Cross-border banking and financial stability in the EU

This paper examines the implications that alternative regulatory structures may have for resolving failed banking institutions. Emphasis on the European Union (EU), which is both economically and financially large and has several features relating to cross-border banking in the form of direct investment that may heighten the problems we consider. To ensure the efficient resolution of bank failures with minimum, if any, credit and liquidity losses a four step program should be followed. This includes prompt legal closure of institutions before they become economically insolvent, prompt identification of claims and assignment of losses, prompt reopening of failed institutions, and prompt re-capitalizing and re-privatization of failed institutions. These policies together with a prompt corrective action system could be voluntarily adopted through the use of deposit insurance premium discounts as an incentive.     

市场约束与银行风险承担的文献回顾

市场约束是指银行的利益相关者出于时自身利益的考虑,会在不同程度上关注银行的经营和风险状况,并根据其掌握的信息采取一定措施影响相关的利率和资产价格,从而通过市场对银行的经营产生约束作用.市场约束是维护银行业稳定的重要机制.巴塞尔协议Ⅱ的新的监管框架中把市场约束与资本监管、政府监督共同作为有效银行监管的“三大支柱”,同时2006年底中国也全面开放了银行业市场,市场对中国商业银行风险承担的约束作用也越采越大.本文系统的回顾了国内外关于市场约束对商业银行风险承担的影响,包括市场约束的存在性、存款保险、政府监管对市场约束作用的影响以及危机时的市场约束,这对我国商业银行市场约束作用的发挥具有很好的借鉴意义.     

存款保险制度诱发道德风险的理论解析

存款保险制度的设计必须考虑到对市场约束、银行稳定性、金融发展和解决金融危机的影响,还要因地制宜地考虑一国的制度和契约环境。在没有解决好信息与监管环境缺陷的条件下,仓促实施显性存款保险制度将会后患无穷。本文对西方近年来的相关研究成果作一管窥,以期有助于中国特色的存款保险制度的审慎设计与适时出台。     

A contingent claim analysis of a rate-setting financial intermediary

Realizing that a financial intermediary's lending, treated as an investment opportunity, is like a financial call option clarifies the role of uncertainty. We argue that the portfolio-theoretic approach and the firm-theoretic approach have important linkages that can be used to demonstrate the contingent claim analysis of a rate-setting financial intermediary. Borrower-intermediary-lender relationships between the portfolio-theoretic combined volatilities and the firm-theoretic rate-setting modes under the Black-Scholes valuation are investigated, and the conclusions depend upon the portfolio composition redistribution effect. The effect of changes in the open market security rates on the loan rate and deposit rate settings depend on the borrower-intermediary-lender relationship, portfolio risk, and management of rate-setting strategy. Moreover, movements in open market security rates are not necessarily transmitted to the loan lender and deposit absorber.     

我国银行存款保险制度的路径选择研究

明确存款保险制度应当作为我国金融安全的重要组成部分。基于风险定价的存款保险费应当由政府和银行共同承担。政府提供的隐性存款保险随着存款保险制度完善逐步减少,为银行积累资本赢得时间。银行应当通过充实资本,降低存款保险费,为实施明确存款保险创造条件。我国最终应当建立信息透明、市场机制主导、政府严格监管、风险处置及时的明确存款保险制度。     

存款人市场约束机制研究

与股东和债权人相比,存款人时银行的市场约束一直以来相对较弱.文章首先回顾了有关存款人市场约束的相关文献,然后利用数学模型分析了影响存款人市场约束力度的因素,在此基础上对我国商业银行加强市场约束提出了相应的建议.本文的创新之处在于将影响存款人市场约束力度的主要因素及其相互关系纳入一个模型中进行综合讨论,从而对加强市场约束机制进行了比较全面的分析.     

Market discipline in the Central American banking system

The hypothesis of market discipline is empirically verified in the Central American banking system. A contrast is carried out on whether the riskier banks (the ones with the worst banking fundamentals) pay higher interest rates and receive smaller amounts in deposits. The generalized method of moments is used for dynamic panel data models (the SYS GMM estimator), as well as a sample of 30 banks from six Central American countries during the 2008–2012 period. Unlike the majority of the previous empirical literature, specifically for developed countries, no evidence of market discipline was found in Central America. The results are robust for several indicators of the banking fundamentals for purposes of internal demand of bank capital, and for other econometric models. These findings indicate weaknesses in the bank policy regarding the disclosure of information.     

当前我国货币政策工具选择的依据及运用

2010年我国调整了实施两年多的宽松货币政策,宣布2011年实行稳健的货币政策。使货币政策从宽松转向稳健的最直接原因是目前我国物价上涨加快,资产泡沫化加剧,通胀预期上升。但是,紧缩货币政策工具的力度除了考虑国内物价因素以外,还应考虑到国际因素。当前,外围主要经济体增长率下滑、失业率高企,因而当前甚至今后一段时间内,央行在使用紧缩货币政策工具收紧流动性、防止资产泡沫风险时,应把握好节奏和力度,以防经济硬着陆风险。     

How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis

Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks which lead to excessive risk-taking. We examine the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to and during the recent financial crisis. We find that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Our findings suggest that the “moral hazard effect” of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the “stabilization effect” of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. The overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample we study remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, we find that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability.     

经济增长的背后理论研究

经典的经济理论强调生产资本积累与经济增长的关系,强调生产资本积累和劳动投入的增加对经济增长的动力作用。尽管经济学家们在未来发展的取向上提出了诸多经济增长的理论,见解不一,然而很少有人从经济增长的背后入手,解释经济增长的根本原因。为此,本文从经济增长的背后理论出发,论述储蓄、投资、政府与技术进步对经济增长的作用,并提出了两个基本点：其一,经济是否获得增长,取决于国民改变未来趋向的能力;其二,经济增长的关键原因,取决于技术进步。论文以罗伯特·索洛（Robert Merton Solow）经济增长理论为框架,以美国经济现象为参照,阐述经济增长背后的理论。