美国金融业对外直接投资流向的实证分析

美国1995年～2000年金融业对外直接投资流向分布极不均衡,对投资流向分布进行统计分析发现,非金融领域直接投资、1994年金融业对外直接投资存量、双边贸易量、东道国经济金融发展水平是金融业对外直接投资的主要决定因素,证明了邓宁国际生产折衷主义理论对金融业对外直接投资的解释力。据此简要分析美国对中国金融领域直接投资现状,并分析了今后发展趋势。     

Teams, Firms and the Evolution of Profit Seeking Behavior

Even as advances in information theory over the last quarter century have cast increasing doubt on the proposition that firms successfully maximize profits, the objective of profit maximization continues to be an axiomatic feature of the neoclassical theory of the firm. This paper attempts to improve our understanding firms by treating the objective function as an open question. Specifically, an ontogenetic thought experiment is undertaken to address the question of what differentiates production teams from firms by asking why team members would sell their control rights to a principal, thereby transforming the team into a firm. What results is an account of the emergence of the objective of profit seeking. Profit seeking emerges endogenously as a more fit alternative than the objective of value maximization, which is less capable of coping with uncertainty through purposive adaptation.     

Directional duality theory Directional duality theory

In this paper we introduce a complete duality theory based on directional distance functions. This duality theory parallels the duality theory based on radial distance functions in Färe and Primont (1995).     

汇率决定理论的新近发展:文献综述

传统汇率决定理论对于现实经济中汇率实际变动情况的解释能力十分低下.20世纪80年代以来,学术界不断寻求突破,以期为汇率如何决定这一基本命题提供更为合理的解释.在这一过程中,不断有新的文献出现,从不同的方面对传统的汇率理论进行补充、发展和替代.鉴于此,本文试图对汇率决定理论的新近发展进行梳理和介绍,借以为国内经济学界研究汇率决定问题提供一个理论参考.     

末位淘汰——管理中的一柄“双刃剑”

末位淘汰作为一种管理手段在企业界被广泛采用,在实践中具有优缺点,实施末位淘汰要根据企业的实际情况,选择一个部门或几个部门进行。同时要注重培育良好的绩效文化,让刚性的末位淘汰变得充“满柔性”以有利于末位淘汰制的实施。     

论生态经济理论与科教兴农战略

融生态经济理论于科教兴农战略之中,以协调人与自然、经济与生态的关系,指导技术政策的制订和技术措施的选择以及科技兴农成果的评价,是中国式农业现代化的正确选择。     

超越契约理论--演化论视角的企业理论研究

企业的契约理论围绕交易成本概念解释了企业的存在、边界和内部组织,但严重忽视了企业的技术和生产功能,演化经济学的企业理论通过研究企业内知识的产生、传播和利用过程,以及组织与个人的交互学习,不仅重新解释了企业的存在、边界和内部组织问题,还研究了契约理论未触及的企业异质性、竞争优势和企业家等问题.     

投资决策中个人理性与集体理性博弈分析及对策研究

针对近期多起曝光的企业对外投资、担保大案,本文应用博弈论分析方法,在强调个人理性与集体理性矛盾的基础上研究投资决策中两者的完全信息博弈及无限阶段重复博弈,并建立相应的定量分析模型,通过分析博弈参与人均衡行为,指出投资决策中寻租的存在的必然性及巨大危害,并针对性的提出了适合实际操作的对策建议.     

Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

We present a brief overview of recent developments in discounted repeated games with (imperfect) private monitoring. The literature explores the possibility of cooperation in a long-term relationship, where each agent receives imperfect private information about the opponents' actions. Although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such as collusion under secret price-cutting, exchange of goods with uncertain quality, and observation errors, it has fairly complex mathematical structure due to the lack of common information shared by players. This is in sharp contrast to the well-explored case of repeated games under public information (with the celebrated Folk Theorems), and until recently little had been known about the private monitoring case. However, rapid developments in the past few years have revealed the possibility of cooperation under private monitoring for some class of games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D43, D82, L13, L41.