卖空的事前威慑、公司治理与高管隐性腐败

本文以我国融资融券的分步扩容为准自然实验,考察卖空的事前威慑对高管隐性腐败的治理效应及其作用机制,并分析不同公司治理环境下卖空机制作用的差异。研究结果表明,卖空的事前威慑能够有效抑制高管隐性腐败行为,显著降低在职消费水平,尤其是超额在职消费,并且卖空机制对高管隐性腐败的治理效应在国有企业中更为显著。进一步地,通过剖析卖空治理效应的作用机制,发现卖空机制加强了外部投资者和股东的监督作用,并促使公司提高了高管权益薪酬比重,使得高管与股东共担卖空导致的股价下跌风险,从而有效约束了高管的隐性腐败。此外,卖空机制的治理效应依赖于成熟的市场化环境,即只有在市场化水平较高的地区,卖空机制才能更有效地发挥其治理作用。而卖空机制与公司内部治理之间具有“替代效应”,当公司内部治理失灵时,卖空机制能够代替内部治理来规制高管的隐性腐败。本文不仅拓宽了卖空机制治理效应的有关研究,为我国放松卖空管制提供了微观的经验证据,而且为治理高管腐败提供了新思路。     

Corruption and natural resource rents: evidence from quantile regression

This study examines the impacts of oil rents on corruption for 157 countries. While existing studies have primarily focused on average effects, we employ quantile regression to estimate the effects of natural resource abundance for different corruption levels. We consider the effects of natural resource rents, mainly oil rents and then compare them with those of total and non-oil natural resources rents. The estimation results show that, generally, more oil rents increase corruption. Specifically, impacts are larger in countries with an intermediate level of corruption and smaller in highly corrupt countries. While total resource rents increase corruption significantly, non-oil resource rents do not. This may be due to non-oil resource rent management (mainly inland) being more subject to public scrutiny. Non-oil natural resources are concentrated in the less-developed sub-Saharan African countries, where corruption is prevalent; therefore, the impacts of natural resource rents are unremarkable.     

Political uncertainty and international corruption

This article uniquely considers influences of political uncertainty on corruption. Political uncertainty disturbs existing corrupt (and legal) contractual relations inducing greater corrupt activity to strengthen existing alliances and foster new ones. Results across two measures of cross-national corruption show that political assassinations increase corruption in different variations and time periods, and a general index of political instability mostly has the same effect. The influences of other factors on corruption are in general accord with the literature. These findings are generally robust to consideration of alternate dimensions of political uncertainty.     

Who gets caught for corruption when corruption is pervasive? Evidence from China’s anti-bribery blacklist

This article empirically investigates why in a corruption-pervasive country only a minority of the firms get caught for bribery while the majority get away with it. By matching manufacturing firms to a blacklist of bribers in the healthcare sector of a province in China, we show that the government-led blacklisting is selective: while economically more visible firms are slightly more likely to be blacklisted, state-controlled firms are the most protected compared to their private and foreign competitors. Our finding points to the fact that a government can use regulations to impose its preferences when the rule of law is weak and the rule of government is strong.     

Is the cure worse than the disease? The effect of emerging market MNEs on host country corruption

In recent years, there has been an exponential increase in the amount of foreign investment by emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs). While it has been debated whether EMNEs strengthen or weaken the institutions in host countries they invest in, the literature has paid limited attention to how EMNE investment impacts corruption in other emerging markets, one of the most significant destinations of EMNEs. Following Hoskisson et al. (2013), we categorize two types of emerging markets as targets of EMNE investment, a) low-income emerging markets and b) middle-income emerging markets, based on their institutional and market development. Building on the theory of firm-specific advantages (FSAs) and the institutional advantage (IA) of EMNEs, we reason that EMNEs enter foreign markets in accordance to where their skills and competencies can be effectively utilized, and this impacts corruption in the host country. We make two key arguments: (1) EMNEs predominantly use their IA in low-income emerging markets, which in the long term increases corruption in the host market, and (2) EMNEs predominantly use their FSAs to gain competitive advantage in middle-income emerging markets, which decreases corruption in the host market. Empirical analysis of Chinese outward FDI from the 2008-2018 period supports our hypotheses. Our research contributes to both the literature on EMNEs and corruption.     

Pilferage from opaque food subsidy programs: Theory and evidence

Theft rates from subsidized food programs vary greatly and strongly influence program efficiency. Unfortunately, the determinants of these variations remain understudied because the agencies that run these programs seldom publicize the allocations of subsidized food to local markets. We develop a theoretical model of pilferage which predicts that: (i) pilferage from opaque programs is likely to rise more than proportionately with per capita food allocations; (ii) pilferage of inferior goods may be lower in poorer communities; (iii) pilferage rates need not rise as price subsidies are increased; and (iv) pilferage may rise as the relative quality of subsidized food is reduced. A comprehensive literature review and new estimates of pilferage across regions of the Philippines validates these predictions. Our finding, that around 48% of the subsidized rice went missing, is robust to new tests for sampling and recall error. Our policy discussion encourages geographic over administrative targeting, greater transparency in food allocations, and the use of realistic quotas.     

腐败会抑制市场化程度吗？——基于省际面板经验分析

本文研究了腐败对市场化的作用机制及影响程度，认为市场竞争机制在腐败的作用下扭曲了企业的行为，使企业之间产生了不公平竞争，最终导致市场竞争机制无法实现优化资源配置能力。此外，本文对全国各省份的面板数据进行实证分析，结果表明：腐败对市场化进程产生显著的抑制作用，而且腐败滞后期的系数绝对值比当期腐败系数的绝对值小0．001，这意味着腐败对市场化的影响具有一定的持续性，在腐败行为不被打击的情况下，腐败对市场化影响的衰退速度较慢。     

科研经费腐败社会网络:属性、类型与结构

由于管理者和使用者分离,集体腐败逐渐演变为科研经费腐败行为的主流形式,越来越多地呈现出社会网络的相关结构及特征,因而可以将嵌入载体和运作路径作为解析科研经费腐败网络的两个重要变量。嵌入载体表达的是腐败网络建构和生成的场域,以此区分科研经费腐败行为中不同个体之间的联结机制究竟是通过公共权力还是私人关系,而运作路径则用于区分行为主体实施腐败的过程是直接或是间接。根据这两项重要变量,可以划分出4种不同结构的科研经费腐败网络类型,即公职人员自体腐败网络、公共组织寻租网络、科研人员自体腐败网络以及科研人员—中介网络,这4类科研经费腐败网络较为全面地概括出了当前我国科研经费腐败的共谋方式,据此提出了科研经费腐败防治的相关对策建议。     

Foreign direct investment in emerging markets and acquirers’ value gains

We investigate the shareholder wealth effects of 306 foreign direct investment (FDI) announcements by UK firms in seventy-five emerging markets (EM). Our results show that acquirers enjoy highly significant gains during the announcement period of FDI. Perhaps surprisingly, the highest gains are accrued to acquirers investing in countries with high political risk and high corruption ratings. The type of asset acquired has also a significant effect on the gains of acquirers’ shareholders, with the highest gains accrued to acquirers of physical assets. Also, investments in physical assets in EM with a high corruption rating elicit the highest gains. We contend that UK firms following resource-seeking strategies in EM with a high corruption rating are facilitated access to resources on favorable terms and this is viewed positively by the market participants. Our results are robust to alternative model specifications and the endogenous choice to expand internationally.     

新农村建设中的新型经济违纪与腐败及其治理

由于取消农业税后,乡镇发展受到财政资金瓶颈制约,在新农村建设中,各地乡镇政府纷纷将目光投向国家各项政策性专项资金。一种新型的腐败行为——乡镇申报国家支农建设项目资金过程中的寻租逐渐被越来越多的单位和部门以及个人觉察并被广泛利用。本文运用寻租理论和新制度经济学对该新型腐败行为从现象到本质进行了深入的理论分析,并提出了治理对策。