关于品牌经营中几个问题的思考

分析了品牌经营中的四个问题：(1)品牌与服务：名牌需要服务,抓服务促名牌;(2)品牌与质量：名牌体现质量,抓质量保名牌;(3)品牌与创新：名牌是创新的成果,抓创新守名牌;(4)品牌与利义：名牌带大利,但见利要思义。     

自然垄断产业的分类管制模式与政策取向

根据当代自然垄断理论的最新研究成果，基于自然垄断产业已经收敛到网络经济效应较强的产业上这一事实，本文进一步将自然垄断产业划分为信息传输型网络产业和物理传输型网络产业，探讨了不同类型自然垄断产业的管制类型以及不同类型自然垄断产业的管制政策。     

上市公司会计利润操纵的成本与收益分析

本文分析了上市公司会计利润操纵各主体的成分与收益构成,对各主体的成本和收益进行了量化分析.在此基础上得出上市公司在目前状况下必然存在会计利润操纵的结论.最后本文以上述成本收益分析为依据,提出如何进一步控制上市公司利润操纵的建议.     

关于企业合并的会计处理方法探讨

在实际经济业务中,对于企业合并应采用的会计处理方法,引起了人们广泛的关注。美国财务会计准则委员会(FASB)以及国际会计准则委员会(IASB)由于权益法的弊端,而宣布禁止使用权益结合法,改为全部使用购买法。中国由于目前的实际情况,权益结合法正在兴起。对于中国企业合并方法的选择,以及对企业信息真实性影响,引起了人们广泛的关注。     

主导零售商折扣行为的利润补偿研究

主导零售商折扣行为的最终目的只能是为了最大限度地获取利润,但主导零售商的折扣销售表明其商品价格远低于其竞争对手,由此文中主要研究主导零售商折扣行为的利润补偿问题,以期为这一现象提供合理的解释。     

现代企业成本控制机制研究

传统意义上的成本控制方法体系构建于“收入-费用=利润”的数量关系之上,不惜一切代价绝对地削减成本以保持一定的利润水平是其最显著特征。现代企业成本控制突破了企业这种价值观,而是将利润观念与成本控制语境演进进行对称研究,并进而建立了现代企业成本控制机制整体框架。在具体操作上,成本核算、成本控制与成本分析三位一体的实现是企业生产方式再造、成本流程设计与最佳成本控制方式选择的整体性制度安排。最后提出企业制度效应决定了成本控制方法体系的选择,任何期望不改变企业组织现存状态的成本控制都有必要进一步改进。     

试探海峡西岸经济区的银行盈利模式

本文结合福建省所在的特色区域位置及经济特征,探讨了在"十一五"规划把福建省创新定义为"海峡西岸经济区"这一特殊经济地带后,地处海峡西岸经济区的银行如何面对经济发展及区域关系发展带来的经济转变,与时俱进,寻找适合自身以及区域经济特点的盈利模式,实现可持续的科学发展.本文以海峡西岸经济区的某家银行2006年数据为例,浅析了该行的主要盈利模式和盈利产品板块的变化,提出了海峡西岸经济区银行盈利模式的抉择及其发展方向.     

How Common Are Intentional GAAP Violations? Estimates from a Dynamic Model

This paper uses data on detected misstatements—earnings restatements—and a dynamic model to estimate the extent of undetected misstatements that violate GAAP. The model features a CEO who can manipulate his firm's stock price by misstating earnings. I find the CEO's expected cost of misleading investors is low. The probability of detection over a five‐year horizon is 13.91%, and the average misstatement, if detected, results in an 8.53% loss in the CEO's retirement wealth. The low expected cost implies a high fraction of CEOs who misstate earnings at least once at 60%, with 2%–22% of CEOs starting to misstate earnings in each year 2003–2010, inflation in stock prices across CEOs who misstate earnings at 2.02%, and inflation in stock prices across all CEOs at 0.77%. Wealthier CEOs manipulate less, and the average misstatement is larger in smaller firms.     

Equity‐based incentives and collaboration in the modern multibusiness firm

Research summary : This paper examines the role of equity‐based incentives in fostering cross‐business‐unit collaboration in multibusiness firms. We develop a formal agency model in which headquarters offers equity and profit incentives to business‐unit managers with the objective of maximizing total expected firm returns. The resulting compensation contract provides a rich mechanism for aggregating value from collaborative interactions across business units, aligning managers' efforts with the firm's growth prospects and organization structure and managing the dual risks in profits and firm market value. The inclusion of equity incentives elicits higher levels of own‐unit and collaborative efforts over the profits‐only contract. Our results suggest that equity‐based incentives are most beneficial when profitability is uncertain relative to long‐term growth prospects, in firms pursuing related diversification strategies, and in periods of rising equity markets. Managerial summary : Equity‐based compensation such as restricted stock grants and options are increasingly common, not only for CEOs and other top executives, but also for business unit managers and other non‐C‐suite employees. The paper studies the role of such “global” incentives in enabling multibusiness firms to benefit from cross‐unit collaboration. Results from our model show that managerial contracts that include appropriate levels of equity incentives, in addition to profit‐based incentives, generate higher own‐unit and collaborative efforts. We also find that equity incentives are likely to be most beneficial for large firms in high‐growth sectors, for firms pursuing a related diversification strategy, and in periods of rising stock markets. The model can also provide useful guidance on designing return‐maximizing compensation contracts for business unit managers in different firm, organizational, and industry contexts. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Behavior of an Institutional Investor with Arbitrage Opportunities and Liquidity Risk

This study analyzes the efficiency of liquidity flows in stabilizing distressed markets from a theoretical perspective. We show that even in the event of a major negative market shock, a financial institution can increase its investment in the market when there is a strong incentive for arbitrage profit. However, the institution may choose to reduce its investment if the fear from liquidity risk exceeds the arbitrage incentive. In addition, our model reveals a positive relationship between funding liquidity and market liquidity. Our findings help to explain several financial issues in distressed markets, including the flight to quality, liquidity dry-ups, asset fire sales, and market shock amplifications.