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51.
Pascal Frantz Norvald Instefjord Martin Walker 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2013,40(9-10):1184-1220
Recent public policy debates have led to increased calls for full transparency of executive compensation. However, in practice, many firms are reluctant to disclose the full details of how they link executive compensation to performance. One possible reason for lack of full disclosure is that managers use their power to hide the details of their compensation plan in order to disguise opportunistic rent extraction. If this is the reason for secrecy, then public policy designed to force firms to provide full disclosure is unlikely to be resisted by shareholders. However, another possible explanation for less than full transparency is that some degree of secrecy about executive compensation may be in the interest of the company and its shareholders. If this explanation is correct, then public policy moves to increase transparency may be met by counter moves designed to protect managers and shareholders from such policies. In this paper we investigate if full disclosure of executive compensation arrangements is always optimal for shareholders. We develop a model where optimal executive remuneration solves a moral hazard problem. However, the degree to which the moral hazard problem affects the shareholders depends on hidden information, so that disclosure of the executive compensation scheme will typically reveal the hidden information, which can be harmful to shareholders. The model derives, therefore, the optimal disclosure policy and the optimal remuneration scheme. We find that the shareholders are better off pre‐committing not to disclose the executive compensation scheme whenever possible. Executive directors are shown to be better off too in the absence of disclosure of executive compensation schemes. An argument for mandating disclosure is that it provides better information to shareholders but our analysis demonstrates that disclosure does not necessarily achieve this objective. The results suggest that less than full disclosure can be in the interest of shareholders, the reason for this being that disclosures cannot be made selectively to shareholders but will also be made to strategic opponents. This will be the case if the board of directors and the remuneration committee includes enough independent directors. Whether or not non‐disclosure to shareholders is in their interest is however an empirical matter involving a trade‐off between the proprietary costs associated with disclosure to shareholders and the costs of potential collusion between executive and non‐executive directors associated with non‐disclosure. 相似文献
52.
中国垄断性生产业管制机构的改革--以中国电信产业管制机构为例 总被引：5，自引：0，他引：5
管制机构对垄断性产业的经济效率具有重要影响.本文将分析中国垄断性产业现行管制机构存在的主要问题,具有独立性的管制机构的优越性,讨论美国和英国等经济发达国家管制机构的特点,最后探讨中国垄断性产业管制机构的设立与规范问题. 相似文献
53.
To develop further insight into antecedents of the CEO's psychological orientation toward the firm, we investigate what might lead CEOs to identify with their firms. Although research suggests that CEO organizational identification can be quite consequential for the firm, little research attention has been paid to its determinants. To predict how the special context of the CEO position might lead to identification, we consider a set of motives that members have for identifying with their organizations and consider how unique features of the CEO position might be relevant to those motives. Our theory and supportive findings help explain how the context of the CEO position, including variables often conceptualized as control mechanisms in agency theory research, can have important effects on subsequent CEO organizational identification. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
54.
We explore the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings on sell‐side analysts' assessments of firms' future financial performance. We suggest that when analysts perceive CSR as an agency cost they produce pessimistic recommendations for firms with high CSR ratings. Moreover, we theorize that, over time, the emergence of a stakeholder focus shifts the analysts' perceptions of CSR. Using a large sample of publicly traded U.S. firms over 15 years, we confirm that, in the early 1990s, analysts issue more pessimistic recommendations for firms with high CSR ratings. However, analysts progressively assess these firms more optimistically over time. Furthermore, we find that analysts of highest status are the first to shift the relation between CSR ratings and investment recommendation optimism. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
55.
本文简要论述了我国会计师事务所在考虑产品策略、价格策略、分销策略、促销策略时用4C理论观念来思考,从顾客、成本、便利和沟通四个方面说明了我国会计师事务所在执行营销方案时应该考虑的一些策略和自身实际情况。 相似文献
56.
代理问题、公司治理与企业价值--以民营上市公司为例 总被引：25，自引：0，他引：25
本文运用代理理论对2002年在上海、深圳证券交易所上市的122家民营上市公司治理与企业价值进行理论分析与实证检验,发现民营上市公司治理包括在股权集中度、债务融资比重、金字塔式控股、控制权与现金流权偏离、流通股与非流通股价偏离等五个方向上存在着代理冲突,并指出引发民营上市公司代理冲突的首要原因是现行流通股与非流通股的股权割裂。 相似文献
57.
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59.
纳税筹划自产生以来越来越多地在涉税业务中应用,可筹划的结果却有喜有忧。许多在使用初期被看作十分成功的案例却在业务发生后的数年间变成了反面教材,不但没有达到节税的目的反而给企业带来经济损失。文章分析了纳税筹划失败的原因并提出了合理规划。 相似文献
60.
Byungjun Yu Saixing Zeng Hongquan Chen Xiaohua Meng Chiming Tam 《Business Strategy and the Environment》2021,30(1):1-20
Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations. 相似文献