政治制度和市场广度对经济绩效影响的理论和实证分析

本文运用计量经济学理论中的最小二乘方法,建立了政治制度、市场广度和经济绩效三者之间的线性关系模型。通过分析35个国家的跨国数据样本,得到以下结论:政治制度和市场广度决定了一国的经济绩效。若其他条件相同,一国的腐败程度和二元经济程度越高,其经济绩效越差;另一方面,一国的国内市场与世界市场的融合程度越高,其经济绩效越好。最后,本文针对我国经济的发展提出若干政策建议。     

论我国股份制商业银行发展的若干问题

股份制商业银行高速扩张造成潜在的金融风险加大.应转变股份制商业银行的发展模式,从以资产规模增长为中心的发展模式转变到以提高资本收益为中心的发展模式上来.股份制商业银行要做好市场定位:从防范金融风险的角度而言,把服务对象定位于中小企业;从空间定位角度而言,应定位于名副其实的地方性或区域性的银行.股份制商业银行要完善公司治理结构应做到:一是切实加强对中小股东利益的保护;二是要加强制度建设,抑制金融腐败.     

Tracking the international proceeds of corruption and the challenges of national boundaries and national agencies: the UK example

ABSTRACT

Corruption is a major inhibitor to economic growth, discouraging to domestic and foreign investment and destabilizing of governments. Unsurprisingly, international attention has intensified in recent years with global initiatives to counter corruption and address the proceeds of corruption. These have placed requirements upon national governments to increase transparency, reducing opportunities for use of the legitimate legal and financial infrastructure to disguise and move the proceeds of corruption. This paper reviews the boundaries at national and agency level that can create challenges for those agencies tasked with investigating and returning the proceeds of corruption to the countries from which they came. The paper considers the mechanisms that the agencies in a returning country—the UK—have at their disposal and whether national policy changes can affect their focus and operation. Specifically it reviews the role and future of the International Corruption Unit of the National Crime Agency.     

Competition and corruption in an agency relationship

The paper reconsiders the relationship between competition and corruption in a model, where corruption has solid informational foundations and where the regulatory response to the possibility of corruption is taken into account. It is shown that the effect of greater competition on corruption depends on the complementarity or substitutability of the two instruments available to decrease information rents, namely low powered incentives and greater competition. The paper concludes with a brief empirical exploration of the relationship between competitiveness and corruption on African data.     

论明朝初期的重典治贪制度

重典治贪是明朝初期朱元璋重典治国思想的重要组成部分。朱元璋从明朝的统治实践出发,采取各种有效措施,严格治贪,以身作则,有效遏制了明朝初期贪污现象的发生。对今天的反腐倡廉工作有所启迪。     

政治收益、经济贿赂与经济绩效：一个新古典政治经济学模型

目前研究政治对经济影响的大量文章都利用锦标赛模型分析官员激励如何影响经济绩效,但这些模型仅仅假设府官员只是追求政治晋升最大化,而且对经济领域的行为分析太少。我们通过将追求货币收入也纳入官员的目标函数,在构造了一个带约束的古诺模型的基础上,将官员政治激励嵌入其中,并以此分析了官员对自己精力和时间的分配如何对经济绩效产生影响。尽管我们没有利用应用锦标赛模型,但是本文的模型也可以解释大多数政治晋升现象,而且由于我们丰富了经济领域的行为人（企业）行为,从而可以解释更多的现象如官员的经济腐败、政府采购以及“高薪养廉”等。     

Introduction to the Special Issue

This special issue, “Developing the African Continent: Selected Issues,” is the outgrowth of a conference held in Gaborone, Botswana, August 19–21, 2008 sponsored by the Institute for Economic Policy Studies (IEPS), Worcester Massachusetts, USA. The theme of the conference was, “Developing the African Continent: Who is in Charge?”     

e-Relationships for e-Readiness: Culture and corruption in international e-B2B

The role of electronic networks in B2B relationships has been growing exponentially. From massive internet B2B exchanges to tiny RFID chips, B2B is increasingly becoming e-B2B. Whilst e-B2B has been explored intra-nationally, its international counterpart is less well documented; as has been the role that culture might play in the development of international e-B2B relationships. In this paper we address this important issue of international e-business relationships. Specifically we explore the interconnection between national e-readiness and cultural values, and address the research question: How do cultural values impact a nation's readiness to engage in e-business? Drawing upon international surveys we link cultural values with national e-business infrastructure. Our findings suggest an intriguing link between cultural values and a nation's readiness for e-B2B. From these results we develop managerial recommendations and extrapolate research opportunities.     

Opportunism, corruption and the multinational firm's mode of entry

The paper develops a theoretical approach to the boundaries of the multi-national firm in the context of institutional constraints in host countries, focusing especially on corruption. The model incorporates two types of corruption: petty bureaucratic corruption and high-level political corruption. The model predicts that-in the absence of corruption-multinational firms will prefer FDI (internal expansion with strong control rights) to debt (arm's length expansion with loose control rights), the weaker the host country's ability to commit. However, both types of corruption shift the trade-off marginally toward debt. Cross-country panel empirical evidence supports these conclusions. Corruption has a second order marginal effect and matters mostly through its interaction with political risk.     

Seize the state, seize the day: state capture and influence in transition economies

Data from the 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey is used to examine state capture and influence in transition economies. We find that a capture economy has emerged in many transition countries, where rent-generating advantages are sold by public officials and politicians to private firms. While influence is a legacy of the past inherited by large, incumbent firms with existing ties to the state, state capture is a strategic choice made primarily by large de novo firms competing against influential incumbents. Captor firms, in high-capture economies, enjoy private advantages in terms of more protection of their own property rights and superior firm performance. Despite the private gains to captor firms, state capture is associated at the aggregate level with social costs in the form of weaker economy-wide firm performance. Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (4) (2003) 751–773.