How effective is European merger control?

This paper applies an intuitive approach based on stock market data to a unique dataset of large concentrations during the period 1990–2002 to assess the effectiveness of European merger control. The basic idea is to relate announcement and decision abnormal returns. Under a set of four maintained assumptions, merger control might be interpreted to be effective if rents accruing due to the increased market power observed around the merger announcement are reversed by the antitrust decision, i.e. if there is a negative relation between announcement and decision abnormal returns. To clearly identify the events' competitive effects, we explicitly control for the market expectation about the outcome of the merger control procedure and run several robustness checks to assess the role of our maintained assumptions. We find that only outright prohibitions completely reverse the rents measured around a merger's announcement. On average, remedies seem to be only partially capable of reverting announcement abnormal returns. Yet they seem to be more effective when applied during the first rather than the second investigation phase and in subsamples where our assumptions are more likely to hold. Moreover, the European Commission appears to learn over time.     

Law and credit constraints in transition economies1

Using a survey of over 4,000 firms in 21 transition economies, this paper investigates how legal extensiveness (law on the books) and legal effectiveness (law in practice) affect availability of bank finance. Our findings suggest that both law on the books and law in practice are important, but that they impact firms of different sizes differently. Small firms appear to be the most credit constrained in countries with weak creditor rights and with weak contract enforcement, while large firms are the most credit constrained in countries with weak courts and unclear and inconsistent laws pertaining to firms’ business operations.     

The evolution of corruption and development in transitional economies: Evidence from China

It is widely accepted in the literature, that the level of corruption is negatively and robustly related to economic development. However, skeptics argue that for transitional economies, this relationship may not hold. Economic reform loosens up the control of local officials and can increase corruption; Corruption and per capita income can be positively related. Using panel provincial data of China from 1995 to 2014 on prosecuted cases of corruption, we discover that during the early phase of China’s economic reform (during Zhu Rongji and Hu-Wen administrations), a positive short-run relationship is indeed observed. But, there is a robust negative long-run cointegration relationship between corruption and per capita income. The development of the market economy improves private wage and income in the long-run. The relatively inefficient and low returns to ordinary corruption cannot compete with rising market returns, which lead to dwindling corruption. However, the share of major corruption cases is increasing over time to be able to compete with rising market wages.     

The Efficacy of Regulation Fair Disclosure

This paper examines the impact of Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on information leakage around voluntary management disclosures. We find a positive correlation between stock returns two days before and after the voluntary disclosure in the pre‐Regulation FD period, but not in the post‐Regulation FD period. After Regulation FD is implemented, pre‐announcement abnormal return as a percentage of total return decreases by 26.1% (21.4%) for large firms with good (bad) news, suggesting that the amount of information leakage reduces for these firms. These findings provide support for the premise and the intended purpose of the regulation for large firms.     

The Nature of Corruption Deterrence in a Competitive Media Sector

This paper compares the deterrence provided by a competitive media sector towards government induced corruption with that of a media monopoly in a setting where the media might raise both true as well as false allegations of corruption. It finds that competition’s impact on corruption deterrence is not necessarily better than a monopoly but rather hinges on a delicate balance between government’s kickback from corruption and the media’s potential benefit from exposure. While the paper does identify conditions in which a competitive media sector would improve upon the deterrence provided by a monopoly, it also find conditions under which it would do no better than a monopoly and in some situations its strategic response could be even worse especially when it intensifies effort towards justifying false allegations.     

氮,磷,钾配合施用对人参质量影响的研究

利用正交试验设计给人参配施氮、磷、钾肥在鲜根重量和人参药效成分－－人参皂甙含量啬的基础上，找出最佳施肥处理组合，用以探讨氮，磷，钾肥与人参质量的关系。     

Stochastic labelling of biological images

Many hypotheses made by experimental researchers can be formulated as a stochastic labelling of a given image. Some stochastic labelling methods for random closed sets are proposed in this paper. Molchanov (I. Molchanov, 1984, Theor. Probability and Math. Statist. 29 , 113–119) provided the probabilistic background for this problem. However, there is a lack of specific labelling models. Ayala and Simó (G. Ayala and A. Simó, 1995, Advances in Applied Probability 27 , 293–305) proposed a method in which, given the whole set of connected components, every component is classified in a certain phase or category in a completely random way. Alternative methods are necessary in case the random labelling hypothesis is not reliable. A different kind of labelling method is proposed that considers the environment: the type of every connected component is a function of its location.
Two different biphase images are studied: a cross section of a nerve from a rat, and a cross section of an optic nerve from a lizard.     

Prices vs. Quantities with fiscal cushioning

Enforcement of international environmental quantity regulations (e.g. tradable pollution permits) is often expected to be stricter than that of price regulations (e.g. emission taxes). While both instruments provide opportunities for misrepresenting actual pollution, enforcement of international price-based instruments is additionally hampered by potential fiscal cushioning, i.e. an adjustment of domestic fiscal policies offsetting the tax incentive to reduce emission reductions. The present paper extends the formal debate on Prices vs. Quantities by including the risk of fiscal cushioning. We find the level of the marginal benefit curve and the variance of costs become key elements for instrument choice and can render quantity regulations strictly preferable. Remarkably, in the latter case, the slopes of the marginal curves do not affect optimal instrument choice. Numerical calculations, using data taken from the international climate policy context, support the potential dominance of quantity regulations found in our formal analysis.     

OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT AND ANTI‐COPYING STRATEGIES TO COUNTER COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT*

In this paper we study the mix of anti‐copying investment strategies by an incumbent firm and the enforcement policies of a government that consists of monitoring and penalizing the copier to address the issue of commercial piracy. If monitoring is socially optimal then the subgame perfect equilibrium anti‐copying investment does not guarantee the prevention of copying. If not monitoring is socially optimal then the subgame perfect equilibrium anti‐copying investment may guarantee the prevention of copying.     

Board size and the variability of corporate performance

This study provides empirical evidence that firms with larger boards have lower variability of corporate performance. The results indicate that board size is negatively associated with the variability of monthly stock returns, annual accounting return on assets, Tobin's Q, accounting accruals, extraordinary items, analyst forecast inaccuracy, and R&D spending, the level of R&D expenditures, and the frequency of acquisition and restructuring activities. The results are consistent with the view that it takes more compromises for a larger board to reach consensus, and consequently, decisions of larger boards are less extreme, leading to less variable corporate performance.