隐性知识概念阐释与特征分析

显性知识仅仅代表了知识整体的冰山一顶,而隐性知识则占据冰山的大部。隐性知识相对于显性知识而言更具体、更大量。研究隐性知识对企业的发展和企业核心竞争力的增强将有重大的促进作用。论文全面、系统的阐释了隐性知识概念并对其特征进行分析。     

携号转网政策对电信运营商合谋的影响研究

电信业是一个典型的寡头垄断产业,在运营过程中,电信运营商容易达成合谋,同时电信市场较高的转移成本为电信运营商合谋提供一定的基础。本文通过构建博弈模型,研究携号转网政策对电信运营商合谋的影响效应。研究得出：实施携号转网政策,通过有效降低消费者的转移成本,使得电信运营商坚持合谋的临界贴现因子提高,电信运营商将更难坚持合谋。该政策的实施效果随转移成本降低率的提高而增强,随电信运营商产品差异性的不断扩大而减弱。因此,携号转网政策的实施将在一定程度上降低电信运营商的合谋行为。     

共谋行为在政府采购中的表现及对策分析

共谋行为是委托代理问题中的一个重要组成部分,由于信息不对称、多层代理和权力的存在,使政府采购过程中有着共谋行为滋生的可能,并且广泛地表现在采购官员与财政部门、供应商、各级政府机关和监督主体之间的合作博弈中。其结果是增加了政府采购的交易成本,违背了政府采购的初衷。     

Pipes,pools, and filters: How collaboration networks affect innovative performance

Research summary : Innovation requires inventors to have both new knowledge and the ability to combine and configure knowledge (i.e., combinatory knowledge), and such knowledge may flow through networks. We argue that both combinatory knowledge and new knowledge are accessed through collaboration networks, but that inventors' abilities to access such knowledge depends on its location in the network. Combinatory knowledge transfers from direct contacts, but not easily from indirect contacts. In contrast, new knowledge transfers from both direct and indirect contacts, but is far more likely to be new and useful when it comes from indirect contacts. Exploring knowledge flows in 69,476 patents and 89,930 unique inventors reveals evidence that combinatory knowledge from direct contacts and new knowledge from indirect contacts significantly affects innovative performance. Managerial summary : Inventors often combine ideas to create innovations. To do this, they need ideas to combine and they need the ability to combine those ideas. Inventors can get ideas to combine as well as the ability to combine ideas through prior co‐workers. Prior co‐workers can share ideas that may be relevant for the inventor's project and can tell the inventor about other things that other people are working on, especially people the inventor may not know. This can help inventors easily learn about ideas from friends‐of‐friends. The ability to combine ideas, however, is much harder to pass on. Prior co‐workers must carefully work with the inventor to teach him or her the complex processes of combining ideas. This means that it is very hard to learn how to combine knowledge from a friend‐of‐a‐friend, but it may be possible to learn from prior co‐workers. We explore this phenomenon in the social relationships of software inventors. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Networks,Law, and the Paradox of Cooperation

There is a tension between libertarians' optimism about private supply of public goods and skepticism of the viability of voluntary collusion (Cowen 1992, Cowen and Sutter 1999). Playing off this asymmetry, Cowen (1992) advances the novel argument that the free market in defense services favored by anarcho-capitalists is a network industry where collusion is especially feasible. The current article dissolves Cowen's asymmetry, showing that he fails to distinguish between self-enforcing and non-self-enforcing interaction. Case study evidence on network behavior before and after antitrust supports our analysis. Furthermore, libertarians' joint beliefs on public goods and collusion are, contrary to Cowen and Sutter (1999), theoretically defensible.     

管理咨询企业知识库提升模式研究

企业创造知识的能力和水平决定着管理咨询公司的核心竞争力水平,因此提升咨询企业的知识能力具有十分重要的作用。在咨询项目运作过程中,充分引入外部知识是项目有效运作及企业知识库提升的必要条件。基于IDE—SECI模型,对咨询企业在项目咨询过程中引入外部知识进行了探讨,并提出了提升咨询公司知识库的有效模式。     

浅析国有企业隐性知识转化的障碍及相应对策

本文以国有企业为主要研究对象,系统阐述了国有企业在知识管理尤其是隐性知识管理方面所遇到的障碍,并通过对国有企业知识管理现状的分析,找出提高国有企业隐性知识管理水平的策略。     

核心竞争力概念模型构建研究

如何获得竞争优势是战略管理的研究主题。RBV作为分析竞争优势的视角之一,受到学者的广泛关注。本文以RBV理论和博弈论为基础分析时间和知识对竞争优势形成的作用机理,尝试建立核心竞争力的概念模型。     

企业隐性知识管理绩效评估的指标体系建设研究

知识管理绩效评估是知识管理的重要内容之一,绩效评估的科学性和准确性直接影响知识管理策略的改进和企业的创新发展。绩效评价指标的科学性和合理性对绩效评估结果的准确性至关重要。在对知识链及平衡计分卡（BSC）进行相关性分析的基础上,从知识链过程节点出发,改进平衡计分卡的维度设计,建立基于平衡记分卡和知识链的企业隐性知识管理绩效评估指标体系。     

Low-Wage Labor Markets and the Power of Suggestion

The paper argues that a non-binding minimum wage may serve as a focal point which facilities tacit collusion by low-wage employers, effectively pulling down wages of the lowest-paid workers. This can explain the puzzle as to why the minimum wage does not reduce employment, as predicted by the traditional economic theory. A simple game-theoretic argument explains when collusion emerges. The hypothesis is tested using the 1990–2002 CPS data on service occupation workers. The results suggest that during this period, on average 19.3%, and as much as 31% of service occupation workers, who earned minimum wage or less, could had been affected by collusive wage-setting.