Reducing the plate waste of families at hotel buffets – A quasi-experimental field study

Twenty percent of all global greenhouse emissions are food-related. Tourism and hospitality contribute significantly, with food accounting for nearly half of the waste these sectors produce. One type of food waste – plate waste – could easily be avoided. Plate waste is the food people leave behind uneaten on their plates. It does not increase the enjoyment of the meal, yet costs the hotel money, and harms the environment. We develop and test – in a quasi-experimental field study – a game-based intervention that reduces plate waste by 34 percent, and is available for immediate adoption by hotels globally. Our study contributes to theory by demonstrating the power of increasing pleasure in pleasure-seeking contexts when aiming to change environmentally significant tourist behaviour. Our findings also challenge established behavioural theories, which postulate that people's beliefs are the key drivers of pro-environmental behaviour.     

Convertible tranche in securitization

It is essential to motivate a banker in order to diligently screen borrowers if the banker has the option to securitize its loans and sell part of it to outside investors. Based on theoretical analysis and experimental research, we propose that issuing a convertible tranche in securitization can not only motivate a banker to exert greater effort to screen loans, but also lead to higher prices for selling tranches. A convertible tranche can also increase the sale proportion of the loan pool under the condition of ensuring socially optimal effort, thereby increasing more social surplus than a static tranche. The optimal convertible proportion is positively related to the natural proportion of high-default-risk borrowers, the borrowers’ default possibilities, and the screening cost. The value of the convertible option is higher in an economic downturn. Consequently, not only should regulators formulate policies on the convertible proportion under consideration of the economic state, but also adopt a counter-cyclical policy.     

Always play against par? The effect of inter-team coopetition on individual team productivity

Current research lacks a deeper explanation of inter-team coopetition as a potential source of improved organizational performance on a micro-level. To fill this gap, our paper explores how inter-team coopetition influences individual team productivity. Building on social identity theory, we hypothesize that inter-team competition and inter-team coopetition both have a positive influence on individual team productivity with inter-team competition having a stronger influence. We further argue that organizational identification has a positive moderating effect on the link between inter-team coopetition and individual team productivity. To test our hypotheses, we conducted a laboratory experiment with 240 university students in which we simulated team scenarios using the puzzle board game Ubongo. Our findings confirm a positive effect of inter-team competition and coopetition on individual team productivity. In case of a high organizational identification, inter-team coopetition will boost individual team productivity further. Our paper improves the understanding of coopetition within the boundaries of the firm and the circumstances under which inter-team coopetition enhances individual team productivity and ultimately organizational performance. We also advance the literature on social identity theory by applying it to the organization’s micro-levels in the context of inter-team coopetition.     

Regulatory stringency and behavior in a common pool resource game: Lab and field experiments

Reducing deforestation is one of the key actions necessary to mitigate global climate change. However, in developing countries where there is low enforcement of regulations, it is often difficult to motivate conservation. This paper applies a common pool resource game to look at whether or not changing the level of permitted resource use (i.e. regulatory stringency) affects behavior in a low-enforcement environment. The experiments are conducted in both the lab and the field in Thailand. We study the impact of varying the rule on permitted resource use on resource extraction, individual payoff and payoff distribution. Three levels of resource use are studied – strict, moderate, and relaxed, corresponding to disallowing usage, allowing a moderate amount of use, and allowing a generous amount of use respectively. We find that in our settings, imposing a strict rule is not always the best strategy to manage a common pool resource. In fact, allowing a higher level of resource use yields more desirable social (more equitable payoffs distribution), economic (individual payoff), and environmental (remaining resource stock) outcomes. Thus, our findings suggest that in a low enforcement environment, the design of the rule itself could help motivate conservation behavior by allowing resource users to realize the economic benefits of conservation.     

Security Returns and Tax Aversion Bias: Behavioral Responses to Tax Labels

This article studies behavioral responses to taxes in financial markets. It is motivated by recent puzzling empirical evidence of taxable municipal bond yields significantly exceeding the level expected relative to tax exempt bonds. A behavioral explanation is a tax aversion bias, the phenomenon that people perceive an additional burden associated with tax payments. We conduct market experiments on the trading of differently taxed and labeled securities. The data show an initial overvaluation of tax payments that diminishes when subjects gain experience. The tax deduction of expenses is valued more than an equivalent tax exemption of earnings. We find that the persistence of the tax aversion bias critically depends on the quality of feedback. This suggests that tax aversion predominantly occurs in one-time, unfamiliar financial decisions and to a lesser extent in repetitive choices.     

财富约束、市场时机与融资行为的实验研究——优序融资和市场择时理论的行为元素提炼

本文使用实验经济学的方法研究了匿名交易市场中的融资行为,并检验了不同财富约束条件下融资啄序和市场择时理论的预测能力。在行为元素的提炼过程中,市场择时理论的预见在财富约束程度小于50%时得到了支持,此时行为人会根据市场时机选择最有利的融资方式;而融资啄序理论在财富约束程度大于50%时得到了验证。本文还发现人们的融资行为有较强的策略性合作倾向,受到收益波动程度的调节作用;融资方的二阶信念对他的风险态度与决策有部分中介效应。     

经验类隐性知识多阶隐性特征分析与演变模型构建

针对知识管理研究中存在的隐性判据单一问题,提出知识多阶隐性特征,从知识是否可见的单一判据逐阶扩展到结果、过程、情景等多个维度,对隐性知识进行更加明确清晰的界定和划分。然后,基于知识多阶隐性特征,从二维视角研究隐性知识从完全隐性到完全显性演变过程,提出经验类隐性知识演变二维体系模型,进而详细论述演变模型中隐性知识显性化过程的多阶内涵和特征。最后,通过企业实例验证模型的适用性和有效性,研究结论对于企业知识管理中的隐性知识表征、获取、共享等应用型研究具有重要意义。     

生态文明建设视角下国家可持续发展实验区资源配置评价

建设国家可持续发展实验区是实施可持续发展和生态文明建设的重要战略,对实验区资源配置效率进行科学评价可以为其提供重要决策依据。以生态文明建设为主线,兼顾社会经济发展目标,从优化国土空间格局、自然生态环保、资源节约提升及生态文明制度建设4个方面,统筹建立国家可持续发展实验区资源配置效率评价指标体系,运用数据包络分析方法构建国家可持续发展实验区资源配置效率评价模型,对实验区资源配置效率进行纵向和横向两个维度的评价。以湖北省国家可持续发展实验区资源配置为例进行实证分析,验证了模型有效性,可为衡量和提升国家可持续发展实验区建设水平提供决策参考。     

Strong reciprocity and team production: Theory and evidence

Punishment of shirkers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems and sustaining coordination in work teams. Explanations of the motivation to punish generally rely either on small group size or on a Folk theorem that requires coordinated punishment and, hence, highly accurate information concerning the behavior of each player. We provide a model of team production in which the punishment of shirkers depends on strong reciprocity: the willingness of some team members to contribute altruistically to a joint project and also to bear costs in order to discipline fellow members who do not contribute. This alternative does not require small group size, complex coordinated punishing activities, or implausible informational assumptions. An experimental public goods game provides evidence for the behavioral relevance of strong reciprocity and how it differs from unconditional altruism.     

Three very simple games and what it takes to solve them

We study experimentally the nature of dominance violations in three minimalist dominance-solvable guessing games. Only about a third of our subjects report reasoning consistent with dominance; they all make dominant choices and almost all expect others to do so. Nearly two-third of our subjects report reasoning inconsistent with dominance, yet a quarter of them actually make dominant choices and half of those expect others to do so. Reasoning errors are more likely for subjects with lower working memory, intrinsic motivation and premeditation attitude. Dominance-incompatible reasoning arises mainly from subjects misrepresenting the strategic nature (payoff structure) of the guessing games.