新形势下会计变更为上市公司带来了什么

本文列举了从2001～2004年以来发生会计变更的上市公司.对上市公司的会计变更与会计报表收益之间的关系进行了描述以及对变更方式进行了归纳,并对会计变更的动机进行了详细的解析.最后浅谈了对上市公司会计变更的启示.     

地勘单位激励机制的思考

笔者通过对正处于快速发展的某地质队的员工激励机制的调查,认为地勘单位由于激励形式单一,单位整体管理水平低,并未形成有效的、系统的激励机制,现有的激励措施偏重于外部激励而忽视内部激励和自我激励。激励投入不小但效果不佳。改进的措施应是:①建立健全贡献大小评价体系,深化奖酬分配制度改革;②建立动态用人、用工激励机制;③强化精神激励;④建立情感激励模式。     

Managerial Incentives and Durable Goods Monopoly

In many cases durable goods monopolists who sell out output do not appear to act in the competitive fashion suggested by Coase (1972). This indicates the firm‘s owners mitigate their commitment problem with buyers in some manner. This paper shows that managerial incentives provide a natural mechanism for the owner to mitigate its commitment problem without explicitly contracting with buyers. Owners will optimally shift their managers from the singular goal of profit maximization by penalizing them for sales. Additionally, the paper demonstrates that the degree to which managerial incentives and compensation diverge from pure profit maximization is in large part a function of the durability or quality of the product.     

企业晋升公平激励与优化对策研究

我国企业晋升制度不健全、监督机制不完善、晋升文化扭曲等原因导致了我国企业晋升激励中存在性别歧视、玻璃天花板、看重关系等问题。企业要构建基于组织公平的晋升激励模型,并从培育正确的组织公平文化,不断完善晋升程序,选择和培训合适的晋升决策者,帮助员工树立正确的晋升观念,扩展我国企业晋升激励路径等五个方面保障企业晋升的公平激励效果。     

挑选合适酒店工作的员工提高激励效果

挑选适合酒店工作的员工是酒店成功的前提,是创造满意客人的关键。合适的酒店员工可为客人提供满意的情感体验,提升酒店在客人心目中的地位,切实提高酒店的激励效果。因而酒店管理者对合适的员工应建设一个开放型的上下级沟通环境,鼓励员工从工作中寻找乐趣,制定高标准的服务程序,提倡酒店的合作精神,并努力促使员工自行解决问题,同时关注员工的职业生涯发展,从而进一步的提高酒店的激励成效。     

经济全球化下的国际税收竞争与税收优惠

本文从经济全球化入手,论述了经济全球化、税收国际化、国际税收竞争与税收优惠的关系,主张纵向研究国际税收竞争,从国民经济发展的全局出发审视利用税收优惠手段参与国际税收竞争的利与弊.     

激励、监督与经销商依从：依赖结构的调节作用

文章以代理理论为基础,实证分析激励和监督对经销商依从的影响及依赖结构的调节作用。研究发现：激励会促进经销商依从,而监督则会抑制经销商依从;相互依赖强度会削弱监督对经销商依从的负向影响,但对激励与经销商依从间的关系没有显著影响;经销商相对依赖会增强激励对经销商依从的正向影响,但对监督与经销商依从间的关系没有显著影响。文章最后对研究发现进行讨论,并提出管理建议和未来研究的方向。     

CEO Inside Debt Incentives and Corporate Tax Sheltering

This paper examines the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and corporate tax sheltering. Because inside debt holdings are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm, CEOs are exposed to risk similar to that faced by outside creditors. As such, theory (Jensen and Meckling [1976]) suggests that inside debt holdings negatively impact CEO risk‐appetite. To the extent that corporate tax shelters are likely to result in high cash flow volatility in the future, we expect that inside debt holdings will curb CEOs from engaging in tax shelter transactions. Consistent with the prediction, we document a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and tax sheltering. Additional analyses suggest that the effect of inside debt on tax sheltering is more (less) pronounced in the presence of high default risk and liquidity threats (cash‐out options in pension packages). Overall, our results highlight the importance of investigating the implication of CEO debt‐like compensation for corporate tax policies.     

Stakeholder incentives and reforms in China's state-owned enterprises: A common-property theory

We argue that state-owned enterprise reform has failed in China, because incentive mechanisms that confront the key stakeholders did not elicit efficient behavior. Although incentive mechanisms were intended to elicit more effort, incentives became de facto improper because of a number of developments. This paper analyzes alternative sharing or incentive systems and highlights the interdependency among property rights, incentives, and enforcement. A common-property model is put forward to analyze recent reforms and to show that alternative property right assignments have complex and diverse configurations of positive and negative externalities. Incentive mechanisms that favor more equal distribution are the most inefficient, whereas those that differentiate among heterogeneous stakeholders based on effective, rather than actual, effort are more promising. An ideal arrangement that combines equal sharing and proportional effort is proposed.     

Tax and green transport plans: a survey of UK experience

The widespread adoption of Green Transport Plans (GTPs) by employers has become an important aim of the UK government transport policy as it tries to find ways of reducing transport demand. However, the tax treatment of employee benefits that form part of many GTPs has been identified by the government and others as a potential barrier to their adoption. Based on telephone interviews with employers and meetings with tax and transport experts, this paper confirms this perception. It also explains precisely how tax forms a barrier to GTP implementation, reviews the approaches taken to this problem in three other countries and makes outline proposals for reform and further research.