全文获取类型
收费全文 | 5870篇 |
免费 | 139篇 |
国内免费 | 53篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 719篇 |
工业经济 | 383篇 |
计划管理 | 971篇 |
经济学 | 1922篇 |
综合类 | 424篇 |
运输经济 | 26篇 |
旅游经济 | 178篇 |
贸易经济 | 753篇 |
农业经济 | 180篇 |
经济概况 | 501篇 |
信息产业经济 | 5篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 11篇 |
2023年 | 62篇 |
2022年 | 71篇 |
2021年 | 64篇 |
2020年 | 89篇 |
2019年 | 110篇 |
2018年 | 67篇 |
2017年 | 68篇 |
2016年 | 78篇 |
2015年 | 58篇 |
2014年 | 109篇 |
2013年 | 324篇 |
2012年 | 173篇 |
2011年 | 839篇 |
2010年 | 190篇 |
2009年 | 193篇 |
2008年 | 261篇 |
2007年 | 182篇 |
2006年 | 204篇 |
2005年 | 169篇 |
2004年 | 126篇 |
2003年 | 345篇 |
2002年 | 420篇 |
2001年 | 311篇 |
2000年 | 280篇 |
1999年 | 293篇 |
1998年 | 189篇 |
1997年 | 146篇 |
1996年 | 99篇 |
1995年 | 44篇 |
1994年 | 24篇 |
1993年 | 15篇 |
1992年 | 11篇 |
1991年 | 7篇 |
1990年 | 5篇 |
1989年 | 4篇 |
1988年 | 6篇 |
1987年 | 11篇 |
1986年 | 5篇 |
1985年 | 62篇 |
1984年 | 54篇 |
1983年 | 33篇 |
1982年 | 33篇 |
1981年 | 24篇 |
1980年 | 81篇 |
1979年 | 53篇 |
1978年 | 36篇 |
1977年 | 22篇 |
1975年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有6062条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
91.
The proper panel econometric specification of the gravity equation: A three-way model with bilateral interaction effects 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
We argue that the proper specification of a panel gravity model should include main (exporter, importer, and time) as well
as time invariant exporter-by-importer (bilateral) interaction effects. In a panel of 11 APEC countries, the latter are highly
significant and account for the largest part of variation.
First version received: February 2001/Final version received: June 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful to two anonymous referees and Robert Kunst for their helpful comments. 相似文献
92.
Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts 总被引:8,自引:0,他引:8
Pradeep Agrawal 《Journal of Economics》2002,75(1):33-61
generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort).
The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent
of monitoring.
Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the
agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or
the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts
observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work
under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for
senior managers than for the production workers.
Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997 相似文献
93.
We analyze the impact of product diversification on performance. This topic has been discussed in the literature, and there
is no consensus so far as to the significance or the direction of the impact. Performance is measured using Tobin's q for
a sample of 103 large, non-financial Spanish firms (1992–1995). Diversification is measured by means of a categorical variable,
as suggested by Varadarajan. The principal results indicate that the firms with intermediate levels of product diversification
have the highest performance, while the firms with low and high levels of diversification show significantly lower performance,
which performance is not significantly different between them. 相似文献
94.
Summary. A model that includes the cost of producing money is presented and the nature of the inefficient equilibria in the model
are examined. It is suggested that if one acknowledges that transactions are a form of production, which requires the consumption
of resources, then the concept of Pareto optimality is inappropriate for assessing efficiency. Instead it becomes necessary
to provide an appropriate comparative analysis of alternative transactions mechanisms in the appropriate context.
Received: September 5, 2000; revised version: May 3, 2001 相似文献
95.
Summary. We analyze an oligopoly model of homogeneous product price competition that allows for discontinuities in demand and/or costs.
Conditions under which only zero profit equilibrium outcomes obtain in such settings are provided. We then illustrate through
a series of examples that the conditions provided are “tight” in the sense that their relaxation leads to positive profit
outcomes.
Received: April 7, 2000; revised version: September 14, 2000 相似文献
96.
Manuel S. Santos 《Spanish Economic Review》2002,4(1):1-18
This paper presents a methodology for the formulation and testing of economic growth models. The model selected includes
two production sectors with physical and human capital accumulation. These capital stocks are associated with spillover effects
in the production of the physical good and in the accumulation of both factors. 相似文献
97.
Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters.
The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is
shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates
in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety
of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued
formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented
observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized.
Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar
participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful
suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University
of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from
the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín).
Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin 相似文献
98.
Summary. This paper considers a dynamic version of Akerlof's (1970) lemons problem where buyers and sellers must engage in search
to find a trading partner. We show that if goods are durable, the market itself may provide a natural sorting mechanism. In
equilibrium, high-quality goods sell at a higher price than low-quality goods but also circulate longer. This accords with
the common wisdom that sellers who want to sell fast may have to accept a lower price. We then compare the equilibrium outcomes
under private information with those under complete information. Surprisingly, we find that for a large range of parameter
values the quilibrium outcomes under the two information regimes coincide, despite the fact that circulation time is used
to achieve separation.
Received: August 24, 2000; revised version: October 24, 2000 相似文献
99.
Alex Possajennikov 《Economic Theory》2003,21(4):921-928
Summary. I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite population in symmetric games in which payoff
depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon.
Received: August 27, 2001; revised version: January 29, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The paper has profited from the comments of Maria Montero, Burkhard Hehenkamp, Wolfgang Leininger, and Dave Furth.
Financial support from the DFG via Postgraduate Programme at the University of Dortmund and via SFB 504 at the University
of Mannheim is acknowledged.
RID="*"
ID="*" Present address: University of Mannheim, SFB 504, L 13, 15, 68131 Mannheim, Germany (e-mail: possajen@sfb504.uni-mannheim.de) 相似文献
100.
Reiko Aoki 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):653-672
We show how credible revelation and ability to commit to quality choice effect equilibrium qualities and welfare when product
market is either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We show that results depend on the type of competition but not generally
on the cost of quality function. We show that with Bertrand competition, the equilibrium qualities are lower with credible
commitment. Competition is moderated and producer surplus is higher and consumer surplus lower. With Cournot competition,
higher quality will be better but lower quality will be worse with credible commitment. Consumer surplus is always greater
with credible commitment and if cost does not increase too quickly with quality, producer surplus will also increase. Thus
credible commitment is a collusive device with Bertrand competition but it can improve social welfare with Cournot competition.
Received: February 8, 2000; revised version: February 14, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The idea of this paper originated in the weekly workshops of Mordecai Kurz at Stanford. I am forever in debted to Mordecai
and fellow students – Luis Cabral, Peter DeMarzo, John Hillas, Michihiro Kandori, Steve Langois, Patrick McAllister, Steve
Sharpe, Peter Streufert, Steve Turnbull and Gyu-Ho Wang – for their criticism and encouragement. I also benefited from comments
from Yi-Heng Chen, Jin-Li Hu, Kala Krishna, Jinji Naoto, Thomas J. Prusa, and Shyh-Fang Ueng at various later stages of this
work. Last but not least, I am grateful for the detailed comments of the referee. 相似文献