Incentive Regulation of Prices When Costs are Sunk

We present a model featuring irreversible investment, economies of scale, uncertain future demand and capital prices, and a regulator who sets the firm’s output price according to the cost structure of a hypothetical replacement firm. We show that a replacement firm has a fundamental cost advantage over the regulated firm: it can better exploit the economies of scale because it has not had to confront the historical uncertainties faced by the regulated firm. We show that setting prices so low that a replacement firm is just willing to participate is insufficient to allow the regulated firm to expect to break even whenever it has to invest. Thus, unless the regulator is willing to incur costly monitoring to ensure the firm invests, revenue must be allowed in excess of that required for a replacement firm to participate. This contrasts with much of the existing literature, which argues that the market value of a regulated firm should equal the cost of replacing its existing assets. We also obtain a closed-form solution for the regulated firm’s output price when this price is set at discrete intervals. In contrast to rate of return regulation, we find that resetting the regulated price more frequently can increase the risk faced by the firm’s owners, and that this is reflected in a higher output price and a higher weighted-average cost of capital.     

Government as a discriminating monopolist in the financial market: the case of China

We show that the many unusual features of China’s financial markets are consistent with a government choosing regulations to maximize a standard type of social welfare function. Under certain conditions, these regulations are equivalent to imposing explicit taxes on business and interest income, yet should be much easier to enforce. The observed implicit tax rates are broadly in line with those observed in other countries. The theory also forecasts, however, that China will face increasing incentives over time to shift to explicit taxes.     

注册会计师行业监管的若干问题研究

针对我国对舞弊的会计师事务所处罚力度明显不够的事实，监管机构应加大处罚力度，在确定合理处罚的基础上选择适当的监管力度，政府监管力度按成本效益原则确定监管费用的最优投入，决定监管机构的规模和大小，并完善相关的机构建设。     

Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion

Regulators often do not regulate all firms competing in a given sector. Due to product substitutability, unregulated competitors have incentives to bribe regulated firms to have them overstate their costs and produce less, thereby softening competition. The best collusion-proof contract entails distortions both for inefficient and efficient regulated firms (distortion ‘at the top’). But a contract inducing active collusion may do better by allowing the regulator to ‘team up’ with the regulated firm to indirectly tax its competitor. The best such contract is characterized. It is such that the unregulated firm pays the regulated one to have it truthfully reveals its inefficiency. We finally compare those contracts.     

云南长防林体系建设中几个问题的探讨

本文就云南省长防林体系建设中存在的认识问题,指导思想、政策、资金投入及有关技术问题,进行分析。提出相应的对策和意见。     

Sustainable resource use,economic development,and public regulation

The role of production technology for sustainable economic growth and resource management in the multispecies renewable resources industries is a neglected issue, particularly in complex tropical ecosystems. Given the still rudimentary understanding of biological interactions among species, even in most temperate ecosystems, the importance of under-standing the technological and economic interactions is heightened for sustainable economic growth and public regulation. This paper evaluates these interactions for the multiproduct gill net fisheries of Peninsular Malaysia. Standard price and quantity controls may have little promise. Gear regulations, a policy of constant escapement, and managing the entire mix of species as a single stock for economic rather than biomass yield appear the most promising management tools given the limited regulatory options.     

试论调控个人收入分配的财税政策选择

根据实际情况，我国政府调控个人收入分配，在财政政策方面，应加快完善社会保障制度，加大转移支付力度，缩小地区经济差距，加大扶贫投入的力度；在税收政策方面，应进一步完善个人所得税制度，适时开征遗产税与赠与税，加强特别消费税的作用，建立个人财产税制，适时开征社会保障税。     

网上银行业务发展初探

文章就网上银行的特点,我国网上银行业务发展状况、存在问题及解决措施进行了初步探讨。     

Measuring the Impact of Asymmetric Information: An Example from Energy Conservation

Asymmetric information has occupied a central role in theoretical microeconomics for almost two decades, but little has been done to ascertain when it matters in practice. The regulatory problem of promoting energy conservation offers an opportunity to ascertain if asymmetric information mattered and to what extent it altered outcomes. Regulators encouraged utilities to promote conservation, and while the regulators could observe conservation prices, they could not observe utilities' promotional efforts. A theoretical model of the regulatory asymmetric information problem yields propositions about the levels of conservation, prices and utility effort, and simulations with realistic parameters are used to determine asymmetric information's impact on these levels.     

The Practice Boundaries of Advanced Practice Nurses: An Economic and Legal Analysis

The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of State regulation that determines the extent of professional independence of advanced practice nurses (APNs). We find that in States where APNs have acquired a substantial amount of professional independence, the earnings of APNs are substantially lower, and those of physicians assistants (PAs) are substantially higher, than in other States. These results are striking since PAs are in direct competition with APNs; the only real operational difference between these groups is that PAs are salaried employees who must work under the supervision of a physician. The implication is that physicians have responded to an increase in professional independence of APNs by hiring fewer APNs and more PAs. The finding that earnings of APNs decline when they attain more professional autonomy vis-à-vis physicians reinforces work by Sass and Nichols on physical therapists.The content is the responsibility of the authors and does not represent official positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve SystemJEL classification: I11, I18, J31, J44, L51