会计寻租成因及对策探讨

对会计寻租活动产生原因进行了深入探讨,认为政府管制是产生寻租的最主要因素。同时,从博弈论的角度探讨会计寻租的结果,认为会计寻租对于经济确实有一定的积极作用,但需要对此进行适当的控制。     

Rent-seeking,R&D,and productivity

To investigate whether rent-seeking discourages productivity, we consider a third-market model, in which a domestic firm and a foreign firm engage in both Research and Development (R&D) and output competition. We show that the relationship between rent-seeking and productivity depends on two forces. On the one hand, rent-seeking increases the marginal benefit of R&D and encourages productivity. On the other hand, a lower production cost due to R&D enables the government to extract the rent from the firm to a greater extent and discourages the productivity. Which force is dominant depends on the level of corruption or, as an alternative interpretation, the weight the government attaches to political contributions. Unlike the monotonic relationship proposed by the literature, we find a non-monotonic relationship between rent-seeking and productivity.     

Heinrich von Storch's innovative contributions to economics

Heinrich von Storch was a classical economist of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century; he was of German descent and of Russian nationality; his main work was written in French. This paper tries to present the essence of Storch's innovative ideas and contrasts them with contemporary British and French economic thinking on value, land rent, foreign trade, money and currency, “inner goods,” and development. It is argued that Storch was an economist of moderate impact on literature but of high professional relevance.     

Government size and economic growth in an endogenous growth model with rent‐seeking

We explore the relationship between government size and economic growth in an endogenous growth model with human capital and an unproductive capital which facilitates rent‐seeking. With exogenous as well as endogenous time discounting, we find a non‐monotonic relationship between the size of government and economic growth. We find that with very high (low) discounting, there is a unique low (high) growth equilibrium, regardless of the size of government. For the intermediate range of discounting, there are multiple equilibria and the growth outcome depends on the size of government. With endogenous time discounting, the growth outcome is path dependent and depends on the level of inherited human capital. However, there is only one stable growth regime and the economy endogenously switches to it. When the institutional constraints on rent‐seeking are not extremely high, the stable regime is the one in which there is a high‐growth equilibrium for a smaller size of the government and for larger size, both the high‐growth and the low‐growth equilibrium coexist. When the institutional constraints on rent‐seeking are extremely high, there exists only a unique high‐growth equilibrium irrespective of the size of government. Furthermore, economies with bigger size of the government and/or with poor quality institutions will take longer to endogenously switch to this stable growth regime.     

The Macroeconomic Consequences of Reciprocity in Labor Relations*

We develop and analyze a structural model of efficiency wages founded on reciprocity. Workers are assumed to face an explicit trade‐off between the disutility of providing effort and the psychological benefit of reciprocating the gift of a wage offer above some reference level. The model provides a rationale for rent sharing—a feature that is very much present in the data but absent from previous formulations of the efficiency wage hypothesis. This firm‐internal perspective on efficiency wages has potentially important macroeconomic consequences: rent‐sharing considerations promote wage rigidity, internal amplification and differential responses to technology and demand shocks.     

资本市场监管与资本市场寻租行为分析

租金不仅存在于私人物品市场和要素市场,而且也存在于资本市场。哪里有垄断、特权和管制,哪里就存在租金。租金的存在,导致寻租活动的存在。寻租的目的是为了保护现有的租金或通过这些垄断和特权来创造租金。本文系统地论述了我国资本市场寻租的表现形式以及造成的不良社会后     

Unwilling Subjects of Financialization

This article seeks to advance debates about the financialization of housing by focusing on the emergence of rental housing as a frontier for financialization, a dynamic that is increasingly relevant since the global financial crisis. Situated in New York City, the research focuses on an aggressive wave of investment in affordable rent‐stabilized properties by private equity firms, their efforts to release value from these properties, and the implications of the 2008 financial crisis for their investment strategies and thus for tenants’ experience of home. Through detailed empirical analysis tracing the connections between how rental housing has been constituted as a new site for private equity investment globally, the local conditions facilitating this process in New York and how it reshaped everyday life for tenants, the article theorizes tenants as unwilling subjects of financialization. Yet unwillingness does not necessarily translate into being overtaken; it also connotes reluctance and indeed struggle. This novel conceptualization highlights the ways in which financialization meets with dissent, and its necessarily contingent and incomplete nature. The article therefore develops the wider intellectual project of understanding financialization not as a monolithic and inevitable process, but as one characterized by resistance from without and contradiction from within.     

以地租理论构筑矿业税费体系的探讨

本文以马克思主义地租理论为依据 ,分析了我国目前矿业税费体系存在的问题 ,提出了适应市场经济需要的、利于矿业发展的矿业税费体系的新思路。     

城市化进程中失地农民的权益保障——基于马克思地租理论的思考

土地是农民工作和生活的重要场所和生存基础,拥有土地是农民与社会其他人群相区别的一个重要特征,也是农村家庭的核心秉性。由于城市建设的步伐加快,由于各地经济加速发展,需要征占农民的土地,一部分农民因此失去了土地。在城市化进程中失地农民的权益保障成为构建和谐社会的一个重要问题。马克思的地租理论以劳动人民的根本利益为出发点,阐述了地租的产生及其最终的归属和分配问题,可以为保障我国失地农民权益问题提供理论指导。     

Competition in the political arena and local government performance

Competition reduces rent extraction in private-sector firms. In this article, we empirically assess whether it similarly disciplines politicians by evaluating local-level governments’ performance in Flanders. The results indicate that electoral competition – measured via the number of parties competing in elections – significantly positively affects the productive efficiency of municipal policy. Intertemporal competition – measured as the volatility of election outcomes over time – has a similar, but weaker, positive effect. These beneficial effects are mitigated by the fact that competition may lead to more fragmented governments, which is shown to work against their productive efficiency. Overall, though, the beneficial effects outweigh the unfavourable ones in our sample.