租值消散、财政支持与农业保险区域性差异

农业保险对于减少自然灾害对农业生产的影响,稳定农民收入,促进农村经济的发展具有重要作用。由于各地区农业经济特点不同,因此应据此制定相应的政策。本文从产权经济学的租值消散理论出发,运用聚类分析的方法将全国31个省市分为三类,通过比较各地区面板模型的估计结果,对各地区农业保险的发展提出了相关建议。     

What drives firms’ intent to seek strategic assets by foreign direct investment? A study of emerging economy firms

What drives firms, particularly those from emerging economies, to engage in competitive catch-up with world leaders? We study the first step leading to catch-up, namely the managerial intent to acquire strategic assets that help closing the gap. Theoretically grounded in the awareness–motivation–capability (AMC) framework of competitive dynamics, we identify key factors contributing to firms’ strategic intent to catch-up by acquiring strategic assets abroad. Using a sample of 154 Chinese firms, we find that firms’ strategic assets seeking intent of foreign direct investment is influenced by their exposure to foreign competition, their governance structure, and relevant financial and managerial capabilities.     

集群、租与产业转移:一个理论分析框架

企业可以通过抽取“租”的方式把订单转给那些生产效率高于自己的生产者,“租”的存在和产业集群内在的联系网络,使订单总是可以传到那个效率最高的生产者手上,这提高了集群整体的生产绩效。地租作为“租”的最一般形式,对企业选址产生影响,较低的地租有利于集群形成,地租的变动促进了产业的梯度转移。     

The Impact of Unionization Structures with Heterogeneous Firms and Rent‐Sharing Motives

How are unemployment and output affected if wages are set on the sector level rather than firm level? We take a new look at this question, allowing for heterogeneous firms and rent‐sharing motives. Without these motives, employment and output are lower under sector‐level wage‐setting due to higher wage markups. With rent‐sharing motives, however, firm selection is higher under sector‐level wage‐setting, which tends to increase employment and output, thus counteracting the markup effect. Simulations show that the firm‐selection effect decreases the difference between the two unionization structures substantially but it does not change the signs of the effects on output and employment.     

Political activism and polarization

I develop a model of activism and polarization in the context of electoral competition. Two candidates simultaneously announce policy platforms and seek the support of ideologically inclined activists. Activists compete to influence electoral outcomes by expending costly support for their respective candidates. The presence of activists always moderates the platform choice of candidates, compared to the case of no activism. The central finding of the paper is that the relationship between partisanship of activists and polarization is ambiguous. As activists become increasingly partisan, polarization of candidate platforms reduces or widens depending on the costs of activism. I present normative conditions under which the presence of activism and increased partisanship among activists are both welfare‐improving for voters. Finally, introducing a public funding option for candidates increases polarization in the political process.     

Pure rent taxation and allocation of capital in a two-sector open economy: A long-run analysis

In this paper, the long-run incidence of a tax on pure rent is analyzed in an OLG two-sector small open economy, in which one sector produces a capital good and one sector a consumer good. Contrary to what is obtained in a one-sector closed economy, a land rent tax does not necessarily foster nonhumam wealth accumulation and capital formation. The accommodating scheme for the government budget plays a crucial role for the effects of pure rent taxation. A rent tax stimulates nonhuman wealth if distortionary taxes on wealth or on income from nonland inputs are alleviated. The mechanism spurring capital formation is brought into action, instead, only when the rent tax is matched by a fall in capital taxation or, if the capital sector is capital intensive, by an increase in government spending on the capital good.     

State‐Led Financial Regulation and Representations of Spatial Fixity: The Example of the Spanish Real Estate Sector

This article offers a bottom‐up contribution to the fixity–motion literature. It aims to unravel the apparent contradiction of real estate spatial fixity in Spain, which is portrayed both as a barrier to accumulation and as a unique source of investment by different capitalist actors. Empirically, it describes the shifts in real estate ownership and changes in profit‐making strategies that have taken place across the real estate sector during the crisis years, and the role of the state in these shifts. The article asserts that the idea of spatial fixity representing a spatial barrier for accumulation does not necessarily apply in the Spanish case. It further claims that the tensions in capital circulation through real estate are not only to be found in the action of time, but in different state strategies pursued by various actors. The opposing representations of fixity are the result of state regulation of interest rates, taxation and risk weighting. The state also increasingly promotes land rents as a source of liquidity creation.     

When Passion Fades: Disentangling the Temporal Dynamics of Entrepreneurial Passion for Founding

This study examines how and why entrepreneurial passion for founding changes over time. In particular, we propose that in the founding phase of a venture's lifecycle entrepreneurs’ founding identity centrality will remain stable over time. We also propose, however, that in our sample and time period studied, entrepreneurs’ intense positive feelings for founding will decrease over time. On the basis of theories of positive illusion, self‐regulation and role theory, we further hypothesize that venture idea change, change in role ambiguity and entrepreneurs’ feedback‐seeking behaviour are factors that help explain the rate of change in entrepreneurs’ intense positive feelings for founding. Using a three‐wave longitudinal research design, we find that among a sample of 112 entrepreneurs’ identity centrality does not change over time, whereas intense positive feelings for founding decrease over time. Moreover, the more entrepreneurs change their venture ideas, the weaker their decrease in intense positive feelings. Further, we show that entrepreneurs who frequently seek feedback suffer less from reduced positive feelings in response to higher increases in role ambiguity as compared to entrepreneurs who seek less feedback.     

The Competitive Impact of International Trade: The Case of Import Liberalization of the Japanese Oil Product Market

This paper analyzes the competitive impact of the recent import liberalization of the Japanese oil product market. In response to the import liberalization in March 1996, not only did the market price of gasoline decline sharply but also its domestic production kept rising and did not decline relative to imports. Moreover, its price fell substantially before the actual liberalization of the import. This paper demonstrates both theoretically and empirically that the theory of implicit cartel can explain such features of the impact of import liberalization very well. The paper also identifies the significantly positive welfare impact of such liberalization due to the expansion of supply in a market with a large tax wedge between price and cost and, possibly more importantly, due to the transformation of competitive conduct from unproductive investment for cartel-rent shifting into price cuts. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 1999, 13(4), pp. 397–423. Hitotsubashi University; and Keio University. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: L40, F12, K21.     

Residential Asking Rents and Time on the Market

Landlords offering a house in the rental market face a difficult strategic pricing decision. The revenue maximizing decision for the landlord involves a tradeoff between the rental rate and time on the market. Because the turnover of renters is higher than owners, and because the landlord must bear some carrying costs on a vacant house, pricing the rent too high may decrease revenue due to a higher vacancy period and pricing it too low may reduce the revenue when occupied. While there is substantial research on the relationship between listed prices and time on the market for freehold interests, this is the first study to provide empirical evidence on the relationship between asking rent, contract rent and time on the market for single family residential rental (leasehold) property interests. We present two models; a rental price model and a duration model for time-on-the market. Using data from the Dallas–Fort Worth area we find that landlords who set a lower asking rent relative to predicted rent can expect a shorter marketing period for their properties. The results also indicate that overpricing the asking rent and then lowering it at a later date leads to a longer marketing time (after the reset) and often a lower rent. These finding are reasonably robust for low-, mid-, and higher-valued rental properties.