数学在建筑监察领域的运用

对于在建建筑的规划管控,是一个城市规划管理局的重要职能,由于在建建筑众多,尤其对于一些大型城市,对于在建建筑的规划管控主要是从建筑物的尺寸角度来进行的,包括是否超宽、超高等。如何引入计算机数学思想,构建一个在建建筑的智能化规划监察管控系统,并杜绝人情因素,成为提升规划监察工作效率和质量,体现科学发展观的重要技术手段。     

Labor‐Market Institutions and Long‐Term Effects of Youth Unemployment

Graduating from a school during a time of adverse economic conditions has a persistent, harmful effect on workers’ subsequent employment opportunities. An analysis of panel data from OECD countries during the 1960–2010 periods reveals that a worker who experiences a 1 percentage point higher unemployment rate while the worker is 16–24 years old has a 0.14 percentage point higher unemployment rate at ages 25–29 years and 0.03 percentage points higher at ages 30–34 years. The persistence of this negative effect is stronger in countries with stricter employment protection legislation. A composite index for labor‐market rigidity is constructed and the index is shown to have positive correlation with the persistence. Moderating macroeconomic fluctuations is more important in countries that have more persistent labor‐market entry effects on subsequent outcomes.     

Accountability of independent directors: Evidence from firms subject to securities litigation

We examine which independent directors are held accountable when investors sue firms for financial and disclosure-related fraud. Investors can name independent directors as defendants in lawsuits, and they can vote against their reelection to express displeasure over the directors’ ineffectiveness at monitoring managers. In a sample of securities class action lawsuits from 1996 to 2010, about 11% of independent directors are named as defendants. The likelihood of being named is greater for audit committee members and directors who sell stock during the class period. Named directors receive more negative recommendations from Institutional Shareholder Services, a proxy advisory firm, and significantly more negative votes from shareholders than directors in a benchmark sample. They are also more likely than other independent directors to leave sued firms. Overall, shareholders use litigation along with director elections and director retention to hold some independent directors more accountable than others when firms experience financial fraud.     

Stochastic labelling of biological images

Many hypotheses made by experimental researchers can be formulated as a stochastic labelling of a given image. Some stochastic labelling methods for random closed sets are proposed in this paper. Molchanov (I. Molchanov, 1984, Theor. Probability and Math. Statist. 29 , 113–119) provided the probabilistic background for this problem. However, there is a lack of specific labelling models. Ayala and Simó (G. Ayala and A. Simó, 1995, Advances in Applied Probability 27 , 293–305) proposed a method in which, given the whole set of connected components, every component is classified in a certain phase or category in a completely random way. Alternative methods are necessary in case the random labelling hypothesis is not reliable. A different kind of labelling method is proposed that considers the environment: the type of every connected component is a function of its location.
Two different biphase images are studied: a cross section of a nerve from a rat, and a cross section of an optic nerve from a lizard.     

Investigating corporate management lobbying in the U.K. accounting standard-setting process: a multi-issue/multi-period approach

A large body of literature examines the motives of corporate managers to lobby accounting standard-setters. In general, studies confine their examination to single episodes of the standard-setting process (e.g., exposure draft). This article extends the literature by adopting a multi-issue/multi-period approach to investigate corporate lobbying of the U.K.'s ASB. The findings suggest that the extent of corporate lobbying, defined on the basis of the frequency with which companies made submissions to all of the publications issued by the ASB over a six-year period, depends on the size of companies, the debt covenant costs they face and whether they are listed on a U.S. stock exchange. Separate analyses, however, involving (a) the frequency of lobbying on income-related issues and (b) the frequency of lobbying on disclosure issues revealed that, while all these three variables explain lobbying on income-related issues, only size is significant in explaining lobbying on disclosure issues. The results also suggest that the debt to equity ratio is an imperfect proxy for debt covenant costs.     

OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT AND ANTI‐COPYING STRATEGIES TO COUNTER COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT*

In this paper we study the mix of anti‐copying investment strategies by an incumbent firm and the enforcement policies of a government that consists of monitoring and penalizing the copier to address the issue of commercial piracy. If monitoring is socially optimal then the subgame perfect equilibrium anti‐copying investment does not guarantee the prevention of copying. If not monitoring is socially optimal then the subgame perfect equilibrium anti‐copying investment may guarantee the prevention of copying.     

Board size and the variability of corporate performance

This study provides empirical evidence that firms with larger boards have lower variability of corporate performance. The results indicate that board size is negatively associated with the variability of monthly stock returns, annual accounting return on assets, Tobin's Q, accounting accruals, extraordinary items, analyst forecast inaccuracy, and R&D spending, the level of R&D expenditures, and the frequency of acquisition and restructuring activities. The results are consistent with the view that it takes more compromises for a larger board to reach consensus, and consequently, decisions of larger boards are less extreme, leading to less variable corporate performance.     

Climate for Scandal: Corporate Environments that Contribute to Accounting Fraud

We examine the governance characteristics, earnings quality, growth rates, dividend policy, and compensation structure of 97 firms recently under investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for accounting fraud. Our results show that the corporate environment most likely to lead to an accounting scandal manifests significant growth and accounting practices that are already pushing the envelope of earnings smoothing. Firms operating in this environment seem more likely to tip over the edge into fraud if there are fewer outsiders on the audit committee and outside directors appear overcommitted.