深化专业教学改革 打造合格应用型人才

做为二级学院首批教学改革试点专业的汽车运用和财务管理两个本科专业，在转换人才培养模式、培育应用型本科办学特色、提升教育质量上，做了许多开拓、探索性的工作，成为促进学院建设与发展、全面提高办学质量和市场竞争力的强劲动力。     

《机床电气设备及升级改造》工学结合课程的开发

本文阐述了哈尔滨职业技术学院电气自动化技术专业《机床电气设备及升级改造》工学结合课程开发的过程。从行业背景和人才需求调研入手,介绍了课程的性质及地位、课程设计理念与思路和课程内容、课程设计的特点、教学方法和手段以及教学设施等六个方面的内容。该课程已于2010年被评为国家精品课。     

公平偏好的博弈实验及理论模型研究综述

近年来的一系列博弈实验一致显示出人们具有公平偏好。现有描述公平偏好的理论模型要么强调收益分配公平、要么强调行为动机公平、要么强调收益分配和行为动机的综合公平。相比之下，基于收益分配公平的理论模型在假设的真实性和模型的可操作性之间取得了较好权衡，因而得到了广泛应用。公平偏好能够解释许多纯粹自利偏好不能解释的经济现象。结合中国人的性格特征和价值观念，建立符合我国文化和经济条件的理论模型，分析公平偏好在我国人文社会环境中对经济行为的影响，对促进我国经济理论研究和解决经济改革深层次问题具有重要意义。     

一种结构简捷的混沌调制保密通信系统电路

介绍了一种硬件实现较简单的混沌调制保密通信系统电路，并分析系统的同步原理，由编程计算对发射系统进行仿真，最后构建了相应的实验电路，在此基础上进行了传送音频信号的实验，给出了实验结果。     

电阻抗层析成象（EIT）系统的研究

本文提出一种新的获取图象重建数据的系统，该系统通过在模型边界的３２个电极上注入多种组合方式的自适应电流，然后测量相应电极上的电压值，再经过特定的算法处理，得到重构图象。同时介绍了系统的数学模型及算法原理。     

Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?

Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo, Sjöström and Yamato [Saijo, T., Sjöström, T., Yamato, T., 2003. Secure implementation: Strategy-proof mechanisms reconsidered. Working paper 4-03-1. Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University] argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria, including equilibria other than dominant strategy equilibria. For only a subset of strategy-proof mechanisms do the set of Nash equilibria and the set of dominant strategy equilibria coincide. For example, this double coincidence occurs in the Groves mechanism when preferences are single-peaked. We report experiments using two strategy-proof mechanisms. One of them has a large number of Nash equilibria, but the other has a unique Nash equilibrium. We found clear differences in the rate of dominant strategy play between the two.     

The importance of being informed: Experimental evidence on demand for environmental quality

To what extent does information affect the demand for environmental quality? A randomly selected group of households in an Indian city were informed whether or not their drinking water had tested positive for fecal contamination using a simple, inexpensive test kit. Households initially not purifying their water and told that their drinking water was possibly contaminated, were 11 percentage points more likely to begin some form of home purification in the next eight weeks than households that received no information. They spent $7.24 (at PPP) more on purification than control households. By way of comparison, an additional year of schooling of the most educated male in the household is associated with a 3 percentage-point rise in the probability of initial purification, while a standard-deviation increase in the wealth index is associated with a 12 percentage-point rise in this probability and an $11.75 rise in expenditure. Initially purifying households that received a “no contamination” result did not react by reducing purification. These results suggest that estimates of the demand for environment quality that assume full information may significantly under-estimate it.     

Whatever you say, your reputation precedes you: Observation and cheap talk in the trust game

Behavior in trust games has been linked to general notions of trust and trustworthiness, important components of social capital. In the equilibrium of a trust game, the investor does not invest, foreseeing that the allocator would keep all of the returns. We use a human-subjects experiment to test the effects of changes to the game designed to increase cooperation and efficiency. We add a pre-play stage in which the investor receives a cheap-talk message from the allocator, observes the allocator's previous decision, or both. None of these changes alter the game's theoretical predictions. We find that allowing observation results in substantially higher cooperation and efficiency, but cheap talk has little effect.     

谐波治理在卷烟行业变配电中的应用

本文主要介绍了谐波产生的原因及其危害,在此基础上,提出了治理措施,并进行案例分析。     

How luck and performance affect stealing

This paper investigates how the way of earning payoff affects the probability of stealing. The participants who earned their payoff according to performance were three times more likely to take the (undeserved) maximum payoff than participants with randomly allocated payoff. Conditional on stealing something, most subjects steal the full amount available.