Former Communist party membership and bribery in the post-socialist countries

We study the effect of former Communist party membership on paying bribes to public officials and motivations for bribery, 25 years after the fall of communist rule. Data come from a large representative survey, conducted in post-socialist countries in 2015/16. To deal with endogeneity, we instrument party membership with information on whether family members were affected by the Second World War. Instrumental variable results suggest that links to the former Communist party increase the likelihood of paying bribes today; this result applies to the former party members as well as their children and relatives. Among bribe payers, people with the party links are more likely to offer bribes as well as think that bribe payments are expected. Overall, our findings suggest that the proclivity to corruption of the former Communist party members has been transmitted through family and thus sustained over time, contributing to corruption decades after the demise of the Socialist bloc.     

Modelling the dynamics of corruption and unemployment with heterogeneous labour

This paper presents an endogenous growth model with heterogeneous labour, endogenous unemployment, and public sector corruption. Unlike most previous studies, the model does not separate public officials and private individuals into two distinct groups. Instead, taking up bureaucratic appointment as a public servant is modelled as an occupational choice, which then allows for the endogenous determination of the proportion of public officials, the share of corrupt officials among them, and the public investment efficiency of the economy. The dynamics of endogenous corruption and unemployment are studied using numerical policy experiments based on a stylized representation of a middle-income African economy with high corruption and unemployment. The main finding is that, large-scale public infrastructure push has no effect on raising growth in an economy with high corruption. However, if preceded by social and anti-corruption policies that successfully induce a structural change, it will then be effective in raising growth.     

The role of auditing in the fight against corruption

The purpose of this paper is to analyze how various types of auditing may contribute to fight corruption. While previous literature has primarily addressed auditing's ability to prevent corruption, this paper systematically explores auditing's potential to detect corruption. It argues that financial auditing has excluded corruption from the definition of fraud and instead classified it as ‘non-compliance with laws and regulations’. The main arguments for this exclusion is that corruption leaves no material errors in financial statements and no evidence for the auditor to follow. The paper refutes this, arguing that commercial and political corruption creates misstatements in the financial statements of the corruption giver's organization as well as the corruption receiver's organization. Thus, if auditing is to gain a more prominent role in the fight against corruption, auditing standards must include corruption in the definition of fraud, private and public sector auditors need to cooperate and exchange information, auditing techniques to detect corruption should be employed, and the auditing profession must embrace effective preventive measures such as anti-corruption certifications.     

How does anti-corruption affect firm labour inputs? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China

This study investigates the impact of anti-corruption on firm labour inputs. Using the province-by-province rollout of the central inspection team campaign in China, we find that the labour intensity rises by 9% in the firms located in the provinces inspected by the central inspection teams. Moreover, firms with low corruption are more susceptible to the policy shock.     

The transition of corruption institutions and dynamics

The paper analyzes the strong but complex relation between corruption and development. The corruption/honesty index is explained by three variables measuring aspects of development: Income, Polity and Fraser (for Economic Freedom). The last two indices represent the political and the economic system. Two problems arise: (i) Development is a common factor in all four variables, giving the variables strong confluence, so it is difficult to sort out the contribution of each explanatory variable. However, kernel regressions on the corruption/income scatter give a well-defined long-run transition path, which permits an identification of the specific contributions of institutions to corruption. (ii) The correlation of corruption to the first difference of the three development variables is negative. This gives a substantial lag in the corruption/income relation in the form of wide J-curves, but the main direction of causality is still from development to corruption. High income and modern institutions cause low corruption after some time. The corruption/development-relation is a fuzzy but strong long-run connection.     

Business corruption in Ukraine: A way to get things done?

Corruption at the firm level is a very complex issue better understood within its cultural, national, and historical contexts. Using Ukrainian firms as an example via two data sets from 2013 (n = 625) and 2015 (n = 120), we describe two types of corruption: (1) the abuse of power by individuals or groups for private gain, and (2) abuse of power by CEOs and general managers not for their own private gain, but for the gain of other individuals or groups. The latter abuse of power—either within or beyond the existing rules, laws, and norms—is often the only way to get things done in Ukraine. On the other hand, corruption might also be used to hinder business activities. This ambivalent function is the main challenge in mitigating corruption.     

Corruption control,shadow economy and income inequality: Evidence from Asia

Developing countries often suffer from high corruption, high income inequality and poor institutional arrangements that give rise to large shadow economies. Earlier evidence shows that shadow economies moderate the negative effects of corruption on income inequality in highly unequal South American countries. For Asia, we show that the persistence of shadow economies raises inequality even if corruption control is strong. Supported by static and dynamic panel data analyses of 21 countries in Asia between 1995 and 2015, we show that in order to combat rising inequality, corruption control must be complemented by the ability to translate secondary and tertiary school enrolment into industrial and, more importantly, service sector jobs. Countries with low corruption but high inequality can reduce inequality by committing to higher public consumption expenditures. Further, combining greater trade openness with low corruption lowers inequality, except for countries in South Asia.     

“Alcohol Bans”: Can they reveal the effect of Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign?

China is perceived to be one of the most politically corrupt countries in the world. Chinese government officials establish firm ties with trusted people through lavish banquets with flowing alcohol, providing privileged access to scarce resources like licenses, land, bank loans, subsidies, and government contracts. In China, Baijiu, the most popular grain liquor at these parties, works as the currency of bribery and is the lubricant for political connections for corruption. Xi Jinping's anti-corruption policy, known as the “Alcohol Bans,” has targeted Baijiu in an attempt to stop the boozy banquets, and, consequently, to bring an end to this channel of political networking. This paper employs the event study approach and connects cumulative abnormal stock returns of high-end Baijiu companies with the impact of the Alcohol Bans. It applies the difference-in-difference method to rule out unobserved reasons for stock market changes. The result is unchanged in both the efficient market hypothesis test and the abnormal return test. We consider if Baijiu may be substituted for other luxuries, and find little evidence for such “substitution effects.” Our work concludes that the Alcohol Bans has partially contributed to Xi's anti-corruption campaign.     

政府清廉对资本外逃的影响性分析

随着中国社会经济体制改革的不断深化,资本外逃问题越来越受到理论界的关注。本文在测算中国(1995~2003年)资本外逃数额的基础上,探讨了影响资本外逃的因素,认为资本外逃只与政府清廉指数存在着显著性影响,而对资本外逃与政府清廉指数的计量分析来看,两者之间有“倒U”型关系且中国资本的资本外逃数目已经过了峰值,所以加强政府廉正建设,必然最终会减少资本外逃。     

试论“村治”新廉政监督机制：户代表会议制度

传统乡村治理模式存在着乡村公共信息不透明等诸多问题,导致村民作为自治主体无法实现对村委会等乡村自治组织的有效监督,乡村腐败问题日趋严重;而户代表会议制度,则通过建构一种协商民主的机制,将村民主体导入乡村公共事务管理之中,其廉政监督机制对乡村腐败治理有着积极作用。