The Value of a Utilitarian Curriculum: The Case of Technological Education

The position taken in this paper is that narrow conceptions of human development and the purposes of schooling have tended to displace rather than situate subjects like technology in the curriculum. Arguments which support this position, however, are only possible when the paradigm through which schooling is operationalized, is inverted. Viewing classic school subjects as abstractions which perpetuate narrow conceptions of pedagogy is a contentious position to take. But taking it and understanding how a utilitarian curriculum spawns real human development and learning gives a whole new perspective to curriculum theory and practice.     

高职院校教师专业发展的研究现状与展望

高职院校教师专业发展是高职师资队伍建设的必由之路。目前，关于高职院校教师专业发展的研究深度和广度都需要进一步加强。该文从高职院校教师专业发展的理论基础、出现的问题和对策以及国外高职院校教师专业发展的有益经验几个方面，来分析高职院校教师专业发展研究的现状，并提出了进一步加强高职院校教师专业发展的研究需要关注的问题。     

论职业院校“双师型”教师专业发展的四种模式

职业院校"双师型"教师专业发展有四种模式,即"学术-理性"模式、"技术-训练"模式、"实践-反思"模式和"文化-生态"模式。每种模式都体现出不同的特点和路径。通过分析这四种模式使我们认识到,职业院校"双师型"教师专业发展是一个复杂的多种因素作用的过程和结果,是一个"学术性、技术性和师范性"相融合的文化过程,是一个学术体系与工作体系、理论知识与实践操作、应用与创新的生态化发展过程。     

“学生评教”——提高教师素质的有效手段

通过学生参与“评教”,使得教师主动调整教学态度和提高自身业务素质,调动教师提高课堂教学质量的积极性,营造教师之间相互促进的氛围,达到在教学中引进竞争机制的目的。     

班主任的管理艺术

班主任工作"繁琐"和"辛苦",本文着重探讨班级管理的艺术,使班级管理工作收到事半功倍之效。     

对提高大学体育教师教学水平的思考

体育教学水平和科研水平构成体育教师的专业学术水平 ,两者缺一不可。高校应重视政策导向 ,有计划地开展各类教研活动 ,加强教学质量监控 ,开展教学质量评价 ,提高教学水平     

Decentralized advice

We compare the amount of information credibly transmitted by cheap talk when information is centralized to one sender and when it is decentralized, with each of several senders holding a distinct but interdependent piece. Under centralization, full information transmission is typically impossible. Under decentralization, however, the number of receivers is decisive: decentralized communication with one receiver is completely uninformative, but decentralized communication with multiple receivers can be fully informative. We analyze the extent of such fully-informative communication, and apply our results to the issue of transparency in advisory committees.     

Incentives and teacher effort

Few would contest that teachers are a very important determinant of how much students learn in school, and how to improve teacher performance has been the focus of lively policy debate in both rich and poor countries. This paper examines how teacher incentives, both pecuniary and non‐pecuniary, correlate with teacher effort. Using school survey data from Lao PDR, we estimate measures of teacher effort, including the number of hours that teachers spend preparing for classes and teacher provision of private tutoring outside of class hours, which are not the typical measures used in previous research. Estimation results fit well under the standard labour supply framework and indicate that greater teacher effort is associated with non‐pecuniary incentives such as more teacher autonomy over teaching materials and monitoring as measured by the existence of an active parent – teacher association and the ability of school principals to dismiss teachers. Methodologically, this paper provides a detailed derivation of a simultaneous OLS‐probit model with school random effects that can jointly estimate teacher work hours and tutoring provision.     

论学校教育场域下良好师生关系的建构

布迪厄提出了“场域”的范畴，并广泛运用于社会学领域中，也体现在学校教育过程中。了解学校教育场域下师生关系的矛盾与冲突，对于建构和谐、融洽的良好师生关系有着指导意义。     

Incentives for risk reporting — A discretionary disclosure and cheap talk approach

This paper adopts and reviews discretionary disclosure and cheap talk models to analyze risk reporting incentives and their relation to regulation. Given its inherent discretion, risk reporting depends on disclosure incentives. To assess these incentives the analytical models consider risk reporting as an endogenous feature, thereby providing a benchmark to discuss regulatory attempts. Particularly, discretionary disclosure models refer to verified disclosure, e.g., on risk factors or risk management, whereas cheap talk models refer to unverified disclosure, like managerial forecasts on the impact of risk factors. This provides an analytically-based framework for discussion. Unlike prior literature, which focuses on disclosure cost, I argue that uncertainty of information endowment and issues of credible communication can explain restricted risk reporting observed empirically. Linking regulatory attempts to these restrictions implies that regulation may mitigate the incentives-driven restrictions to some extent, but can have adverse effects on risk reporting. I particularly discuss the link between effective risk monitoring and the precision of risk reporting; the ex post assessment and usefulness of managerial forecasts on impacts of risk factors; the claimed decreasing cost of capital by mandatory risk reporting; and the threat of self-fulfilling prophecies. While the discussion has implications for both specific risk reporting requirements and empirical research, overall results suggest that we should not overestimate the informativeness of risk reporting even in a regulated environment.