我国审计定价影响因素的实证研究

审计定价与注册会计师的独立性和审计质量息息相关.通过运用2006年沪、深两市上市公司的实证数据对我国审计定价影响因素进行实证研究,结果表明:非审计费用未影响审计定价,董事会规模、董事会勤勉与独立性、事务所品牌、企业规模和子公司数目等直接影响审计定价.     

Board Connections and Dividend Policy

We examine the role of firm board connectedness in shaping a firm's dividend policy. We show that firms with well-connected boards not only have a higher likelihood of paying dividends in the pooled sample of both dividend payers and non-payers but also pay more dividends in the sample of dividend payers, compared with those with poorly connected boards. Further analysis reveals that the relation between board connectedness and dividend-paying behaviour tends to be economically stronger in firms pre-identified to have more severe agency conflicts, suggesting that well-connected boards tend to use dividends to mitigate agency problems in these firms. These findings are robust to different measures of board connectedness, different dividend payout measures, alternative estimation methods, and tests that account for endogeneity.     

技术董事、技术资源配置与企业成长:来自上市公司的经验数据

选取2012-2017年上市企业为样本,探索技术董事对企业成长的驱动效应及技术资源配置的中介作用,以解读技术董事、技术资源与企业成长的多重关系。研究发现：技术董事对企业成长具有显著驱动效应;技术董事对技术资源规模具有一定的放大效应,且能够改善技术资源配置质量;进一步讲,技术资源配置规模与质量是技术董事与企业成长之间的部分中介变量。立足于创新发展现实情境,以上结论可为处于创新十字路口的中国企业董事治理及技术培育提供一定参考借鉴。     

国有资本管理体系的完善及财务问题探讨

本文根据产权理论,构想国有资本管理体系,建议设置中央和地方人大国有资产监督管理委员会,分别对中央、地方的国有资本管理实施监督.建议设立国有资本的非执行董事制度,并对国有资本的财务运行机制进行了深人地探讨.     

独立董事制度有效性与控股股东关联交易——来自深交所制造业上市公司的经验数据

基于2002～2008年深交所制造业上市公司的证据,本文以控股股东与上市公司之间的关联交易作为研究对象,结合独立董事所占比例、专业性和薪酬等基本特征,考察了独立董事能否有效发挥其监督职能。研究发现:独立董事的专业性对控股股东与上市公司的关联交易有显著的抑制作用,独立董事薪酬与控股股东与上市公司关联交易的频率显著正相关,独立董事的比例对控股股东与上市公司关联交易没有显著影响。这些结论有助于我们从新的视角去改进我国上市公司独立董事制度以提高其监督制约控股股东的职能。     

Director Compensation and CEO Bargaining Power in REITs

We analyze director compensation for Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and investigate the relations between director compensation and other measures of the board independence and board monitoring. Using 136 REITs in 2001, we find that REITs that pay higher equity-based compensation to their board members are associated with higher financial performance. Our data indicate that board equity-based compensation is positively related to the existence of an independent nomination committee, however, it has no significant relationship with board size, proportion of outside directors, CEO duality and CEO tenure and ownership.

在Director中用Lingo语言实现视频播放器的方法

在用Director开发设计多媒体课件时，为了实现对视频文件的正常播放控制，可用Lingo语言来设计视频播放器。本文提供了一种设计方法，这种方法具有编程简单、容易移植的特点，在多媒体课件的开发设计中有一定的参考价值。     

欧盟EuPs指令对发展中国家贸易的影响及因应策略

2007年8月11日实施的欧盟用能产品生态设计框架指令（EuPs指令）引起我国政府和企业的普遍关注。该指令对发达国家与发展中国家存在质的差异，对发达国家更多地是一项技术标准，而对发展中国家则是一项技术性贸易壁垒（TBT）措施或是一项技术壁垒（TB）。应针对该指令作为TBT对发展中国家的影响进行理论分析，并为我国企业提出因应对策。     

Critical uses of research in business marketing

Research into business markets and marketing operations can have very high payoff when applied critically in high leverage situations. Five characteristically high leverage situations are identified and discussed. They are: high cost decisions, major new activities, business strategy, marketing productivity, and the creation of new knowledge and theory. Mentioned are encouraging new academic and professional activities that are likely to have significant impact on the discipline.     

Is there an association between director option compensation and the likelihood of misstatement?

Oversight bodies in the United States (US) have addressed the issue of director independence in recent years. Bebchuk et al. [Bebchuk, L., Grinstein, Y., Peyers, U. (2006). Lucky directors. (Working paper Harvard University Law School) SSRN # 952239.] found that director oversight may be impaired if directors receive option grants under favorable terms because these grants may create a mutuality of interest between directors and managers. We assess whether option grants to independent directors reduce oversight of financial reporting. Using a sample of 105 US firms that misstated their revenue matched with a sample of non-misstatement firms, we find that companies whose independent directors do not receive stock options are less likely to misstate revenues than companies who meet the Sarbanes-Oxley definition of independence. Our results show that compensating outside directors with stock options may weaken their independent oversight.