陕西实施农村养老保险制度的经济分析及措施

随着我国人口老龄化的加剧，老年人特别是农村老年人的养老问题日益突出，本文主要通过对陕西农村养老现状和所存在问题的分析，提出了建立农村养老保险制度的建议，旨在于试图为我国农村养老保险制度的实施提供一些借鉴。     

中国保险业的合谋倾向强度:一个理论分析框架

从结构、需求与信息三个维度构建了一个产业合谋倾向强度理论分析框架，并用该框架分析了我国保险业的合谋强度。研究认为，我国保险业合谋强度比较大。     

社区医疗企业的经营策略研究

社区医疗经营的好坏关系到广大人民群众的切身利益,同时发展社区医疗存在大量的商机,但是目前许多问题阻碍了社区医疗的进一步发展。文章指出,如何去发掘潜力、发展壮大社区医疗,关键是要有创新的思维,目前社区医疗走与大医院联营或者与大医院直接经营的方式应该是一种值得尝试的途径。     

分红保险合同红利负债的确认与计量研究

近年来分红保险已成为我国保险市场的热销产品,它几乎占据了寿险市场的半壁江山,但分红保险负债的确认与计量问题,特别是分红保险红利负债的确认与计量问题在我国并未形成统一的规范,本文根据分红保险的不同红利分配方式对分红保险合同红利负债的确认与计量问题进行研究。     

构建我国个人信用体系保障机制--韩国"坏银行"重整制度考察之思考

我国个人消费信贷近几年的发展十分迅速，但是在个人消费信贷的快速发展中，银行由于个人不良信贷所引发的不良债权比重逐年上升，而且信用环境不良有恶化这一问题的趋势。个人信用制度的建设、个人不良信贷资产的处置和我国个人信用安全体系的构建，已经成为摆在我们面前的现实问题。韩国资产管理公司在处置信用卡公司不良债权中的“坏银行”重整制度，构成了韩国金融安全网络的重要组成部分，这一制度设计值得我们借鉴。     

Deposit insurance and bank regulation in a monetary economy: a general equilibrium exposition

Summary. It is commonly argued that poorly designed banking system safety nets are largely to blame for the frequency and severity of modern banking crises. For example, underpriced deposit insurance and/or low reserve requirements are often viewed as factors that encourage risk-taking by banks. In this paper, we study the effects of three policy variables: deposit insurance premia, reserve requirements and the way in which the costs of bank bailouts are financed. We show that when deposit insurance premia are low, the monetization of bank bailout costs may not be more inflationary than financing these costs out of general revenue. This is because, while monetizing the costs increases the inflation tax rate, higher levels of general taxation reduce savings, deposits, bank reserves, and the inflation tax base. Increasing the inflation tax rate obviously raises inflation, but so does an erosion of the inflation tax base. We also find that low deposit insurance premia or low reserve requirements may not be associated with a high rate of bank failure.Received: 2 January 2002, Revised: 1 March 2003JEL Classification Numbers: D5, E5, G1.B. D. Smith: Sadly, our co-author, colleague and dear friend, Bruce D. Smith, died on July 9, 2002.     

The politics of redistributive social insurance

This paper analyses the political support for a social insurance that includes elements of redistribution when there exists an imperfect private insurance alternative. Individuals differ both in their income and risk. The social insurance is compulsory and charges an income-related contribution with pooling of risks. The private insurance is voluntary and charges a contribution based on individual risks. However due to the adverse selection problem, private insurance companies provide only partial insurance. Adopting a non-expected utility model, we show that there is a general majority support for social insurance and that this support is increasing with risk aversion. We also show that a mixed insurance is politically impossible, regardless of the degree of redistribution of social insurance and the joint distribution of risk and income in the population. Lastly, we analyse how the political support for social insurance is affected by any change in its redistributive component and the possibility of using genetic tests.     

Unemployment dynamics in an OLG economy with public pensions

Pension benefits in old age establish a disincentive to save in youth, thereby yielding lower levels of capital stock and the wage rate. As a result, the trade union has an incentive to change the composition of its two targets: employment and the wage rate. This paper develops a model that includes employment effects of public pensions via capital accumulation and union wage setting. Within this framework, we consider how contribution rates to the pension system influence the level and time path of the unemployment rate. It is demonstrated that (1) a higher contribution rate results in a lower unemployment rate, and (2) the economy with a high (low) contribution rate experiences monotone convergence towards (oscillatory convergence towards or a period-2 cycle around) the steady state. The author would like to thank an anonymous referee, Kazutoshi Miyazawa, and seminar participants at Osaka University for their useful comments and suggestions, and Masako Ikefuji and Hiroaki Yamagami for their research assistance. Financial support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) through a Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) (No.17730131), the Asahi Glass Foundation, the Japan Economic Research Foundation and the 21st Century COE Program (Osaka University) is gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are mine.     

构建贫困农村养老保障体系的对策研究——基于河北省涞水县的实证分析

本文通过对涞水县3个乡的12个村、362户居民的入户调查，了解了困扰涞水县贫困农民养老的问题所在，并就贫困农村养老保障进行了对策性探讨，旨在帮助贫困农民解决实际的养老问题，同时也为构建贫困农村养老保障体系提供参考。     

Market Structure and Risk Taking in the Banking Industry

We demonstrate that the common view according to which an increase in competition leads banks to increased risk taking fails to hold in an environment where homogeneous loss averse consumers can choose in which bank to make a deposit based on their knowledge of the riskiness incorporated in the banks outstanding loan portfolios. With an exclusive focus on imperfect competition we find that banks incentives for risk taking are invariant to a change in the banking market structure from duopoly to monopoly. Finally, we show that deposit insurance would eliminate the gains from bank competition when banks use asset quality as a strategic instrument.revised version received October 15, 2003