如何理解“制度重要”命题——从哈耶克“知识问题”视角看科斯的比较制度分析

虽然自科斯定理出现以来,人们普遍接受了在一个交易成本为正的世界中制度重要命题,但由于各种原因该命题存在着极大的被新古典化的风险,制度分析被窄化为制度的均衡分析。从这种分析出发,作为外在第三方的经济学家被认为可以基于对有关交易成本信息的完全掌握而对制度效率进行事前比较。本文从哈耶克的知识问题出发对这种分析路径进行批判,认为这实际上相当于以另外一种方式将人们重新拉回到零交易成本世界。     

碳市场:原理、实践和前景

全球气温变暖使得减少二氧化碳等温室气体的排放变得十分必要,由《京都议定书》催生出来的以交易温室气体排放权为主的国际碳市场就是解决这一问题的有益尝试。本文从经济理论出发,分析了国际碳市场的形成基础和运行条件,通过对该市场现状的研究,指出了其存在的问题和今后的发展前景,并对我国如何发展碳市场提出了相关建议。     

Endogenous transfers in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An experimental test of cooperation and coordination

We test a two-stage compensation mechanism for promoting cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games. Players first simultaneously choose binding non-negative amounts to pay their counterparts for cooperating, and then play the induced game knowing these amounts. In our games, all payment pairs consistent with mutual cooperation in subgame-perfect equilibrium transform these games into coordination games, with both mutual cooperation and mutual defection as Nash equilibria in the second stage. When endogenous transfer payments are not permitted, cooperation is much less likely. Mutual cooperation is most likely when the (sufficient) payments are identical, and it is also substantially more likely with payment pairs that bring the mutual-cooperation payoffs closer together. Both the Fehr–Schmidt and Charness–Rabin models predict that transfers that make final payoffs closer are preferred; however, they do not explain why equal transfers are particularly effective. Transfers are also effective in sustaining cooperation even when they are imposed and not chosen.     

基于科斯定理的我国地质公园管理模式探析

在世界地质公园网络计划的推动下,我国地质公园发展迅速,然而管理水平却相对滞后,存在产权不清、政企不分、协调不力等问题,严重影响了地质公园综合效益的发挥。针对这些问题,在分析专家建议的基础上,依据科斯定理,从＂产权—效率＂角度,构建了覆盖全行业、全方位、权威的地质公园管理模式。     

Teaching Economics to Trade Unionists

This audience for economic education has special pedagogical and subject matter needs from instructors. The rewards to both, however, outweigh the efforts required.     

Interpreting suboptimal business outcomes in light of the Coase Theorem: Lessons from Sidmouth International Festival

The management team of the world-famous Sidmouth Festival resigned in 2004, after failing to secure bad-weather underwriting worth £200,000, and amidst widespread fears that the Festival was doomed. While claims of a local economic impact of £5 million are seriously flawed, it is highly likely that the local economy did benefit by at least several times the amount of the required insurance. Failure to capture these net positive benefits is linked to ill-defined property rights, rising transaction costs, incomplete information from unreliable sources, and actual or feared free riding. These conditions prevented the type of efficient bargaining solution in the face of externalities envisioned by the Coase Theorem. Practically all of the problems preventing the ideal Coasean solution could have been addressed by granting key stakeholders' individual ownership rights. Hence, while the Coase solution was not applicable, the Theorem's predictions (or its corollary's predictions) were confirmed.     

"科斯定理"与科斯理论的核心思想--读"社会成本问题"

本文所指的"科斯定理"仅限于科斯"第一定理",即"如果交易成本为零,那么无论初始权利如何界定,都可以通过市场交易实现产值最大化"这一基本思想.文章通过对"社会成本问题"一文脉络的简要梳理之后指出,"科斯定理"只是科斯为了讨论外部侵害问题而发展出来的分析方法,但这一思路对于分析和解决我国社会主义市场经济建设中所出现的一些问题具有启发和借鉴意义.     

排污权交易的经济分析

排污权交易是按照科斯定理而制定的基于市场机制的行之有效的污染控制手段。实行排污权交易的结果是污染的治理主要由边际治理成本较低的企业来完成,从而优化了资源配置,有利于社会总产值的提高。排污权交易便于政府进行污染物的总量控制,有助于推动企业进行污染控制技术的革新,实施清洁生产,也有利于环境保护与经济的协调发展,应尽快在我国推广。     

回到“定分”经济学： 法律经济学对科斯定理的误读与澄清

科斯定理面世至今,不管是在经济学界还是法学界,均存在对该定理的诸多理论误读。从科斯一以贯之的理论逻辑出发,基于一般化的交易成本概念和比较制度分析进路,科斯定理的重点是科斯第二定理（或科斯定律）,即一种“经济的法律分析”。但基于新古典经济学的最优化思维,波斯纳错将科斯第一定理视作科斯定理的核心和重点,不仅将该定理内在的财富最大化视为法律（包括立法和司法）的应然目标,也将最优化模型视为法学研究的基本方法。这是一种将法律视为新古典经济学最优理论之新殖民地的“法律的经济分析”。该理论不仅与科斯经济学背道而驰,还导致了国内法学界在科斯定理上的误判和误用。基于此,我们应该回归科斯所提倡的一种基于比较制度分析的定分经济学。     

Monopoly power and the firm’s valuation: a dynamic analysis of short versus long-term policies

Summary. Recent anti-trust cases exacerbated the concerns of investors regarding the effects of a firms monopoly power on its production choice, shareholder value, and the overall economy. We address this issue within a dynamic equilibrium model featuring a large monopolistic firm whose actions not only affect the price of its output, but also effectively influence the valuation of its stock. The latter renders time-inconsistency to the firms dynamic production choice. When the firm is required to pre-commit to its strategy, the ensuing equilibrium is largely in line with the predictions of the textbook monopoly model. When the firm behaves in a time-consistent manner, however, the predictions are strikingly at odds. The trade-off between current profits and the valuation of future profits induces the firm to increase production beyond the competitive benchmark and cut prices. This policy may result in destroying shareholder value, and does indeed fully wipe out the firms profit in the limit of the decision-making interval shrinking to zero, in line with the Coase conjecture.Received: 23 December 2003, Revised: 1 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D42, D51, D92, E20, G12.Correspondence to: Anna PavlovaWe thank Steve Spear and the anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. We are also grateful to Franklin Allen, Dave Cass, Peter DeMarzo, Bernard Dumas, Ron Giammarino, Rich Kihlstrom, Leonid Kogan, Branko Urosevic, Dimitri Vayanos, seminar participants at Boston University, University of Colorado at Boulder, Columbia University, MIT, University of Pennsylvania, Princeton University, American Finance Association Meetings, and European Finance Association Meetings for valuable comments. All errors are solely our responsibility.