集团管控下母子公司决策权配置模式与公司 价值

基于租值耗散理论，由剩余控制权与剩余索取权是否匹配识别出集团管控下母子公司决策权配置模式并探究其对上市子公司价值的影响。以 2007-2019 年上市公司为样本，结果发现：（1）协同型配置模式有助于提高上市公司价值，而母公司主导型配置模式和子公司主导型配置模式则会降低公司价值；（2）协同型配置模式有利于降低关联交易、提高投资效率，促进公司价值；（3）母子公司剩余索取权、制度发展水平以及独立审计能够有效缓解母公司主导型配置模式和子公司主导型配置模式对公司价值的侵害作用。研究不仅丰富了租值耗散理论在企业集团的应用，也为集团母子公司管理控制提供实践参考。     

Works council ‘disaffection’ and establishment survivability

This article investigates the association between a measure of works council heterogeneity and plant closings in Germany, 2006–2015. Two datasets are used to identify failed establishments, while institutional heterogeneity is captured by management perceptions of the role of the works council in managerial decision making and also by allowing for works council learning. The potential moderating role of sectoral collective bargaining is also examined. We report that works councils per se are not associated with plant closure. Rather, it is establishments with disaffected councils that display higher rates of closure. The latter result does not obtain where such establishments are covered by sectoral agreements; an outcome that is consistent with the literature on the mitigation of rent-seeking behaviour, and one that also receives support from our finding that plants with dissonant councils are more likely than their consensual counterparts to transition into sectoral bargaining coverage. On the other hand, there is only limited evidence of works council learning.     

Political corruption and accounting choices

We examine how political corruption affects firms’ accounting choices. We hypothesize and find that firms headquartered in corrupt districts manipulate earnings downwards, relative to firms headquartered elsewhere. Our finding is robust to alternative corruption measures, alternative discretionary accrual measures, alternative model specifications, the instrumental variable approach and difference-in-differences analyses based on firm relocation and high profile cases. We find that firms headquartered in corrupt districts prefer income-decreasing accounting choices and exhibit higher conservatism. Finally, we find that the effect of corruption on earnings management is more pronounced for geographically concentrated firms, for firms without political connections, for firms in politically sensitive industries, for firms with lower transient institutional investor ownership and for firms with less analyst coverage. In sum, our findings suggest that firms respond to corruption by lowering their accounting earnings.     

The roles of risk preferences,selection, and uncertain returns on land contracts

Using panel data on a statistically representative sample of Iowa farmland parcels from 1997 to 2017, we analyze the factors determining whether land is farmed by the owner or rented out under a cash rent or crop share contract. The landowner's decision to rent or operate the land depends on the distribution of expected net returns to the land, and so estimates of the factors affecting rental terms will be biased if the sample only includes rental contracts and excludes the owner-operator. Land with higher mean and/or lower variance of expected net returns is most likely to be rented out. Participants in the rental market will include the most risk-averse landowners and the least risk-averse tenants, while the least risk-averse landowners operate their own land. Our empirical results suggest that the rising use of cash rent contracts and declining incidence of owner-operation and crop-share rental contracts is consistent with falling coefficient of variation in expected net returns per acre.