我国利率政策效果的实证检验及改革取向

我国一度连续降低利率,但对分流资金、刺激需求的作用并不明显,期间存在一些利率外的因素使政策效果受到了影响。通过对利率政策做一实证分析以明确利率变动对经济发展的影响程度,探讨利率政策效果的制约因素,从而给出改革建议。     

解析存款保险与中央银行LLR的关系

我国将建立存款保险制度已是不争的事实,但国内学术界对有关存款保险制度组织形式问题的研究还不够深入,绝大多数仅局限于对国外现有的存款保险制度的优缺点加以比较分析,或是对相关文献做一些整理综述的工作,即使有个人观点,也是描述性地加以阐述.本文借鉴不完全契约理论,从微观经济学角度出发,分析了在不同条件下,存款保险与中央银行LLR之间的关系,得到了比较有意义的结果.从方法论上讲,这与前人的工作有很大的不同.最后,根据本文模型,作者提出了对我国存款保险制度组织形式选择的个人观点,并指出模型有待进一步改进的地方.     

房地产市场和消费市场对储蓄分流效应的实证研究

近年来储蓄存款一直快速增长,虽然最近证券市场的繁荣暂时对储蓄存款形成了较为显著的分流作用,但是,一旦证券市场趋势逆转,流向证券市场的储蓄资金很快就会回流.因此,研究储蓄存款在证券市场之外的分流具有重要意义.消费市场交易和房地产市场交易虽然没有很强的储蓄分流效应,但是具有长期影响.尤其是房地产市场的影响,更值得关注.     

优先处置存量高风险金融机构对建立存款保险制度的作用分析

存款保险制度对保护存款人利益、完善金融机构市场退出机制、维护金融稳定具有重要的作用。但是,客观存在的高风险金融机构,可能会给即将建立的存款保险制度带来一定的压力。本文通过借鉴国际上引入存款保险制度之初,各国处置存量高风险金融机构的经验,提出我国建立存款保险制度,应首先考虑化解高风险金融机构的风险。     

论汇率的决定机制、波动区间与政策搭配

本文论证了汇率的可行波动区间是由经济因素、国际政治经济博弈共同决定的；提出了大国之间在汇率问题上的博弈，只是大国经济关系再调整的一个反映，并据此得出了各方在人民币汇率问题上的博弈具有长期性的结论；本文指出，汇率的可行波动区间应选取在公共区间的右侧，以期实现国内经济、国际收支、国际政治经济博弈的三重均衡；在总结日本与德国经验教训的基础上，提出在货币升值的过程中，应采取适度从紧的财政政策与货币政策，避免短期内的大幅升值，维持较高的实际利率，防范不动产资产对于银行存款的过度替代，防止出现严重的不动产泡沫。     

存款准备金率调整对商业银行流动性创造的影响研究——基于互联网金融冲击的情境

商业银行的超额准备金与法定存款准备金都存放在中央银行的特定账户上。二者之间此消彼长的关系,决定了中央银行可以依托调节存款准备金率来影响商业银行的流动性创造行为。本文着眼于存款准备金率政策实施的动态过程,通过整理2011—2018年20家商业银行的非平衡面板数据,采用系统广义矩估计(System-GMM)方法进行动态面板回归模型估计,考察以P2P为代表的互联网金融快速发展对大型国有银行与中小银行流动性创造的冲击与影响,实证研究证实存款准备金率对我国商业银行的流动性创造行为会产生显著影响。互联网金融的发展虽然对不同银行流动性创造水平的抑制存在一定的异质性差异,但是对银行总体流动性创造能力具有一定的抑制作用,因此会在一定程度上削弱存款准备金率政策作用效果。     

Deposit insurance and credit union lending

We exploit an exogenous change in the coverage of insured deposits following the passage of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (2008) to investigate the impact of deposit insurance on the volume, composition and quality of credit union lending. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find changes in the volume, composition and riskiness of credit union lending. Specifically, we find that affected credit unions increase total and unsecured lending, leading to a decline in loan quality. Overall, our results suggest that an increase in the maximum coverage of insured deposits induces credit unions to lend more at the expense of loan quality.     

Leaving the darkness: The emergence of shadow banks

This paper studies the interaction between bank capital regulation, moral hazard and co-existence of traditional and shadow banks. Bank managers can choose between traditional banking and off-balance sheet special purpose vehicles (SPV), in a setup with deposit insurance and moral hazard. We first show that in the absence of SPV intermediation, capital requirements are ineffective at preventing the moral hazard problem originated by deposit insurance. We find that shadow banks can improve financial stability, when there is full information sharing. Finally, we analyze the case of neglected tail risk. We find that under such circumstances, the SPV will increase financial risk by exposing the system to extreme events.     

Deposit insurance system,risk-adjusted premium and bank systemic risk: Evidence from China

In this paper, we investigate whether and how the Deposit Insurance (DI) system and its Risk-adjusted Premium (RAP) scheme affect the systemic risk of Chinese banks. Based on bank-level panel data from 2007 to 2020 and the difference-in-differences (DID) method, we find that the establishment of the explicit DI system in China increases bank systemic risk, while the implementation of RAP alleviates this negative impact by reducing systemic risk. We further find the mechanism behind this phenomenon that bank profit acts as a mediator. We also find evidence for international heterogeneity using cross-country data and show that, as China has a longstanding implicit government guarantee, the establishment of explicit DI actually reduces the extent to which banks are protected, thus increasing bank systemic risk. Our study highlights the specificity of Chinese DI system, offers important policy implications for the design of financial safety nets in China and worldwide.     

Blessing or curse? Government funding of deposit insurance and corporate lending

A key policy to limit the possibility of bank runs is an explicit deposit insurance scheme, which can be either privately or government funded. Using syndicated loans from 63 countries during the period 1985–2016, we study the effect of government involvement in deposit insurance funding on price and non-price characteristics of loans. We show that changes from purely private-funded to either government-funded or jointly funded deposit insurance increase all-in-spread-drawn by approximately 4.6 %, further increase loan fees, decrease loan maturity, and increase the use of performance pricing provisions. Our findings are consistent with the moral hazard problem behind government-funded deposit insurance schemes.