影子银行强监管与银行风险承担——来自资管新规的证据

本文基于银行博弈视角研究资管新规对银行风险承担的影响,发现资管新规有效降低了银行风险承担水平,影子银行业务规模占比越大,风险承担水平下降越显著。相比于高流动性或地方性银行,低流动性或全国性银行风险承担水平下降更显著。机制检验发现,资管新规通过杠杆率渠道降低银行风险承担水平,通过存款利率渠道结构性地提升地方性银行风险承担水平,资产证券化中介效应不显著。进一步分析发现,资管新规降低了银行风险承担水平,会导致银行提升企业贷款占比与信用贷款占比。     

央行运用冲销工具的成本和影响研究

央行票据冲销外汇占款的微观成本在2004—2010年为盈利,从国内角度来说,央行使用央行票据冲销流动性的微观成本高于存款准备金率的微观成本。央行票据和存款准备金率对宏观经济的影响利弊共存,但就冲销流动性的效果而言,央行票据使用更为灵活,存款准备金率的冲销力度更大。     

Blessing or curse? Government funding of deposit insurance and corporate lending

A key policy to limit the possibility of bank runs is an explicit deposit insurance scheme, which can be either privately or government funded. Using syndicated loans from 63 countries during the period 1985–2016, we study the effect of government involvement in deposit insurance funding on price and non-price characteristics of loans. We show that changes from purely private-funded to either government-funded or jointly funded deposit insurance increase all-in-spread-drawn by approximately 4.6 %, further increase loan fees, decrease loan maturity, and increase the use of performance pricing provisions. Our findings are consistent with the moral hazard problem behind government-funded deposit insurance schemes.     

Market discipline in the Central American banking system

The hypothesis of market discipline is empirically verified in the Central American banking system. A contrast is carried out on whether the riskier banks (the ones with the worst banking fundamentals) pay higher interest rates and receive smaller amounts in deposits. The generalized method of moments is used for dynamic panel data models (the SYS GMM estimator), as well as a sample of 30 banks from six Central American countries during the 2008–2012 period. Unlike the majority of the previous empirical literature, specifically for developed countries, no evidence of market discipline was found in Central America. The results are robust for several indicators of the banking fundamentals for purposes of internal demand of bank capital, and for other econometric models. These findings indicate weaknesses in the bank policy regarding the disclosure of information.     

刍议我国商业银行流动性过剩问题

长期以来,由于受体制性信贷膨胀及信贷资产质量的影响,我国商业银行一直存在着流动性不足的问题。但从近年国内金融的运行情况来看,我国商业银行流动性过剩问题日渐突出。基于此,本文分析了我国商业银行流动性过剩的成因及影响,提出了解决我国商业银行流动性过剩问题的政策建议。     

How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis

Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks which lead to excessive risk-taking. We examine the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to and during the recent financial crisis. We find that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Our findings suggest that the “moral hazard effect” of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the “stabilization effect” of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. The overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample we study remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, we find that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability.     

我国银行存款保险制度的路径选择研究

明确存款保险制度应当作为我国金融安全的重要组成部分。基于风险定价的存款保险费应当由政府和银行共同承担。政府提供的隐性存款保险随着存款保险制度完善逐步减少,为银行积累资本赢得时间。银行应当通过充实资本,降低存款保险费,为实施明确存款保险创造条件。我国最终应当建立信息透明、市场机制主导、政府严格监管、风险处置及时的明确存款保险制度。     

浅析我国存款保险制度的构建

世界范围内目前已有110多个国家先后建立了各自的存款保险制度.随着我国利率市场化改革的推进,迫切需要建立存款保险制度.我国应根据具体国情,由政府出面依法建立具有中国特色的存款保险制度.     

存款人市场约束机制研究

与股东和债权人相比,存款人时银行的市场约束一直以来相对较弱.文章首先回顾了有关存款人市场约束的相关文献,然后利用数学模型分析了影响存款人市场约束力度的因素,在此基础上对我国商业银行加强市场约束提出了相应的建议.本文的创新之处在于将影响存款人市场约束力度的主要因素及其相互关系纳入一个模型中进行综合讨论,从而对加强市场约束机制进行了比较全面的分析.     

宏观审慎视角下存贷期限错配流动性风险的识别与控制

存贷期限错配的流动性风险存在顺周期性与传染性,有必要从宏观审慎视角分析存贷期限错配流动性风险与系统性风险的关系。通过测算期限错配流动性缺口,对我国商业银行业资产占比很大的15家商业银行的存贷期限错配流动性风险进行识别,得出存贷期限错配流动性风险是2013年\"钱荒\"事件发生的重要导因的结论。采用适当的变量并通过面板回归模型分析,能够识别存贷款期限错配流动性风险的主要宏观影响因素和微观影响因素。因此,应从国家金融管理部门的外部控制和商业银行的内部控制两个方面控制存贷期限错配的流动性风险。