Commentary on “The role of innovation in driving the economy: Lessons from the global financial crisis”

This commentary reacts to an article by Hausman and Johnston advocating innovation and entrepreneurship as keys to solving the current global financial crisis published in this special issue. The commentary is a valuable resonance board for my own ideas that, in some respects, deviate from those of the authors. I start from a partially different paradigm than the authors, as my theoretical platform is a new science of marketing and service that emerged during the 2000s. I find many of the suggestions logical and thoughtful, but primarily academic and US-centric. Will they work in practice, and especially on a global scale? I think the suggested solutions will work under certain conditions, but the world is imperfect and the necessary conditions are often absent. For example, the article shows confidence in the ability of governments to regulate and control and of research to contribute with more advanced metrics. Here I have doubts. I also find economic and management disciplines require new aspects for proposed solutions to work. Among these new aspects are the lack of genuine corporate social responsibility, growing corruption and crime, and the role of financial leaders whose behavior opened a new research field called “corporate psychopathy.”     

Contextual analysis of legal systems and their impact on trade and foreign direct investment

Differences among nations in legal tradition play a role in foreign direct investment decisions by multinational firms. How large a role and to what degree these factors impact the success of foreign direct investment are important issues for examination. A principal question is whether macro-differences in legal systems are causal for international investment on a stand-alone basis or subordinate to multiple other legal variations and societal considerations. This article examines the historical roots and nature of varying legal systems, traditions, and cultures that continue to affect international business. The study analyzes other major conditions which surround the legal environment in investment target countries such as system transparency, degree of corruption, adequate enforcement, and issues of bias related to foreign-owned firms. In addition, firms may have varying strategic objectives for foreign direct investment which may not be driven by short term profitability.     

Anti‐corruption agencies: Rhetoric Versus reality

The anti‐corruption successes of Singapore and Hong Kong have encouraged the establishment of strong, centralized anti‐corruption agencies across the globe. This study charts the emergence of anti‐corruption agencies (ACAs), and then examines recent experiences with these bodies in developing countries. We propose a set of criteria for assessing and explaining their performance. The analysis applies within strict limits to those countries that have established the minimum political, legal, and socio‐economic conditions for effective governance. Where these conditions are in place, success is possible. However, ACAs in poor and badly governed states are generally ineffective, if not actively harmful.     

Can self regulation work?: a story of corruption,impunity and cover-up

This paper analyzes the reputation-based incentives of a Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO) to detect and expose consumer fraud committed by its members, and the members’ incentives to bribe the SRO in exchange for a cover-up to avoid an external punishment. In a corruption-free benchmark, SROs are effective in detecting, exposing and deterring fraud only if exposure yields a reputation gain to the SRO, which depends on consumers inferences about the SRO’s type. However, if this case prevails the member can succeed in bribing the SRO in exchange for a cover-up and impunity. Despite this, a bribed SRO yields more vigilance and lower fraud than no self-regulation at all.      

跨国公司与东道国腐败程度相互影响机制研究

本文对于跨国公司所面临的腐败问题做了一个探索性的研究,首先指出发展中国家普遍存在的腐败问题会对进入该国的跨国公司产生影响;然后给出跨国公司与东道国制度环境(腐败)相互影响的机制;接着论述跨国公司在东道国的分公司的特殊角色,指出在应对腐败现象时它同时受到多方面的影响;第四部分论述东道国的腐败现象通过哪些方式会给跨国公司造成影响,产生成本;最后论述跨国公司又是通过怎样的途径反过来影响东道国的腐败商务环境的。     

The incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development

Economic development and bureaucratic corruption are determined jointly in a dynamic general equilibrium model of growth, bribery and tax evasion. Corruption arises from the incentives of public and private agents to conspire in the concealment of information from the government. These incentives depend on aggregate economic activity which, in turn, depends on the incidence of corruption. The model produces multiple development regimes, transition between which may or may not occur. In accordance with recent empirical evidence, the relationship between corruption and development is predicted to be negative.     

司法腐败的成本研究

在一个法官根据贿赂的相对大小来决定判决结果的腐败的法律制度的背景下．我们通过一个公共品的自愿提供的模型．讨论了司法腐败对经济行为的影响及其产生的成本。司法腐败的存在使得参与人合作联盟形成时．每个参与人都需要交纳一笔额外的费用。这笔费用反映了司法腐败所造成的成本．其作用是在司法腐败的背景下使合约变得有约束力。我们发现．虽然司法腐败会造成相当大的成本．但在一定条件下．并不会妨碍公共品的提供数量达到在完美法律制度下所能达到的社会最优水平。     

Sais work against corruption in Scandinavian,South-European and African countries: An institutional analysis

International pressures on Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) to fight corruption are increasing. Nevertheless, SAIs lack a clear mandate and may appear ineffective in their anticorruption work. Using an institutional approach, this paper compares the cases of seven SAIs from Scandinavian, South-European and African countries to better understand how these institutions perceive their role in fighting corruption. Our article demonstrates that the way SAIs organize their work cannot simply be explained by the countries' level of corruption. Rather, efforts to fight corruption reflect the ways in which coercive, mimetic and normative pressures interact with institutional logics to guide the SAIs' work. We conclude that the influence of INTOSAI still appears to be limited, and it needs increased institutional recognition if it is to be effective in harmonizing SAIs' work worldwide to fight corruption.     

政治制度和市场广度对经济绩效影响的理论和实证分析

本文运用计量经济学理论中的最小二乘方法,建立了政治制度、市场广度和经济绩效三者之间的线性关系模型。通过分析35个国家的跨国数据样本,得到以下结论:政治制度和市场广度决定了一国的经济绩效。若其他条件相同,一国的腐败程度和二元经济程度越高,其经济绩效越差;另一方面,一国的国内市场与世界市场的融合程度越高,其经济绩效越好。最后,本文针对我国经济的发展提出若干政策建议。     

Does corruption affect health outcomes in the Philippines?

We examine the effect of corruption on health outcomes in the Philippines. We find that corruption reduces the immunization rates, delays the vaccination of newborns, discourages the use of public health clinics, reduces satisfaction of households with public health services, and increases waiting time at health clinics. We also find that corruption affects public services in rural areas in different ways than urban areas, and that corruption harms the poor more than the wealthy. The research underlying this paper was supported by a grant from the World Bank, financed by the Netherlands Trust Fund.