Persistence and the four‐factor model in the Australian funds market: a note

We investigate whether Australian fund managers are able to deliver persistent performance using Carhart’s (1997) four‐factor model. Short‐ and long‐term persistence is examined and the sample is also divided into unit trusts and superannuation funds. We do not find evidence of persistence in any sample of funds. We find that winner (loser) funds tend to hold past winner (loser) stocks. Winner and loser unit trusts both appear to have positive exposure to small stocks.     

A review and comparison of medical expenditures models: two neural networks versus two‐part models

This paper compares the two‐part model (TPM) that distinguishes between users and non‐users of health care, with two neural networks (TNN) that distinguish users by frequency. In the model comparisons using data from the National Health Research Institute (NHRI) in Taiwan, we find strong evidence in favor of the neural networks approach. This paper shows that the individuals in the self‐organizing map (SOM) network clusters can be described as several different forms of frequency distributions. The integration model of SOM and back propagation network (BPN) proposed by this paper not only permits policymakers to easily include more risk adjusters besides the demographics in the traditional capitation formula through the adaptation and calculation power of neural networks, but also reduces the incentives for cream skimming by decreasing estimation biases.     

Can stochastic discount factor models explain the cross-section of equity returns?

We propose a multivariate test of the capital asset pricing model (C-CAPM) of the cross-sectional variation in equity returns in which we compare cross-sectional variation in equity returns to the cross-sectional variation in their conditional covariance with stochastic discount factors. We use a multivariate generalized heteroskedasticity in mean model to estimate 25 portfolios that are formed on size and the book-to-market ratio. Each portfolio is allowed to have its own no-arbitrage condition. We find that although the conditional covariances of returns with consumption exhibit negative variation across size, they do not vary across the book-to-market ratio. Thus, C-CAPM can capture the size effect, but not the value effect. The fit is, however, improved by allowing the coefficients on the consumption covariances to be different. The value effect appears to be associated with the book-to-market ratio as well as size. On its own the book-to-market ratio does not generate additional information about average returns to C-CAPM. A possible explanation for these findings is that both small and low book-to-market ratio firms are expected to have higher rates of growth.     

Politicians’ motivation,political culture,and electoral competition

We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care about (what they perceive as) the public interest relative to the private rents from being in office. We show that politicians may have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely to behave opportunistically. A political culture may therefore be self-reinforcing and multiple equilibria may arise. We also show that politicians’ incentives to behave opportunistically increase with politicians’ pay and with polarization of policy preferences. JEL Code D72 · D78     

Monetary Policy Expectations at the Zero Lower Bound

We show that conventional dynamic term structure models (DTSMs) estimated on recent U.S. data severely violate the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates and deliver poor forecasts of future short rates. In contrast, shadow‐rate DTSMs account for the ZLB by construction, capture the resulting distributional asymmetry of future short rates, and achieve good forecast performance. These models provide more accurate estimates of the most likely path for future monetary policy—including the timing of policy liftoff from the ZLB and the pace of subsequent policy tightening. We also demonstrate the benefits of including macroeconomic factors in a shadow‐rate DTSM when yields are constrained near the ZLB.