科斯定理在水资源保护中的应用

我国在经济实力不断提高的同时，生态环境却不断的遭到破坏，即存在恶化现象。在水资源方面，水污染非常突出。目前，我国七大水系中近一半的河段污染严重，湖泊中太湖、巢湖、滇池尤为突出；50％以上的城市地下水受到污染；500多条主要河流和湖泊受污染面积达到82％以上。全国有7亿人口饮用大肠杆菌超标水，约1．7亿人饮用被有机体污染的水。水环境保护因此受到重视。本文利用科斯定理的理论逻辑，提出水环境保护应首先建立水权及其交易制度，并充分发挥政府制度在其中的监督引导作用。     

外部性、负外部性及其在生态保护中的应用

外部性是社会生活生产中很常见的一种经济现象,由于行为和结果的不一致造成的负外部性更是普遍,负外部性一般的解决办法为庇古税和科斯定理。以国内影视剧组破坏环境为例,分析负外部性在生态保护中的应用,提出通过科斯手段、庇古税、法律手段、媒体社会力量等多种方法解决外部性问题。     

企业理论的起源和发展:一个时间演绎视角

民众、企业、政府是经济社会的三大主体;现在是,以后是,甚至永远都是.正因如此,企业理论成为了过去三十多年间主流经济学中发展最为迅速、也最富有成果的领域之一,它与博奕论、信息经济学、激励机制设计理论、新制度经济学和演化经济学相互交叉,大大丰富了微观经济学内容,改进了人们对市场机制及企业组织制度运行的认识.本文作者以时间为序,搜集、整理了企业理论起源和发展方面的内容,分三个阶段阐述了曾在学界产生一定影响的企业理论观点.     

浅论碳交易市场形成和运行的经济理论基础

全球环境恶化使减少二氧化碳等温室气体的排放变得十分必要。这一问题从经济学的角度看就是如何有效地校正负外部性。科斯定理提供了以市场机制来解决外部性问题的新思路。发挥科斯定理的作用,必须建立在明晰产权,降低交易成本以及合理分配初始权利的基础上。以科斯定理为主要理论依据建立起来的国际碳交易市场也必须在妥善解决上述三个问题后才能有效运行。     

浅论科斯定理在法律中的应用

科斯通过提出＂交易费用＂来解释企业存在的原因以及企业扩展的边界问题,对庇古的损害法、分析法进行了大胆进攻。尽管以科斯为代表的经济分析法学派、＂法律与经济学＂理论运动曾受过批评和指责,但把经济学的效益原理大胆用于法学研究,并深入案例分析,不仅在当时为西方的法学发展创造了新的生机与活力,更将法学研究融入实践,开辟了新的发展道路。     

Monopoly power and the firm’s valuation: a dynamic analysis of short versus long-term policies

Summary. Recent anti-trust cases exacerbated the concerns of investors regarding the effects of a firms monopoly power on its production choice, shareholder value, and the overall economy. We address this issue within a dynamic equilibrium model featuring a large monopolistic firm whose actions not only affect the price of its output, but also effectively influence the valuation of its stock. The latter renders time-inconsistency to the firms dynamic production choice. When the firm is required to pre-commit to its strategy, the ensuing equilibrium is largely in line with the predictions of the textbook monopoly model. When the firm behaves in a time-consistent manner, however, the predictions are strikingly at odds. The trade-off between current profits and the valuation of future profits induces the firm to increase production beyond the competitive benchmark and cut prices. This policy may result in destroying shareholder value, and does indeed fully wipe out the firms profit in the limit of the decision-making interval shrinking to zero, in line with the Coase conjecture.Received: 23 December 2003, Revised: 1 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D42, D51, D92, E20, G12.Correspondence to: Anna PavlovaWe thank Steve Spear and the anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. We are also grateful to Franklin Allen, Dave Cass, Peter DeMarzo, Bernard Dumas, Ron Giammarino, Rich Kihlstrom, Leonid Kogan, Branko Urosevic, Dimitri Vayanos, seminar participants at Boston University, University of Colorado at Boulder, Columbia University, MIT, University of Pennsylvania, Princeton University, American Finance Association Meetings, and European Finance Association Meetings for valuable comments. All errors are solely our responsibility.     

基于科斯定理的我国地质公园管理模式探析

在世界地质公园网络计划的推动下,我国地质公园发展迅速,然而管理水平却相对滞后,存在产权不清、政企不分、协调不力等问题,严重影响了地质公园综合效益的发挥。针对这些问题,在分析专家建议的基础上,依据科斯定理,从＂产权—效率＂角度,构建了覆盖全行业、全方位、权威的地质公园管理模式。     

Endogenous transfers in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An experimental test of cooperation and coordination

We test a two-stage compensation mechanism for promoting cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games. Players first simultaneously choose binding non-negative amounts to pay their counterparts for cooperating, and then play the induced game knowing these amounts. In our games, all payment pairs consistent with mutual cooperation in subgame-perfect equilibrium transform these games into coordination games, with both mutual cooperation and mutual defection as Nash equilibria in the second stage. When endogenous transfer payments are not permitted, cooperation is much less likely. Mutual cooperation is most likely when the (sufficient) payments are identical, and it is also substantially more likely with payment pairs that bring the mutual-cooperation payoffs closer together. Both the Fehr–Schmidt and Charness–Rabin models predict that transfers that make final payoffs closer are preferred; however, they do not explain why equal transfers are particularly effective. Transfers are also effective in sustaining cooperation even when they are imposed and not chosen.     

Should refusal to sell be illegal?

We analyse a private firm's decision of whether to refuse to sell to a particular group of consumers whose interaction with other consumers generates negative externalities. The literature has rarely incorporated this motive directly into the firm's profit-maximisation problem. Discriminatory refusal-to-sell policies can increase profits and consumer utility among those affected by the negative externality. Of course it also reduces utility among consumers who are refused, raising the possibility of an indeterminate effect on social welfare. We obtain a stark and rather surprising result: The refusal-to-sell policy is socially optimal whenever it is individually optimal for a profit-maximising firm to adopt such a policy. No legislation or regulation is required from a social-welfare perspective (under the assumptions used in the specification of the social welfare function). We prove this result analytically for the case of linear demand functions. Numerical simulations show that the result also holds for constant-price-elasticity demand functions.