我国投资基金选股与择时能力的实证研究

文章选择了比较成熟的单因素T-M模型和H-M模型,对2004年1月1日～2007年11月31日间194个交易周的10只基金进行业绩评价,考察证券投资基金是否在我国这种弱式有效的市场上表现出良好的选股与择时能力。结果表明,除个别基金外,我国基金整体不具备择时能力,虽具有一定的选股能力,但表现并不显著。     

经济全球化对区域自主创新能力的作用探析

经济全球化对我国的影响越来越大。文章通过对经济全球化的表现形式进行分析,得出我国参与经济全球化对各区域自主创新能力产生了几大作用:提供创新要素,打开新产品销路,增加创新压力,增强创新意识,保障创新成果。     

Stock exchange competition in a simple model of capital market equilibrium

This paper uses a simple model of mean-variance capital markets equilibrium with proportional transactions costs to analyze the competition of stock markets for investors. We assume that equity trading is costly and endogenize transactions costs as variables strategically influenced by stock exchanges. Among other things, the model predicts that increasing financial market correlation leads to a decrease of transaction costs, an increase in cross-border trading activity, and to a decrease in the home bias of international equity flows. These predictions are consistent with the recent evolution of international stock markets.     

上市公司主动信息披露行为的博弈分析

本文从同业竞争的简单博弈模型出发进行分析,得出了上市公司主动披露"好消息"但不主动披露"坏消息"的结论.而后,对市场监督机制存在的情况下对上市公司主动信息披露的行为进行博弈分析, 、得出了市场可预测与不可预测情况下上市公司的纳什均衡.最后,对外界监督压力存在的情况进行了博弈分析.上市公司一般会选择主动披露"好消息",但主动披露"坏消息"的行为则随约束条件的不同而变化.增强上市公司的同业竞争,提高上市公司对声誉的依赖性,提高监督效率,降低监督成本,提高监督的覆盖面,对提高上市公司主动信息披露行为会起积极作用.     

青藏线运输能力适应性综合评价分析

在分析影响青藏线运输能力因素的基础上,建立了青藏线运输能力适应性模糊综合评价指标体系和模型,分3个层次对该线运输能力适应性进行综合评价,认为青藏线运输能力适应性水平是高的,整个运输组织方案是可行的,但还需对特大灾害和事故下的应对方案和措施进行研究。     

铁路、民航客运市场竞争焦点及对策探讨

由于民航在机场建设和航线开发上的不断发展,使750～1500km范围内的客运市场成为与铁路竞争的焦点。随着民航票价的下浮,运营成本和人工成本的进一步降低,将对铁路形成更大的挑战。为此,铁路必须明确客运市场竞争重点,通过采取加强管理、降低戍本,继续提速改造、提高运输质量等措施,提高铁路的综合竞争力。     

Mobile tax base as a global common

If countries anticipate international Bertrand competition in tax rates, they may expend effort that makes some of their taxpayers less mobile or increases the mobility of taxpayers elsewhere. Piecemeal evidence on what activities countries use is provided. Such activities are analyzed that interact with Bertrand tax competition if the size of the groups of loyal and nonloyal citizens or investors is endogenous. Further, the implications of tax harmonization and minimum taxes for these types of nonprice competition are considered. Home attachment reduces the intensity of tax competition, but generates a strategic disadvantage for the country that invests much in such home attachment. Harmonization of taxes and high minimum taxes can intensify countries’ investment in home attachment.      

信息不对称条件下银行业市场结构与市场竞争研究综述

将信息不对称理论纳入银行业市场竞争模型是当前跨经济学与金融学两个领域的热点问题。本文从理清产业组织理论中银行业市场结构与竞争和现代金融学中银行业信息不对称研究的发展脉络出发,对信息不对称与银行信息垄断和市场进入壁垒、信息不对称条件下银行的市场竞争行为等文献进行综述,评估银行业市场竞争程度的测量方法和实证分析结果。希望此综述对未来进一步的研究有所启示。     

装备制造企业动态能力评价及其实证研究

阐释了装备制造企业动态能力的概念内涵与构成要素,设计出由市场感知、组织学习、资源获取、重构与转变、协调与控制5个动态能力一级指标和20个二级指标组成的评价指标体系,采用AHP法确定指标权重。针对指标度量的模糊性与不确定性,建立了证据推理的数据融合方法,并对江淮汽车集团动态能力进行了实证分析。     

Optimal insurance in the presence of reinsurance

This paper studies an optimal insurance and reinsurance design problem among three agents: policyholder, insurer, and reinsurer. We assume that the preferences of the parties are given by distortion risk measures, which are equivalent to dual utilities. By maximizing the dual utility of the insurer and jointly solving the optimal insurance and reinsurance contracts, it is found that a layering insurance is optimal, with every layer being borne by one of the three agents. We also show that reinsurance encourages more insurance, and is welfare improving for the economy. Furthermore, it is optimal for the insurer to charge the maximum acceptable insurance premium to the policyholder. This paper also considers three other variants of the optimal insurance/reinsurance models. The first two variants impose a limit on the reinsurance premium so as to prevent insurer to reinsure all its risk. An optimal solution is still layering insurance, though the insurer will have to retain higher risk. Finally, we study the effect of competition by permitting the policyholder to insure its risk with an insurer, a reinsurer, or both. The competition from the reinsurer dampens the price at which an insurer could charge to the policyholder, although the optimal indemnities remain the same as the baseline model. The reinsurer will however not trade with the policyholder in this optimal solution.