A comparison of the executive leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan

Abstract

This article estimates firm mark-ups to evaluate market competition in Korean manufacturing industries for the period of 1982–2004 and analyzes how the mark-ups differ across industry sectors. For the manufacturing sector as a whole, our results lead us to reject the null hypothesis of a competitive market, although market imperfection varies across industry sectors. Meanwhile, the parameter for union bargaining power over firm profit was much smaller than those found in the previous studies and insignificant in some industry sectors. Our firm-level results indicate that intra-industry variation in mark-ups and returns to scale is greater than inter-industry variation as shown in the sector analysis. Also, we find that mark-ups respond counter-cyclically to aggregate demand shocks and that the magnitudes of responses differ from industry to industry.     

Collective rent seeking and division of labor

The article analyzes division of labor within multiple groups engaged in collective rent seeking through time. Each agent seeks membership in one of two subgroups within each group, conveniently labelled a leader-subgroup and a follower-subgroup. The within-group generated payoffs are used as input in the between-group competition for the other groups' payoffs and an external rent. Within-group egalitarian allocation, but not relative-effort allocation, alleviates leadership struggle if the rent is large or the group is moderately more decisive than the other groups. The group employing a more egalitarian sharing rule than the other groups alleviates its leadership struggle more successfully. The Folk theorem is used to show the conditions under which leadership struggle gets intensified or alleviated.     

THE FUTURE OF MARKETS

In the 2009 Wincott Lecture, the author argues that in their approach to markets, economic researchers and policy-makers have focused too much on the role of prices as signals to guide resource allocation, at the expense of two possibly more important elements – markets as a process of discovery and markets as a mechanism for the diffusion of political and economic power. Government policies should support the market rather than particular industries, promote competition not concentration, and facilitate entry, not confer advantages on existing firms.     

现实与法律的冲突和规制——基于利益衡平视角的拆迁中违章建筑补偿问题探究

中国正在社会转型,社会变迁带来纠纷增长,矛盾凸显,我国已进入了高风险社会。拆迁被称为当今"天下第一难事",其中违章建筑的拆迁补偿问题尤为复杂,理论界和实务界分歧很大。违章建筑到底该不该补偿,大多数学者对于违章建筑的定性,一定程度上将原本属于两个层面的问题混淆到一个层面,容易导致对违章建筑定性的模糊不清。对于违章建筑的补偿不应采取"一刀切"的标准予以全部否定,应对违章建筑的定义、财产性质及权属进行详细地分析,揭开违章建筑的面纱,进行甄别,然后在市场比较法、收益法的基础上提出新型的租金定价模式。     

中国模式下所有制结构调整的动力与路径研究

中国所有制改革初期的动力来源于“稳定”和“发展”两大诉求，并在“扶助型政府”的领导下选择了先增量改革、后存量改革的改革路径。目前，中国国有经济的高利润主要来源于垄断所带来的超额利润，且其生产效率仍然低于非国有经济。政府的不恰当干预造成国有经济在某些行业的过高垄断，进而导致市场竞争的扭曲和的国民经济的损失。因此，我国的所有制结构转轨历程还未终结，还需要进一步深化所有制结构调整，即弱化和消除国有经济在所有非自然垄断及战略性行业的垄断。深化所有制结构调整，重点在存量调整，必须解决改革中既得利益者的权力寻租问题。但是，目前中国深化所有制改革的动力不足，应通过推进政治体制改革和法治建设来凝聚经济体制改革新动力。     

Time price differentials in the rent‐to‐own industry: implications for empowering vulnerable consumers

Rent‐to‐own enterprises represent a lucrative and rapidly growing industry. They are of particular concern to social service agencies, policy makers and consumers because they target a vulnerable, economically disadvantaged segment of the population. This article presents an investigation of a major player in the industry in one US state that fell under scrutiny by the courts because of a question of whether it is a retail enterprise covered by truth in lending legislation. Findings indicate that the average time price differentials charged by the largest retailer in this state exceed by more than three times the regulated 30% cap on interest rates. Rent‐to‐own is an example where regulation must be put into place so consumers can make more informed decisions. Such regulation, however, must be accompanied by financial literacy education that will further empower vulnerable consumers in the marketplace.     

契约视角下PPP项目寻租行为与激励监督模型

在PPP项目中,项目公司的行为可以分为有利于项目绩效的履约行为和不利于项目绩效的寻租行为,基于委托代理理论分析了项目公司两种行为与政府激励机制、监督惩罚力度之间的博弈关系及其对项目绩效的影响。研究表明,项目公司寻租与否是在寻租边际收益、激励水平和监督惩罚力度三者之间权衡的结果,进一步研究发现在满足政府收益最大化的条件下仅仅依靠激励监督机制是不能完全消除项目公司的寻租行为的,但政府部门可以通过强化惩罚力度来抑制项目公司的寻租行为。     

住宅价格长期稳定上涨的理论界限

在“住宅零空关”假设下,住宅的理论租金和理论价格均由宏观经济发展水平和住宅存量共同决定。合理的住宅租金上涨率等于国民收入增长率减住宅存量增长率。合理的住宅价格增长率则等于市场贴现率减去该时点住宅理论租金与住宅理论价格之比率,超过这个界限的住宅价格上涨均被看作含有泡沫成分。     

政府管制和寻租的控制理论模型与应用

管制经济学认为 ,市场力量配置资源会导致“市场失败”(marketfailure) ,管制是政府纠正市场失败而采取的手段 ,它的主要作用就是提高市场条件下的资源配置和再分配的效率。管制必须借助于各种政策和规定来执行 ,而执行的结果必须回到市场检验其有效性。但是 ,管制的政策、法令和规定都有相对稳定的目标值 ,它与管制决策机构、管制执行机构、管制反馈机构及管制对象构成了管制的控制系统。目标值和管制控制系统的本身就成为寻租者的寻租对象