我国农村环境问题的经济分析及解决途径

本文分析了我国农村存在的环境问题,从经济学角度分析了农村环境问题产生的原因,并提出了农村环境问题的治理措施与途径:消除其公共物品性和外部性。     

民营经济发展中的深层阻滞因素辨析

民营经济的快速发展已经像其成为中国经济增长的重要引擎。但从运行层面看,民营经济仍然面对各种体制与非体制、人为和非人为的制约因素。目前民营企业普遍反映影响其可能持续发展的主要因素集中在政府政策、融资及资金、人才、创新与技术进步以及管理问题等方面。     

财政透明化背景下的政府治理变革

财政透明度是民主社会中更为广泛的公众知情权和政府信息披露制度的重要组成部分。中国财政透明度同发达国家相比存在很大的差距，甚至落后于许多发展中国家。本文通过对财政透明度的基础理论分析，认为财政透明化作为政府治理变革的核心，对于政府治理效率的提高有积极性影响。为了适应经济全球化发展趋势，在更多领域内参与国际竞争与合作，就必须规范政府行为，实现政府治理再造，     

公共品供给中的政府责任

在公共品供给中,政府责任是提供它需要并且能够提供的公共品。需要提供的公共品是指在现有的资源技术条件下,达到社会效用最大化所需提供的公共品。能够提供的公共品是指征到拉弗曲线隐含的最大税收量所能提供的公共品。需要并且能够提供的公共品是指需要提供的公共品与能够提供的公共品中量较小的一方。通过比较政府实际提供的公共品与需要并且能够提供的公共品,可以评价政府在这一领域称职与否。     

The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers. Confusion within the Executive Branch – A Conceptual Framework

Criminal investigation and prosecution of politicians, top civil servants and other public figures are topics frequently discussed in the media. The nature of the investigating or prosecuting authority varies between countries – from the general public prosecutor, through magistrates to independent counsels or parliamentary investigation commissions. This paper analyzes the role and status of public prosecutors within the separation of powers-concept. Prosecutors are usually part of the executive and not the judicial branch, which implies that they do not enjoy the same degree of independence as judges, and are ultimately subordinated to the directives of the minister of justice or the government. Conflicts of interest may hence arise if members of government can use the criminal process for their own or partisan interests. The incentives of public prosecutors in different jurisdictions are compared.     

Researching Preferences,Valuation and Hypothetical Bias

A number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences – agents are uncertain about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty. This issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation (CV) as well as the debate over the divergence between WTP and WTA. In the context of CV, it has been suggested that the hypothetical nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses. This paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental evidence to contribute to this debate. The model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components that are particularly relevant to the debate. The first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private good but may purchase information about their own value (researching preferences). The second component is that there is a probability that the auction is hypothetical – that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the winning bid. The experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in the parameters (hypotheticalness, information costs and number of agents) on the endogenous variables (such as the proportion of bidders who become informed and the winning bid). Experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect on the winning bid.      

关于我国财政政策导向调整的研究

近年来我国实施的积极财政政策确实在很大程度上促进了经济和社会的发展。但是随着经济市场化程度的不断提高和经济环境的变化，这种积极财政政策也表现出诸多的不适应性。因此应适时调整财政政策导向以适应经济和社会发展的新要求。拟从我国近年来实施的积极财政政策的成效分析出发，阐述了当前调整财政政策导向的必然性，并提出了今后我国财政政策的调整方向。     

公众参与城市绿色空间管理维护 ——以坦纳斯普瑞公园为例

“公众参与”广泛应用于以美国为代表的西方现代景观规划设计领域。随着社会的发展在美国等国相继出现“公众参与”城市绿色空间管理维护的趋势，人们逐渐意识到管理维护对城市绿色空间的重要性。以美国波特兰市坦纳斯普瑞公园为典型案例，通过实地调查、文献研究、访谈、归纳推理等研究方法，从公园建设背景、设计特色出发，回顾“公众参与”前管理维护的困境，阐述“朋友和伙伴”项目的发展历程、工作内容及成效，总结“公众参与”后期维护管理的意义，分析成功推行的原因。“公众参与”有助于解决目前中国城市公园管理维护面临的投入资金不足、游人素质偏低等问题，对未来城市公园管理工作的发展具有重要启示意义。     

美国公共预算改革的途径:管理、政治和法律

公共预算是通过分配有限资源来实现人类各种不同目的的公共行政活动,目前是公共行政的核心所在。为解决如何分配资源的问题,美国公共预算领域产生并发展了多种预算研究途径,戴维.H.罗森布鲁姆将它们归纳为管理途径、政治途径与法律途径。本文试图从该视角入手,以此对美国公共预算改革进行历史的回顾,探析公共预算改革的发展趋势,从而阐明在实践中运用各种预算理论解决不同预算问题的可行性和必要性。     

The flypaper effect and political strength

Simple models of local government behavior predict equal effects of private income and unconditional federal grants on local government expenditures. Numerous empirical analyses, however, find that the effect of grants is larger than the income effect. We argue that this flypaper effect may be a result of weak political leaderships in multi–issue and multi–party decision–making environments. In multi–issue institutions, a strong political leadership may reduce inefficiency due to interest group influence and inter–party bargaining in the local council. Utilizing data for Norwegian local governments in the 1930s, we find that political strength reduces the size of the flypaper effect. When the local council consists of only one political party, we cannot reject absence of a flypaper effect, while the flypaper effect is large in fragmented local councils. Received: June 2000 / accepted: February 2001