Low information nash equilibria for oligopolistic markets

This paper deals with an infinite horizon n firm oligopoly in which firms are assumed to have incomplete information about one another's actions and profit functions. An equilibrium concept is defined that is similar to the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium, but is suitable for the information assumptions of the model. The equilibrium uses a type of bounded rationality which makes firms' computations relatively easy. This is due to an implicit assumption that computation is costly and a Bayesian approach is prohibitively costly. This low information Nash equilibrium is proved to exist, and, in addition, an adaptive expectations decision process is described which, if followed by all firms, leads to the low information Nash equilibrium.     

Why England? Demographic factors, structural change and physical capital accumulation during the Industrial Revolution

Why did England industrialize first? And why was Europe ahead of the rest of the world? Unified growth theory in the tradition of Galor and Weil (2000, American Economic Review, 89, 806–828) and Galor and Moav (2002, Quartely Journal of Economics, 177(4), 1133–1191) captures the key features of the transition from stagnation to growth over time. Yet we know remarkably little about why industrialization occurred much earlier in some parts of the world than in others. To answer this question, we present a probabilistic two-sector model where the initial escape from Malthusian constraints depends on the demographic regime, capital deepening and the use of more differentiated capital equipment. Weather-induced shocks to agricultural productivity cause changes in prices and quantities, and affect wages. In a standard model with capital externalities, these fluctuations interact with the demographic regime and affect the speed of growth. Our model is calibrated to match the main characteristics of the English economy in 1700 and the observed transition until 1850. We capture one of the key features of the British Industrial Revolution emphasized by economic historians — slow growth of output and productivity. Fertility limitation is responsible for higher per capita incomes, and these in turn increase industrialization probabilities. The paper also explores the availability of nutrition for poorer segments of society. We examine the influence of redistributive institutions such as the Old Poor Law, and find they were not decisive in fostering industrialization. Simulations using parameter values for other countries show that Britain’s early escape was only partly due to chance. France could have moved out of agriculture and into manufacturing faster than Britain, but the probability was less than 25%. Contrary to recent claims in the literature, 18th century China had only a minimal chance to escape from Malthusian constraints.     

一种项目采购模式的博弈分析

本文试图用经济学理论 (主要是博弈与信息经济学的理论 )来分析目前工程项目建设中采用的一种工程设备、材料的采购模式。文章首先提出这种模式的内容与特征 ,然后就制度内各参与方 (主要为业主、承包商、供货商 )之间的博弈进行分析 ,分不完全信息博弈、完全信息博弈两种情况来分析这种采购制度下达到的均衡。     

物流服务市场供求关系研究

从认识物流服务市场的供求现状出发,使用经济学理论、竞争理论、物流业固有特性三个分析方法进行物流服务市场供求关系研究,对揭示我国物流服务市场的运行规律有一定的引导作用。     

基于博弈论的二层供应链网络竞争与结盟模型

就两个制造商和一个零售商所组成的供应链模型进行研究,运用博弈论方法来研究制造商间的竞争及制造商与零售商间的竞争和协调决策问题,给出了两种决策下相应的数学模型,并比较了制造商与零售商间有无联盟关系时对各自收益的影响。     

立式双面研磨机变形机理探讨

文章通过对立式双面研磨机运动机理分析,探讨了研磨盘产生伞状变形原因,提出如何针对实际情况消除变形,提高加工精度。     

横向互补型企业网络形成动因的博弈分析

企业网络是一种新型组织结构形式和制度安排。本文首先分析了企业网络的形成动因,然后运用博弈论建立模型论证了横向互补型企业网络得以形成的动因在于网络成员自身的利益最大化。     

需求势能理论在多级物流网络预选点中的应用

针对分销物流网络的特点,提出了基于服务时限的多级物流网络选址问题和选点思路,应用需求势能理论建立了多网点选址数学模型,并提出了详尽的求解方法和步骤。最后通过医药分销物流网络系统的实例分析,说明了该方法在网络选点过程中的模型化方法和求解步骤。     

合并会计报表的编制理论探析

本文在介绍了两种主流合并理论——母公司理论和经济实体理论不同的基础上,从现代企业契约理论的角度,分析了合并报表涉及的母公司与少数股东之间的委托代理关系,论证了子公司的少数股东和其他利益相关者对合并报表信息需要的必然性。最后通过对母公司理论和经济实体理论的利弊比较,预测了合并会计报表理论未来的发展趋势,得出了经济实体理论将会取代母公司理论的结论。     

Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms

Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best.JEL Classification: C91, C92, D64, H41 Correspondence to: Jeffrey P. CarpenterWe thank Carolyn Craven, Corinna Noelke and two referees for comments, and Middlebury College for financial assistance. In addition, Carpenter acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-CAREER 0092953).