National Income Accounting and Public Policy

Modern national income accounting was designed in the early 20th century for the purpose of providing improved indicators about the performance of the economy so that government policy makers could better control the economy. The way that performance is measured affects the types of policies used to try to accomplish policy goals. Two attributes of national income accounting are analyzed for their effects on economic policy. First, government production is included in the national income accounts at cost, rather than at market value as private sector output is measured. This biases policy toward a larger public sector. Second, output is measured as a homogeneous dollar amount. This biases policy toward focusing on increasing quantities of inputs and outputs in the production process, rather than on innovation and entrepreneurship, which are the true engines of economic progress. Economic policy could be improved by focusing less on national income as an indicator of policy, and more on the underlying processes that foster economic progress.     

建立铁路公益性运输补偿机制的探讨

铁路公益性运输超越了企业的职能范围,企业应当得到国家补偿。为此,建议按照依法、据实补偿原则,以税收抵扣方式进行补偿,以利于铁路运输企业的积累和发展。     

基于人工神经网络的地铁施工招标综合评估模型

广州地铁工程是国内数个重要的大型城市基础建设项目之一。目前对于这种复杂的大型工程项目,迫切需要一个成熟可靠的公开招标评估系统。根据广州地铁工程的实际招标评标数据,提出应用人工神经网络(ANN)建立地铁施工招标综合评估模型。BP神经网络具有很强的自学习和自适应能力,可以精确地迫近复杂的非线性动态函数。经过训练网络,基于BP网络的模型成功量化了主观和定性的技术评估指数,得出较满意的评估结果。该模型可以通过增加样本提高精度,从而应用在地铁和其他类似建设项目招标中。     

LABOUR SUPPLY ESTIMATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

Abstract. Economists devote considerable energies towards refining their econometric techniques to overcome difficulties connected with conducting empirical research. Despite advances in technique. it is not clear whether further refinement in this direction is worthwhile for policy purposes. It may be that no further amount of statistical adjustment of inadequate data will increase understanding, and that better data is simply necessary to add to our knowledge. But rarely is sufficient credit paid to new forms of data. In short, econometric technique is emphasized to the neglect of data innovation, as if new data were merely lying about waiting for an ingenious suggestion for use. This paper surveys advances of the last twenty five years in estimating labour supply for policy purposes with a view towards appreciating the relative contribution of both improvements in econometric technique as well as developments of new data.
After briefly detailing the key parameters which economists have sought to estimate, we describe the early 'first generation' research (circa 1970), which is plagued by problems of unobservable variables, measurement errors, truncation and selectivity bias, and non linear budget constraints. 'Second generation' research constitute attempts to resolve one or more of these difficulties, and the respective contribution of econometric technique and new data is acknowledged and assessed, including the contribution of data generated by large scale social experiments in which participants are randomly assigned to different guaranteed income plans and their labour supply behaviour measured.     

Public finance and the optimal speed of transition*

We develop a general equilibrium model that jointly considers the influence of capital accumulation constraints and of labour market frictions on the process of transition. We endogenize the economic and budgetary costs of different government policies and show that, early in transition, governments ought to subsidize state firms. Provided that intertemporal commitment is feasible, this policy limits the initial output fall, which relaxes capital accumulation constraints, accelerates transition, and increases welfare. Moreover, by resorting to indirect – instead of direct – taxes, governments can bring the path of transition closer to the first best. Yet, political pressures may induce a policy of suboptimal subsidization.     

Does an Industry Effect Exist for Initial Public Offerings?

We examine the impact of initial public offerings (IPOs) on rival firms and find that the valuation effects are insignificant. This insignificant reaction can be explained by offsetting information and competitive effects. Significant positive information effects are associated with IPOs in regulated industries and the first IPO in an industry following a period of dormancy. Significant negative competitive effects are associated with larger IPOs in competitive industries, those in relatively risky industries, those in high‐performing industries, and those in the technology sector. IPO firms that use the proceeds for debt repayment appear to represent a more significant competitive threat to rival firms relative to IPO firms that use their proceeds for other purposes.     

Initial Public Offerings: CFO Perceptions

We examine four issues pertaining to initial public offerings (IPOs) using a survey of 438 chief financial officers (CFOs). First, why do firms go public? Second, is CFO sentiment stationary across bear and bull markets? Third, what concerns CFOs about going public? Fourth, do CFO perceptions correlate with returns? Results support funding for growth and liquidity as the primary reasons for IPOs. CFO sentiment is generally stationary in pre‐ and post‐bubble years. Managers are concerned with the direct costs of going public, such as underwriting fees, as well as indirect costs. We find a negative relation between a focus on immediate growth and long‐term abnormal returns.     

Political Entrepreneurship and the Democratic Allocation of Economic Resources

Political entrepreneurship occurs when an individual acts on a political profit opportunity. These profit opportunities can be divided into two categories: productive, and predatory. Productive opportunities enable entrepreneurs to profit from enhancing the efficiency of government, while predatory opportunities enable entrepreneurs to profit from forcibly transferring resources from some to others. This analysis shows that political institutions tend to favor predatory over productive political entrepreneurship, and shows that what is sometimes referred to as political exchange does not have the same efficiency characteristics as voluntary exchange in private markets.     

Trends in British public investment

British public investment has declined sharply both as a share of GDP and as a share of government spending since the 1970s. Only part of this decline is explained by privatisation, which transferred some public investment to the private sector. More important was the very large and permanent reduction in public house‐building between the mid‐1970s and the early 1980s. Between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the rate of public investment recovered somewhat, but after that time it declined again, reaching a record low in 1999. The most recent decline in public investment has affected a range of central government programmes, and it has not been significantly offset by investment under the Private Finance Initiative. The government now plans to increase investment spending, although levels look set to remain low by historical standards for some time to come.     

Stability and Segregation in Group Formation

This paper presents a model of group formation based on the assumption that individuals prefer to associate with people similar to them. It is shown that, in general, if the number of groups that can be formed is bounded, then a stable partition of the society into groups may not exist. (A partition is defined as stable if none of the individuals would prefer be in a different group than the one he is in.) However, if individuals' characteristics are one-dimensional, then a stable partition always exists. We give sufficient conditions for stable partitions to be segregating (in the sense that, for example, low-characteristic individuals are in one group and high-characteristic ones are in another) and Pareto efficient. In addition, we propose a dynamic model of individual myopic behavior describing the evolution of group formation to an eventual stable, segregating, and Pareto efficient partition. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, H41.