Competitive equilibrium when preferences change over time

Summary. We show the existence of a competitive equilibrium in an economy with many consumers whose preferences may change over time. The demand correspondence of an individual consumer is determined by the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in his intrapersonal game. For additively separable preferences with concave period utility functions that are unbounded above, this demand correspondence will satisfy the usual boundary conditions. Whenever consumers can recall their own mixed actions, this correspondence is convex-valued. This ensures the existence of a symmetric competitive equilibrium.Received: 29 July 2004, Revised: 17 November 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, D91, C73. Correspondence to: Thomas MariottiWe thank Michele Piccione for useful comments and suggestions. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.     

Deposit insurance and bank regulation in a monetary economy: a general equilibrium exposition

Summary. It is commonly argued that poorly designed banking system safety nets are largely to blame for the frequency and severity of modern banking crises. For example, underpriced deposit insurance and/or low reserve requirements are often viewed as factors that encourage risk-taking by banks. In this paper, we study the effects of three policy variables: deposit insurance premia, reserve requirements and the way in which the costs of bank bailouts are financed. We show that when deposit insurance premia are low, the monetization of bank bailout costs may not be more inflationary than financing these costs out of general revenue. This is because, while monetizing the costs increases the inflation tax rate, higher levels of general taxation reduce savings, deposits, bank reserves, and the inflation tax base. Increasing the inflation tax rate obviously raises inflation, but so does an erosion of the inflation tax base. We also find that low deposit insurance premia or low reserve requirements may not be associated with a high rate of bank failure.Received: 2 January 2002, Revised: 1 March 2003JEL Classification Numbers: D5, E5, G1.B. D. Smith: Sadly, our co-author, colleague and dear friend, Bruce D. Smith, died on July 9, 2002.     

Diffusion of innovations in globally stable Walrasian equilibrium

When all products in the economy are weak gross substitutes, preferences are homothetic, and firms face menu costs then all prices in an industry move together at the same rate. In the closed-loop Nash noncooperative equilibrium, all firms invest in productivity and reduce real prices. As a result, in the case of quadratic menu costs, the outputs of industries and the economy go up along S-shaped time paths characteristic of diffusion of innovations.     

The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria

It is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in correlated equilibrium may be eliminated, so that only strategies with zero marginal probability in all correlated equilibria survive. This occurs in particular in a family of 4×4 games built by adding a strategy to a Rock-Paper-Scissors game.     

Existence of a competitive equilibrium in a one sector growth model with heterogeneous agents and irreversible investment

Summary. We prove existence of a competitive equilibrium in a version of a Ramsey (one sector) model in which agents are heterogeneous and gross investment is constrained to be non negative. We do so by converting the infinite-dimensional fixed point problem stated in terms of prices and commodities into a finite-dimensional Negishi problem involving individual weights in a social value function. This method allows us to obtain detailed results concerning the properties of competitive equilibria. Because of the simplicity of the techniques utilized our approach is amenable to be adapted by practitioners in analogous problems often studied in macroeconomics. Received: September 13, 2001; revised version: December 9, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to Tapan Mitra for pointing out errors as well as making very valuable suggestions. Thanks are due to Raouf Boucekkine and Jorge Duran for additional helpful discussions. We also thank an anonymous referee for his/her helpful comments. The second author acknowledges the financial support of the Belgian Ministry of Scientific Research (Grant ARC 99/04-235 “Growth and incentive design”) and of the Belgian Federal Goverment (Grant PAI P5/10, “Equilibrium theory and optimization for public policy and industry regulation”). Correspondence to: C. Le Van     

替代产品投放策略与竞争性反应研究

本文首先介绍了产品替代理论，然后回顾了新产品投放及竞争者的反应方面的相关理论研究，在投放策略与反应之间引入信号的概念：根据已有文献研究总结得出企业感知信号的不同类型与其做出竞争性反应的关系。     

具缺货期不同决策支配权的两级供应链合作机制研究

从考虑市场需求固定且卖方和买方对缺货期的不同决策支配权情况,研究了两级供应链的合作机制,建立了其不完全信息的动态博弈模型,并得出其精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡,从理论上证明了卖方和买方分别占支配地位和从属地位时买方卖方应相互合作。     

论废弃产品问题与生产者责任延伸制度的回应

产品在消费后阶段所凸显的环境污染与资源浪费问题,即废弃产品问题,源于产品的资源性和潜在污染性,自然处置方式的不能和焚烧、填埋处置方式的不当。生产者责任延伸制度概念的提出为废弃产品问题的解决找到了合理的责任承担主体,减轻了政府在此方面的责任,为通过立法建立具体的生产者责任延伸制度提供了雏形。建立生产者责任延伸制度,施行回收处置方式是破解废弃产品问题的制度回应。     

农村社区公共物品的农户自愿供给——基于声誉理论的分析

农户的声誉不仅能给农户带来直接效用,它还具备信息效应与资本效应,对农户参与农村社区公共物品供给博弈的均衡路径产生重要影响。在独立博弈下,声誉的直接效用能使农户采取合作行动;在关联博弈和重复博弈中,声誉的信息及资本效应对农户的偷懒行为有很强的约束,将导致博弈进入合作均衡。因此基于声誉损益的考虑,由农户自愿供给农村社区内的公共物品会是一个有效的结果。     

善因营销中的消费者感知和反应研究

善因营销是企业履行社会责任的重要战略形式，因兼顾企业、消费者、非营利组织、社会等多方利益而广受关注。消费者对企业及其善因营销行为的感知和反应是善因营销战略能否成功的关键。但影响感知和反应的因素错综复杂，包含了资助时间、规模、事项类型、企业声誉及消费者个性等不同方面。不同的企业应该区别对待。