Graduated Punishments in Public Good Games

I explain the ubiquitous use of graduated punishments by studying a repeated public good game in which a social planner imperfectly monitors agents to detect shirkers. Agents’ cost of contributing is private information and administering punishments is costly. Using graduated punishments can be optimal for two reasons. It increases the price of future wrongdoing (temporal spillover effect) and it can lead to bad types revealing themselves (screening effect). The temporal spillover effect is always present if graduated punishments prevail, but screening need not occur if agents face a finite horizon. Whether or not a screening effect is exploited has a substantial impact on both outcomes and actual punishments. If the temporal spillover effect is sufficiently strong, then first‐time shirkers are merely warned.     

Cross‐Country Evidence on Labor Market Institutions and Young Adult Employment through the Financial Crisis

I develop and analyze a set of cross‐country facts regarding employment and wage setting institutions over the decade surrounding the 2008 financial crisis. Among long‐industrialized countries, young adult employment declined more than prime age employment over this time period. I show that differences in countries' wage setting institutions strongly predict variations in the magnitude of declines in young adult employment. Both unconditionally and conditional on changes in macroeconomic conditions, young adult employment declined 5 percentage points less in countries where wage setting is driven by collective bargaining arrangements than in countries with statutory wage floors. Evidence on the evolution of legislated minimum wage rates and of an asymmetry in the relationship between growth and young adult employment suggest an important role for a standard “wage rigidity” mechanism.     

Prostitutes,Pimps, and Brothels: Intermediaries,Information, and Market Structure in Prostitution Markets

Prostitution is a multi‐billion dollar, globally distributed, low‐concentration service industry that is receiving increasing attention in the economics literature. This article focuses on a widespread, but little studied, feature of this environment—the role of intermediaries (pimps or brothel owners) on market outcomes. Prostitution laws and markets are perhaps unique in that transactions between principals (prostitutes and johns) are legal in many countries, while intermediary activity (pimping) is illegal. After surveying the varying cross‐country legality of agents we develop a simple theoretical model to analyze how the presence or absence of intermediaries shifts the distribution of market surplus. We show that eliminating pimps and brothels may shift surplus in non‐obvious ways, depending on the precise function they perform and on whether equilibrium is pooling or separating across “high quality” and “low quality” market segments. The implications of alternative policy regimes (intermediaries legal or illegal) are considered.     

Sales expectations and inventory changes in retail trade

In this paper a single equation inventory investment model is estimated for the United States retail sector. Monthly data for the 1970s are utilized. In estimating the model it is alternatively assumed that expectations were formed according to a seasonal model, to perfect foresight, and to a narrowly rational expectations model. We find that a model in which expected sales and the expected rate of inflation are narrowly rational can explain most of the variation in retail inventory investment during the time period studied. The results of the estimation imply that retailers have a relatively short forecast horizon, that they can react quickly to either unexpected sales or to a deviation of actual from desired inventory stocks, and that an increase in the real of interest has a statistically negative impact on retail inventory investment.     

U.K. Conference Venues

ABSTRACT

The following paper investigates the supply and demand for conference venues in the United Kingdom (U.K.) over the past 40 years. The main data relates to trends in the type of venue facilities provided in the U.K. and how the varying market sectors use these. It is suggested that the patterns of venue development have often been in response to perceived opportunity for business rather than actual demand. The concern is raised that current business levels cannot support the growing supply of venues and that continued new developments may not be the most appropriate method of approaching the situation.     

Corporate governance,accounting and finance: A review

We review accounting and finance research on corporate governance (CG). In the course of our review, we focus on a particularly vexing issue, namely endogeneity in the relationships between CG and other matters of concern to accounting and finance scholars, and suggest ways to deal with it. Given the advent of large commercial CG databases, we also stress the importance of how CG is measured and in particular, the construction of CG indices, which should be sensitive to local institutional arrangements, and the need to capture both internal and external aspects of governance. The ‘stickiness’ of CG characteristics provides an additional challenge to CG scholars. Better theory is required, for example, to explain whether various CG practices substitute for each other or are complements. While a multidisciplinary approach to developing better theory is never without its difficulties, it could enrich the current body of knowledge in CG. Despite the vastness of the existing CG literature, these issues do suggest a number of avenues for future research.     

The market reaction to corporate governance regulation

This paper investigates the market reaction to recent legislative and regulatory actions pertaining to corporate governance. The managerial power view of governance suggests that executive pay, the existing process of proxy access, and various governance provisions [e.g., staggered boards and Chief Executive Officer (CEO)-chairman duality] are associated with managerial rent extraction. This perspective predicts that broad government actions that reduce executive pay, increase proxy access, and ban such governance provisions are value-enhancing. In contrast, another view of governance suggests that observed governance choices are the result of value-maximizing contracts between shareholders and management. This perspective predicts that broad government actions that regulate such governance choices are value destroying. Consistent with the latter view, we find that the abnormal returns to recent events relating to corporate governance regulations are, on average, decreasing in CEO pay, decreasing in the number of large blockholders, decreasing in the ease by which small institutional investors can access the proxy process, and decreasing in the presence of a staggered board.     

The Politics of M&A Antitrust

Antitrust regulators play a critical role in protecting market competition. We examine whether the political process affects antitrust reviews of merger transactions. We find that acquirers and targets located in the political districts of powerful U.S. congressional members who serve on committees with antitrust regulatory oversight receive relatively favorable antitrust review outcomes. To establish causality, we use plausibly exogenous shocks to firm–politician links and a falsification test. Additional findings suggest congressional members’ incentives to influence antitrust reviews are affected by three channels: special interests, voter and constituent interests, and ideology. In aggregate, our findings suggest that the political process adversely interferes with the ability of antitrust regulators to provide independent recommendations about anticompetitive mergers.     

The consequences to managers for financial misrepresentation

We track the fortunes of all 2,206 individuals identified as responsible parties for all 788 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation from January 1, 1978 through September 30, 2006. Fully 93% lose their jobs by the end of the regulatory enforcement period. Most are explicitly fired. The likelihood of ouster increases with the cost of the misconduct to shareholders and the quality of the firm's governance. Culpable managers also bear substantial financial losses through restrictions on their future employment, their shareholdings in the firm, and SEC fines. A sizeable minority (28%) face criminal charges and penalties, including jail sentences that average 4.3 years. These results indicate that the individual perpetrators of financial misconduct face significant disciplinary action.