On optimality in intergenerational risk sharing

Summary. This paper defines and studies optimality in a dynamic stochastic economy with finitely lived agents, and investigates the optimality properties of an equilibrium with or without sequentially complete markets. Various Pareto optimality concepts are considered, including interim and ex ante optimality. We show that, at an equilibrium with a productive asset (land) and sequentially complete markets, the intervention of a government may be justified, but only to improve risk sharing between generations. If markets are incomplete, constrained interim optimality is investigated in two-period lived OLG economies. We extend the optimality properties of an equilibrium with land and give conditions under which introducing a pay-as-you-go system at an equilibrium would not lead to any Pareto improvement. Received: October 5, 1998; revised version: April 3, 2001     

Information Flows across Markets: Evidence from China–Backed Stocks Dual–Listed in Hong Kong and New York

Using a bivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model, we examine patterns of information flows for China–backed stocks that are cross–listed on exchanges in Hong Kong and New York. Results analyzing the dual–listed stocks indicate significant mutual feedback of information between domestic (Hong Kong) and offshore (New York) markets in terms of pricing and volatility. Stocks listed on the domestic market appear to play a more significant role of information transmission in the pricing process, whereas stocks listed on the offshore market play a bigger role in volatility spillover.     

格莱明银行模式:基于关联博弈的分析

从关联博弈角度对格莱明银行模式进行了分析,认为格莱明银行小组贷款模式实现了贷款博弈与社会资本博弈的紧密结合,正是这种紧密关联博弈克服了成员贷款中的 "搭便车"行为.由于重复博弈的存在,社会资本成为一种可置信的威胁,保证了贷款协议的执行,成功克服了合约中产生的代理问题.格莱明银行模式对我国小额信贷激励机制的建立具有重要的参考价值.     

基于Internet的多通道用户界面

提出了网络多通道界面模型、语音和指点相结合的基于上下文的查询、基于主通道的整合策略,并将受限的自然语言(汉语)理解技术应用于多通道交互中。文章给出了两个实例:汉语语音驱动的多通道文件管理器和网上购物多通道界面的ActiveX控件。结果表明,以上技术有助于提高人机交互的自然性和效率。     

图书馆应发挥信息咨询中的优势

本文分析了信息社会图书馆信息咨询,信息服务中的优势,提出了有效发挥图书馆信息咨询优势的若干要求和对策。     

Computing equilibria of GEI by relocalization on a Grassmann manifold

An algorithm is described to compute equilibria of the general economic model with incomplete asset markets, that is, of GEI. The algorithm is based on the existence of a route of zeros of a homotopy whose domain includes the price simplex and a Grassmann Manifold. This route is followed, in effect, by localizing and following diffeomorphic pieces in Euclidean space, and by relocalizing as is necessary.     

浅谈会计信息供求的特殊性

会计信息作为一种特殊的商品和普通商品一样,也存在供给方和需求方,会计信息要实现其价值和使用价值,必须在供求双方之间进行交易,因此,会计信息也遵循一般商品的交换规律。但是,由于会计信息既具有公共物品的属性又具有私人物品的属性,所以在供求交换的过程中,又具有自己的特殊性。而正是这种特殊性,使得会计信息市场处于混乱状态,因此,探讨会计信息供求的特殊性具有重要的现实意义。     

西方现代股利政策理论及实证研究回顾

本文对西方现代公司股利政策方面的理论和实证研究进行了一个综合性的回顾和分析。其中包括主流的股利行为模型、股利的信息内涵、代理成本、追随者效应,也包括国内研究中较少涉及的债务约束、声誉学说、成长机会和交易成本问题,以期对国内相对落后的股利政策研究和随意性较强的股利政策制定带来一定的借鉴意义。     

Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information?

The model of public policy studied in this paper has heterogeneous citizens/voters and two public goods: one (roads) chosen directly by an elected policy‐maker, and the other (pollution) stochastically dependent on the amount of roads. Both a one‐country and a two‐country version of the model are analyzed; the latter displays externalities across the countries which create incentives for free riding and strategic delegation. The welfare effects of providing the policy‐maker with information about the relationship between roads and pollution are investigated, and it is shown that more information hurts some—sometimes even all—citizens. In particular, the opportunity not to create an institution for information gathering can serve as a commitment device for a country, although with the unfortunate effect of making the overall outcome even worse. Implications for the welfare effects of “informational lobbying” are also discussed.     

Average Monotonic Cooperative Games

A subclass of monotonic transferable utility (T.U.) games is studied: average monotonic games. These games are totally balanced. We prove that the core coincides with both the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler and the bargaining set à la Mas-Colell. To obtain this result a technique based on reduced games is used. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71