasticity labor-demand schedule, privatization raises efficiency wages. If privatization is modeled as a stronger profit orientation, wages, effort, and labor productivity will rise, while employment will shrink in a wage-setting firm. Again, wage and employment effects can be reversed in the case of wage negotiations.