On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers

In this paper, we develop a model of law enforcement with the possibility of corruption between enforcers and potential offenders. We study how the violation rate changes with the level of the fine imposed on violations. We find, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, that the fine level that minimizes violations can be intermediate rather than large. We then study conditions under which different fine levels would be optimal.      

The “grabbing hand” or the “helping hand” view of corruption: Evidence from bank foreign market entries

This study adopts a resource perspective to explore a non-linear relationship between corruption and two measures of bank foreign market commitment, the capital invested and the share of equity, on a sample of 131 bank entries in forty host countries. Our findings support a U-shaped relationship providing evidence of the “grabbing hand” view at low to moderate levels of corruption and, supporting the “helping hand” view at high levels of it. In addition, market-seeking motives are found to have a positive moderating effect on this relationship. This study contributes to the long-standing debate about the effects of corruption on FDI.     

GLOBALIZATION AND CORRUPTION CONTROL IN ASIAN COUNTRIES: The case for divergence

The globalization of corruption has given rise to the concern in many countries on how to combat corruption and many international conferences on this topic. However, in spite of the sharing of ‘best practices’ in fighting corruption at these conferences, there is still a great deal of divergence in combating corruption in Asian countries because of the different contextual constraints and the effectiveness of their governments' anti-corruption strategies. This article describes and evaluates the three patterns of corruption control in six Asian countries and concludes that the third pattern of anti-corruption laws with an independent anti-corruption agency adopted by Singapore and Hong Kong is the most effective.     

Corporate entertainment expenses and corruption in public procurement

Viewing corporate entertainment of public officials as a form of bribes, Korea recently adopted a strong regulation against such practice (the Antigraft Act of 2016). In this paper, we investigate whether the regulation succeeded in reducing corruption in public procurement. An examination of the procurement system in Korea suggests that bribe-paying firms submit lower bids to procurement auctions than non-bribe-paying firms and that the difference in bid aggressiveness between bribe-paying and non-bribe-paying firms can be used as an indicator of the prevalence of corruption. Using the bidding data of firms participating in Korea Online E-Procurement System (KONEPS) auctions, we document that this indicator of corruption declined after the new regulation was adopted. We conclude that the new regulation reduced the entertainment-expense channel of corruption in public procurement.     

银行信贷监审中的合谋腐败问题研究

商业银行是一个典型的层级组织,存在多重委托代理问题,内部合谋腐败问题非常严重,本文以Laffont和Tirole所提出的P-S-A三层级代理硬信息约束模型为分析框架,分析了诚实但成本高昂的监审人员、廉价但会腐败的监审人员、廉价但会腐败和诚实但成本高昂的监审人员三种情况存在的信贷活动,研究作为代理人的银行信贷经理和信贷监审者之间可能合谋的问题,指出了可能会引致腐败的内部监审仍然是必要的,而只依赖于高成本但有效的外部审查缺乏效率,并相应地给出了一些建议。     

Corruption in Asia: Pervasiveness and arbitrariness

How does one understand the differences and similarities of corruption among various Asian countries? We use a recent framework developed by Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, and Eden (2005) to suggest that corruption has to be examined from two different dimensions: pervasiveness and arbitrariness. Using this framework, we ask why some Asian countries are able to achieve high levels of economic growth in the midst of high level corruption while other countries suffer from economic stagnation. We specifically suggest that more firms would bribe when pervasiveness is high, while fewer firms would bribe when arbitrariness is high. We also look into the implications on foreign direct investment.     

Host-country governance, tax treaties and US direct investment abroad

We investigate how the quality of the host-country governance and a bilateral US income tax treaty affect the rates of return that US companies require on their foreign direct investment (FDI). Using indexes of corruption and political instability, we find that poor governance causes the companies to require significantly higher rates of return. This lends support to earlier authors who have concluded that poor governance discourages both local investment and inward FDI. After accounting for the quality of host-country governance, however, no evidence could be found that an income tax treaty has any effect on the required rates of return.      

加强廉政建设遏制腐败现象

通过对加强廉政建设的重要性，腐败现象的本质及造成原因的分析，提出了解决腐败现象的措施。     

Corruption: Theory and evidence from the Russian Federation

In this paper, we provide theory and evidence on the problem of corruption in the Russian Federation. Our theoretical model indicates that in the presence of official corruption, the numbers of tax inspection (collection) employees could be inversely related to per capita tax collection. Our empirical analysis supports our theoretical model, shedding light on one of the most intractable problems in the Russian Federation.