高管控制权、会计信息透明度与自利行为——来自国有上市公司的经验证据

透明度是集众多信息内容及信息特征于一体的综合化概念,为了掩饰控制权私利攫取行为,高管有动机通过会计选择行为来操纵公司的真实业绩信息。本文结合国企高管的控制权特征视角,建立"高管控制权与自利动机一审计监督一会计信息透明度"这一理论分析框架,以2005—2009年的所有A股国有上市公司为初始样本,经过筛选,最终得到4087个样本观测值,在此基础上就高管控制权、会计信息透明度与自利行为展开实证研究。实证分析发现:(1)高管控制权的增强会降低公司会计信息的透明度;(2)高质量的外部审计能够提高公司的会计信息透明度;(3)高管控制权的增强弱化了外部审计对公司会计信息透明度的正面影响。     

Can Information Transparency Improve Earnings Quality Attributes? Evidence from an Enhanced Disclosure Regime in Taiwan

Investors demand timely and accurate corporate disclosures in order to comprehend the governance and performance of a firm; they also rely on quality earnings information to assess the intrinsic value of a company. This study links the two using a Taiwan sample because the government of Taiwan has just performed a market-wide corporate-transparency rating. We find significant improvement on four accounting-based earnings-quality attributes, including accrual quality, earnings persistence, predictability, and smoothness. Further, there is a statistically reliable association between the level of information transparency and each of these earnings attributes, implying that a disclosure mechanism design can enhance management accountability in financial reporting.     

Social Concentration on Boards,Corporate Information Environment and Cost of Capital

Prior evidence on the relationship between demographic diversity in corporate boards and firm performance is mixed. Some studies have found that the relationship between board attributes and firm performance is driven by a firm's information environment. This study examines whether corporate transparency also impacts the relationship between gender and ethnic diversity of directors and firm performance. To test this hypothesis, I use a Herfindahl Index based on directors’ gender and ethnicity to measure board diversity, and an opacity index based on analyst following, analyst forecast error, bid‐ask spread, and share turnover to measure corporate transparency. I find that the cost of capital is positively associated with social concentration on corporate boards and that this premium is larger for highly opaque firms. In further analysis, I find that the interaction of corporate information environment and social concentration on boards is more important for operationally complex firms. Compared with simple firms, operationally complex firms pay a greater premium on their capital if they have a socially concentrated board and an opaque information environment.     

Central Bank Transparency and the Crowding Out of Private Information in Financial Markets

We use an asset market model based on Diamond (1985) to demonstrate that increased central bank transparency may lead to crowding out of costly private information, which can result in a market that is less able to predict monetary policy. Consequently, for intermediate levels of public information precision, it is optimal for the central bank to actually disclose less than it knows. We show that such crowding out can occur, even in the likely scenario that public information is more precise than private information, under the plausible assumption that traders are nearly risk neutral. Central banks should be aware of possible adverse effects of transparency and take note if market participants reduce investment in information.     

The Impact of IFRS Adoption and Corporate Governance Principles on Transparency and Disclosure: The Case of Borsa Istanbul

This article investigates whether mandatory and voluntary regulation and best governance practices enhance disclosure quality in an emerging market where code law tradition, dominant family ownership, and lax rules and implementation make it less likely for disclosure quality effects to be observed. We show that the Transparency & Disclosure (T&D) scores have improved for a sample of Borsa Istanbul (BIST) firms, and the firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS during 2003 and 2004 have significantly higher scores. However, in 2005, the year IFRS became mandatory, the T&D scores for mandatory and voluntary adopters were no longer significantly different. Multivariate analysis shows that the Corporate Governance (CG) principles and voluntary and mandatory adoptions of IFRS have all had significant positive effects on various T&D scores of the sample firms.     

Real Earnings Management in Sales

We surveyed 1,638 sales executives across 40 countries regarding their companies’ likelihood of asking sales to perform real earnings management (REM) actions when earnings pressure exists. Using this information, which we refer to as companies’ REM propensities, we study how company characteristics and environmental conditions relate to the responses received. The use of cash‐flow incentives for sales personnel and the distribution of interfunctional power in favor of finance rather than sales are both associated with companies’ REM propensities. In addition, we show that sales executives preemptively change their behaviors in anticipation of top management's REM requests. Sales executives working for public companies and companies in the United States reported higher levels of REM propensity. The data also support an association between REM propensity and finance–sales conflict. These findings and others are compared and contrasted with existing empirical and survey‐based research on REM throughout the paper.     

企业避税地直接投资与审计费用

以2002~2016年我国沪深A股上市公司为样本,考察企业避税地直接投资对审计费用的影响,并基于信息风险、代理风险以及法律风险等视角揭示其作用机制.研究发现:避税地直接投资显著增加了上市公司审计费用.原因在于避税地直接投资降低了上市公司信息透明度并增加了公司代理成本这提高了审计师的审计风险,进而导致了较高的审计费用.不过,避税地直接投资并不会增加企业的法律风险进而提高审计费用.进一步研究还发现,税收情报交换协定有助于缓解避税地直接投资所引发的信息风险,而良好的内部控制则有助于减轻避税地直接投资所带来的信息风险与代理风险.研究在理论上丰富了避税地直接投资经济后果及审计费用影响因素的相关文献,在实践中为进一步加强企业避税地直接投资监管提供了有益借鉴.     

当前国际政府债务问题的影响与警示

为应对席卷全球的国际金融危机,各国政府纷纷采取经济刺激措施,代替民间企业和金融机构承担危机成本,这不可避免带来一定的政府债务问题。随着时间的推移,部分政府债务问题逐步凸显,成为全球经济走出危机阴影的障碍。文章分析认为,当前国际上政府债务问题呈现脆弱性、复杂性、集中性和长期性特征,成为全球经济复苏的绊脚石,甚至会给世界各国经济带来灾难性影响。文章同时总结了国际政府债务问题带给我国的启示。     

Does banking system transparency enhance bank competition? Cross-country evidence

There seems to be a consensus among regulators and scholars that in order to improve the functioning of a banking system it is necessary to raise the level of bank information disclosure. However, its influence on bank competition – which is an important factor affecting the efficiency and stability of the banking system – is left out of consideration. To test whether greater bank information disclosure is associated with both lower market power and lower concentration in the banking markets, we use country-level data covering the years 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2010. Our findings show that countries with higher levels of bank transparency have lower levels of bank concentration, while the link between transparency and market power is less pronounced. We also show that the reduction of competition due to stricter disclosure requirements depends on bank credit risks and the relationship is U-shaped.     

Optimal central bank transparency

Should central banks increase their degree of transparency any further? We show that there is likely to be an optimal intermediate degree of central bank transparency. Up to this optimum more transparency is desirable: it improves the quality of private sector inflation forecasts. But beyond the optimum people might: (1) start to attach too much weight to the conditionality of their forecasts, and/or (2) get confused by the large and increasing amount of information they receive. This deteriorates the (perceived) quality of private sector inflation forecasts. As a result, inflation is set in a more backward looking manner resulting in higher inflation persistence. By using a large scale panel data set on the transparency of central banks we find empirical support for an optimal intermediate degree of transparency at which inflation persistence is minimized. Our results indicate that while several central banks would benefit from further transparency increases, some already have reached the optimal level.