The effect of openness on corruption

The seminal paper on the subject of corruption and trade is from Kruger (1974). She finds that quantitative trade restrictions shift resources from directly productive activities to rent seeking activities, such as corruption. This paper analyses the relationship between corruption and trade using corruption estimates and trade measures from multiple sources. The majority of empirical evidence supports a negative relationship between corruption and openness; however, this does not hold for all the data sets available. The estimated relationship seems to depend on the choice of the corruption index. Therefore, the data only provide weak support for the contention that trade restrictions increase corruption.     

A Eurasian Economic Vision for the Twenty-first Century

Widespread corruption in mainland China adversely affects the overall economy in general and international business in particular. Prior to the establishment of the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) in 1974, corruption was also rampant in Hong Kong. The ICAC effectively cleaned corruption in Hong Kong within a short period of time. Hong Kong's success in this area has prompted the Chinese government to learn from Hong Kong's experience. This article reviews the factors that contributed to Hong Kong's success in fighting corruption and discusses whether China can learn from the Hong Kong experience. From this, we can conclude that, first, Hong Kong's experience demonstrates that a corruption‐prone culture can be changed in a relatively short period of time; second, in order for China to learn from Hong Kong's experience, there must be substantial changes in China's political and economic institutions.     

Disintegration of Russian Grain Markets in Transition: Political and Economic Dimensions

Between 1990 and 1996 the share of interregionally traded grain in the total amount of grain domestically available in the Russian Federation was reduced significantly. Much evidence indicates that the decline of the domestic grain trade has mainly been the result of strict control by regional authorities following their own agricultural market policy, of a lack of market institutions, and of uncertain macroeconomic conditions, thus creating a favourable environment only for increasing barter trade. In addition to the weakness of the federal government, which has not been able to enforce the basic rules necessary for the development of a functioning domestic market, the outcome of privatisation of state grain marketing organisations has accelerated the emergence of fragmented Russian grain markets. Regional authorities have managed to gain control over the newly privatised enterprises. This has facilitated the creation of regional monopolies and the isolation of local markets. In addition, increasing transaction costs in interregional trade due to the rise of barter trade have led to a contraction of the trade volume. After the financial crisis of 1998 these disintegrative tendencies have been strengthened further. In this difficult situation only close cooperation between reform-oriented regions can help to create conditions which facilitate the emergence of a domestic grain market in the long run.     

Crime and corruption in transitional economies: lessons for Cuba

Trends in aggregate crime rates across Europe reveal significant increases in crime in transitional countries. We identify causal mechanisms associated with the economic transition. Historical experience of corruption in the Soviet Union is reviewed, and connections between corruption and transition are analyzed. We apply the results to Cuba's current circumstances, examining the potential for growth in crime and corruption in Cuba and suggesting policies to ameliorate it.     

地方官员行为与经济发展:一个分析框架

本文在对地方官员行为的相关文献进行分析的基础上将影响官员行为的多个方面,即财政分权、政治晋升和腐败,构建了一个统一的分析框架。利用这一分析框架,我们考察了不同因素对官员行为(主要是努力和腐败)的影响,并得到了相关命题。与那些只研究一方面因素对地方官员行为影响的文献相比,利用我们的框架得到的结论更加全面。     

Incentives and corruption in chinese economic reform

This paper argues that, given the legacy of Chinese communism and its political structure, corruption, together with the threat of punishment for corruption and the selective enforcement of this threat, serves as a method of compensation that both satisfies the political objectives of the Communist Party and provides an effective inducement to local officials to promote economic reform.     

Corruption in the Context of International Business

Abstract

Corruption is widely accepted in the popular press as a problem for economic development and in conducting international business. Yet, it remains somewhat under-researched, particularly in an academic setting. This article describes corruption in the context of international business. It presents a critical evaluation of the conceptual and methodological issues associated with corruption. In doing so, it portrays the inherent complexities in studying this topic. The paper ends with recommendations for addressing the main concerns.     

Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore

This paper examines cultural differences in individual decision-making in a corruption game. We define culture as an individual's accumulated experience, shaped by the social, institutional, and economic aspects of the environment in which the individual lives. Based on experiments run in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta) and Singapore, we find that there is a greater variation in the propensities to punish corrupt behavior than in the propensities to engage in corrupt behavior across cultures. Consistent with the existing corruption indices, the subjects in India exhibit a higher tolerance of corruption than the subjects in Australia. However, the subjects in Singapore have a higher tolerance and the subjects in Indonesia have much lower tolerance of corruption than expected. We conjecture that this is due to the nature of the recent institutional changes in these two countries. We also vary our experimental design to examine the impact of the perceived cost of bribery and find that the results are culture-specific.     

Corruption and wage inequality?

Does corruption aggravate wage-inequality? We try to answer this question in terms of a general equilibrium model where both skilled and unskilled workers participate in corruption. Corruption in our model diverts resources from the productive sectors. Factor intensities within the productive sectors and between production and corruption activities determine the wage impact of corruption. Lower degree of corruption may increase wage-inequality although the size of the corruption sector definitely contracts.     

英国《反贿赂法》对跨国公司合规提出新挑战——严格责任及其抗辩

在反商业贿赂的法律领域,相比这一领域的"鼻祖"美国《反海外贿赂法》,英国最新实施的《反贿赂法》在具体制度上有了新的发展。《反贿赂法》规定了公司的严格责任,即除非能够证明已经采取"充分措施"防止贿赂行为,公司将为代表其行事的第三方的贿赂行为承担责任。《反贿赂法》具有域外效力,对中国公司的跨国经营提出了挑战。英国执法机构为《反贿赂法》的合规提供了指南,一些国际组织也准备了类似文件,本文据此对跨国公司合规的措施提出了建议。