CDS as insurance: Leaky lifeboats in stormy seas

What market features of financial risk transfer exacerbate counterparty risk? To analyze this, we formulate a model which elucidates important differences between financial risk transfer and traditional insurance, using the example of Credit Default Swaps (CDS). We allow for (heterogeneous) insurer insolvency, which captures the possibility that relatively risky counterparties may exist in the market. Further, we find that stable insurers become less stable as the price of the contract decreases. The analysis includes insured parties that have heterogeneous motivations for purchasing CDS. For example, some may own the underlying asset and purchase CDS for risk management, while others buy these contracts purely for trading purposes. We show that traders will choose to contract with less stable insurers, resulting in higher counterparty risk in this market relative to that of traditional insurance; however, a regulatory policy that removes traders can, perversely, cause stable counterparties to become less stable. We conclude with two extensions of the model that consider a Central Counterparty (CCP) arrangement and the consequences of asymmetric information over insurer type.     

How to get banks to take less risk and disclose bad news

There is wide agreement that before the recent financial crisis, financial institutions took excessive risk in their investment strategies. At the same time, regulators complained that banks did not reveal the extent of their difficulties in a timely fashion thus reducing the effectiveness of government intervention to prevent or mitigate the deleterious effects of the financial crisis. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how regulators can best use certain tools at their disposal to motivate banks to take less risk and to provide adverse information to regulators early. We argue that two tools, namely (i) allowing bank payouts to equity holders even when banks report they are in trouble and (ii) constraining banks’ future investment strategy when they are in trouble can achieve both goals. We show that, in some cases, it is optimal to use both of these tools in combination. That is, in such cases it is optimal to allow equity payouts when banks report they are in trouble, even though such payouts increase the incentive for banks to take excessive risk and even though these payments are financed by taxpayers. We also show that the more socially costly is constraining the bank’s portfolio selection or the more complex are the bank’s assets, the more likely it is that allowing larger payouts and fewer constraints is optimal. Finally we discuss how changes in bank capital requirements interact with inducing disclosure and preventing excessive risk taking.     

Voluntary disclosure in a bargaining setting: A research note

We conduct an experiment on voluntary disclosure within a simple bargaining setting wherein a proposer must choose one of two possible offers and a responder chooses whether to reject or accept that offer. In one treatment the proposer has the option to disclose whether a fairer (more equal) offer was available relative to the one chosen. Under standard economic theory, a responder will interpret no disclosure to mean the proposer's offer was the less fair alternative, and so a proposer who is making the fairer offer will disclose. In consequence, voluntary disclosure should perform as well as mandatory disclosure in motivating proposers to make fair offers. Given their rejection rates, we find responders properly infer the meaning of non-disclosure. However, despite the correct inferences made by responders, proposers submit twice as many fair offers with mandatory disclosure than with voluntary disclosure. Our results suggest that the choice of voluntary versus mandatory disclosure has consequences for resource allocation within the firm even though under standard assumptions about preferences it should not.     

Corporate social responsibility reporting in financial institutions: Evidence from Euronext

The legitimacy, the identity and the social impact of financial institutions go beyond the generation of revenues for providers of capital, through financial intermediation. Financial institutions bear significant corporate social responsibility (CSR). We produce measures of CSR disclosure and explore the determinants of CSR disclosure practices in a cross section of financial institutions. Working with financial companies whose stocks are listed in the Euronext stock exchange, we find that the extent of disclosure of CSR practices is greater in large companies and also in companies of greater financial leverage. Therefore, increased corporate visibility and financial risk increase stakeholder demand for transparency on the social impact of financial institutions and their CSR practices.     

How does investor relations disclosure affect analysts' forecasts?

We study the relationship between investor relations disclosure and analyst forecast properties in Australian firms, a setting dominated by small firms with limited analyst coverage and requiring continuous disclosure of price sensitive information. We find increasing disclosure in the time period investigated is associated with greater accuracy in firms disclosing fewer items. Disclosure was unrelated to forecast dispersion, possibly due to the low analyst following. In periods of uncertainty, the investor relations awards effectively discriminated quality from quantity of disclosure. These findings highlight the importance of active communication with analysts, particularly in firms providing less disclosure and during periods of uncertainty.     

The effects of analyst forecasts and earnings trends on perceptions of management forecast credibility

We examine whether analyst forecasts influence investors’ perceptions of the credibility of a good news management earnings forecast. We hypothesize that the effect of analyst forecasts will depend on whether the analyst forecast confirms management’s forecast and the extent to which management’s forecast is consistent with the prior earnings trend. Findings indicate that the positive effect of a confirming analyst forecast is greater when the management forecast is trend inconsistent than when it is trend consistent. The negative effect of a disconfirming analyst forecast does not differ based on management forecast trend consistency.     

信息披露、寻租与政府补贴有效性

采用深交所信息考评结果作为信息披露质量的代理变量,考量政府补贴的寻租行为及其有效性。实证显示,信息披露质量较低的企业,获得的政府补贴更多,但政府补贴无益于企业绩效和社会绩效的提高,从而支持了企业寻租假设。结果表明,信息透明度的提高有助于政府补贴资金的有效配置,提高社会整体福利。     

The disruptive potential of PWLAN at the country-level: The cases of Germany,the UK,and the USA

This paper analyzes the impact of WLAN technologies for incumbent MNOs based on an empirical cross-country study of the players in the public WLAN-hotspot market using the theory of disruptive innovation and theoretical extensions for the industry- and country-level. The main research question to be analyzed is whether and why PWLAN has shown a disruptive or sustaining impact trend for incumbent MNOs in the hotspot markets of Germany, the UK, and the USA in recent years. The results imply that incumbent MNOs and new entrants have taken advantage of the opportunity provided by PWLAN, but the market success of both types of players varies between the countries analyzed. Incumbent MNOs dominate in Germany but not in the UK and the USA. The reasons for these country-specific differences were further investigated, and the results suggest that the analysis of disruptive potential in telecommunications needs to include country- and firm-specific factors, which are, again, largely influenced by the local regulation.     

The deployment and penetration of high-speed fiber networks and services: Why are EU member states lagging behind?

One of the most controversial regulatory issues in Europe (and elsewhere) is whether the emerging next-generation access (NGA) infrastructure should be subjected to cost-based access regulation or whether at least a temporary removal of ex ante obligations (“regulatory holidays”) should be granted. Likewise, the role of NGA-specific state aid policies is increasingly capturing the attention of policy makers and the academic literature.     

Why Muddy the Water? Short selling and the disclosure of proprietary information

The conventional wisdom of voluntary disclosure literature is that the major factor preventing firms from disclosing customer-related information is firms' concern for proprietary costs. However, non-disclosure may also happen when firms have bad news to hide and are concerned about short sellers using customer information to verify bad news about the firms. By implementing a difference-in-differences research design against the backdrop of the deregulation of short selling in China, we find that increased short-selling pressure discourages firms from disclosing the identities of major customers. The findings also reveal consistent evidence supporting the bad news hoarding hypothesis rather than the proprietary cost hypothesis. Overall, our study provides an alternative explanation for firms’ lack of disclosure of customer information.